Because symmetry. Criminals using e2ee are not going back.
Not to support the act, but your comment doesn't really address the issue.
If they want to investigate stuff, they should have to get warrants and literally send out operatives to physically compromise the targeted equipment. This puts a limit on the scale of government operations. This is how it's supposed to be.
According to you, which is OPs point exactly. The discussion needs to be framed in a way that stakeholders are walking in common ground, not yelling at each other at a distance from their respective ideological ivory towers.
FWIW I happen to agree with you, but IMO “this is how it’s supposed to be” is not a productive argument.
It's a devious exhaustion tactic and it's unethical (without commenting on the bill itself, which I find abhorrent to a free and just society)
We owe no apology to anyone. They're the ones trying to undermine the whole world's security and freedom. They've grown addicted to total access and want to maintain their power which they frequently abuse. Nothing will ever justify it, certainly not their constant "but it makes our job harder" sob story.
And sure, someone might follow up with "but I trust my elected officials/police/FBI/etc. not to abuse power". But then you can provide examples of times when that trust was misplaced. Or point out that elected officials are elected in and out and law enforcement officers quit/retire and are hired all the time, and the incoming people might not be so trustworthy.
So yeah, "this is how it's supposed to be in order to prevent the abuse of power" may not be a complete, ironclad argument, but it's a good jumping-off point to further discussion.
It is nevertheless, the correct argument that is at the heart of the issue.
It needs to be had over and over again until it finally gets through the bureaucrats heads that no; your convenience does not outweigh fundamental freedom from panoptic surveillance.
The only way for such an argument to proceed is to convince enough people that such a trade results in a world not being how it is supposed to be.
TL;DR: This argument lies on the "ought" side of Hume's is-ought distinction [0].
(This is also simplifying a bit, as there are cases where differing goals can have the same next steps. An apolitical example would be a temporary alliance in a board game, where you and I team up to stop a third player from winning. Our long-term goals differ, as each of us wants to win for ourselves, but our short-term goals align at stopping the third player.)
The Constitution Of the United States, which I believe in unswervingly-- was written at a time when privacy was the DEFAULT. Any person could walk into any building or any field and speak, anonymously to another person. It cost quite a bit to spy on someone and that was a natural limit to how much spying could be done.
The argument from the other side is always-- the framers didn't imagine a world where everyone is carrying around a device that spies on them and they didn't happen to imagine a dystopian future where people are paying corporations to spy on them with unimaginable devices, so, we should be allowed to do that.
Politely, fudge that.
(I do care, and like I mentioned in my original comment, I agree with the parent).
What does that mean?
Meanwhile, I don't really feel like there was much privacy back when the constitution was written. What makes you think there was?
Any type of eavesdroppi g would have to be done via tge post, which to this day has better confidentiality guarantees because USPS is one of the only service providers to which Third Party Doctrine does not apply for auto-negating expectations of privacy.
if you were investigated, it would have to be by a local law enforcement official. There was no cross-referencing of biometrics, fingerprints, or driver's licenses across state lines.
There were no license plates to track. When they were eventuallu implemented, it would be decades before data stores were implemented that allowed real-time tracking via ALPR.
It was, in fact, not a given or even remotely a given that it was considered technically possible to localize or pin down an individual without one or more individuals being engaged in the act of tailing.
There is no question that at the timeof the signing of the Constitution, the world had a much higher degree of privacy by default.
i think that's mostly right. i also take the controversial view that consumer encryption should have a front door for law enforcement. there should be a mechanism where if they are in possession of a valid warrant, and said warrant is validated by third party watchdogs, then they can enter into decryption protocol that will immutably log that the protocol took place in a public, yet cryptographically time embargoed location.
i don't agree with the idea of mass-surveillance data mining dragnets, i think they're constitutionally problematic, but on the same token, if a valid warrant has been issued, investigators need to be able to do their jobs and we as citizens need to be able to audit that said powers are not being abused.
but i will admit, this thinking is immature. the prevalence of information systems in our lives has resulted in the most detailed and rich records of human activity that have ever existed. this is new. on the flip side, advancements in communication have enabled all sort of new paradigms in crime that weren't really possible before. i suspect that getting all of this right will be quite difficult as we don't even fully understand how much the game has changed with these new technologies pervading our lives.
maybe there'd be some key at the root, but it doesn't have to be known.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AACS_encryption_key_controvers...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-bandwidth_Digital_Content...
There is no practical scenario where those who want to use e2e will not have that capability. Even if technology companies are totally banned from producing it domestically, it's trivial for foreign companies to provide the e2e software and supply it over the internet.
Thus, supporting an end around, can be attacked as well..
