Over the last decade, Russian leadership has repeatedly floated public hypotheticals (including the Zapad military field exercises) in which nuclear threats (or, in their war games, simulated nuclear strikes) are used to deter NATO from operations “beyond the edge of the Russian empire” (such as majority-Russophone regions in the Baltic states), which is in keeping with an evolving strategy generally termed “escalate to de-escalate” in the West. In fact, where Western game theorists developed an intricate theory of nuclear deterrence vs compellance, the Russian literature refers to both using сдерживания, seeing threats to compel and threats to deter as functionally identical, strategically speaking. (Compare with the PLA’s “Science of Military Strategy,” both editions of which discuss the PLA’s nuclear arsenal in deterrent terms in the event of a general war in East Asia against Western forces.)
This is what unnerves game theorists about the Ukraine war and Russia’s poor performance there — if it weren’t for global public opinion (crucially China and India at this point), their doctrine certainly encompasses an escalatory demonstration strike (a tactical-yield weapon on a largely uninhabited area of farmland, for example) used to quickly “de-escalate” the war, freeze the lines at a position of relative Russian advantage, and force Ukraine into negotiations.
https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-military-doctrine-ca...
What Russian doctrine says this? This sentence is a complete fabrication.