How about a good faith discussion of the fact that crime rates are at historic lows, or the fact that many crimes (burglary, car theft) are never investigated, or the fact that surveillance is never going to solve, let alone prevent the real issues that people care about, like domestic violence, gun violence, or the epidemic of prescription pain killer addiction.
Focus on crime prevention, not more law enforcement empire building.
You cannot really engage in criminal behavior exclusively via E2EE communication. Victim would use the communication as evidence. All the crimes you are talking about have an essential component outside E2EE communication, which means that detection and evidence gathering is possible without breaking E2EE.
I think that the tech community has extended entirely too much "good faith" towards a law enforcement and intelligence community who feel entitled to review and record all communication at their own sole discretion. I know you think that you're the "good guys", trying to keep us safe from "adversaries", but you have to understand that after the Snowden leaks, many people in the tech. industry don't see you that way. They see you as the diet-Coke version of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, and feel that if you were able to slip your legal bonds, you'd attack free speech just harshly as the Chinese Communist Party does.
Of course, from your perspective, it's not cracking down on free speech. It's "preserving democracy" by "suppressing misinformation" planted by "hostile adversaries" and "non-state actors".
Any office with excessive power will be a magnet for assholes. Excessive power will be abused.
Public policy orgs like EFF etc have proposed modifications to limit the most disastrous elements of this proposal but to the extent those proposals fix or limit the 'accidental' limitless liability for communications platforms, they are met only with disingenuous cries of "think of the children." I think it's pretty clear the lack of "good-faith discussion" lies with the people who've never openly acknowledged what all this is really about.
> even by those in the IC.
Hopefully the intelligence community, as opposed to the domestic law enforcement agencies, already understands how dangerous this legislation could be for U.S. national interests. The unintended consequences won't stop at social media. Platforms of all kinds will react to the liability exposure or merely the possibility of it. With other nations imposing their own in-country data requirements on trans-national platforms how many platforms (or their upstream technology providers) will maintain a separate insecure version for domestic tapping and a robustly secure version for international use? Just like our own backdoors being used against us, we've already seen how this kind of thing has a way of undermining our own security. Short-sighted bureaucrats are playing with fire here.
> too many folks defend their position from libertarian ideals
I don't see how this is tied to uniquely libertarian ideals. The 4th amendment prohibition on government search of citizen's "papers and property" isn't some aspirational ideal or partisan political viewpoint - it's always been at the very core of the nation. It's also been continuously endorsed by both liberal and conservative supreme courts for hundreds of years.
> that most folks in govt are just doing their job.
To the extent their actions undermine the constitution, it's no longer "law enforcement". Sadly, quite the opposite. If the law is the 'operating system', then the constitution is the 'secure kernel' - the last line of defense against both external AND internal threats capable of undermining the integrity of the entire system. Law enforcement has privileged accounts which are THE primary internal threat the secure kernel was designed to stop. From day one in the 1700s, the constitution has always made the job of law enforcement MUCH harder. That's not a bug. It's "As Designed" and perma-marked by the original designers (and the maintainers in SCOTUS) as "Won't Fix". Hell, it goes beyond just a feature - limiting the power of the government is the explicitly stated purpose of the thing - to the extent it puts a big fence around the few powers granted to government (with the barbs pointed inward) and grants everything else, mentioned or not, as powers granted to citizens.
It's always been well understood, as well as taught in elementary school, that the unique freedoms the country was founded on came with a cost - and sometimes that cost would be high, but... preserving these freedoms, including making things harder on law enforcement (and potentially easier on criminals), was worth the cost. I suspect congress is going to be surprised by how non-partisan (and non-negotiable) the fundamental integrity of the system is for most users.
What would a "solution" for the IC allow them to do, and what would be the limits on it? Would the IC stop asking to weaken encryption after it was granted?
"Meet us halfway" is meaningless if we don't know what halfway is or what the extent is of what you're asking for, and proponents of these bills never give an answer to that question because they don't have an answer to that question. Is "meet us halfway" on CSAM zero CSAM, because I've people advocate for that -- and if that's the position and any time that encryption gets in the way of that we need to compromise, then you are effectively asking to abolish encryption. Is it that there should never be any information that law enforcement can't access -- because if so, you're asking to ban encryption.
Others have pointed out (correctly) that law enforcement today has unprecedented tools to monitor civilians and catch criminals, everything from facial recognition (which has largely not been banned across America) to digital dragnets to public social media to cooperation with companies that hoover up tons of PII. We carry devices that allow law enforcement with a warrant to ask cell companies for the name and location of everyone inside of a radius. That is a frankly wild amount of power.
You have already been met hecking way more than halfway on the issue of privacy vs law enforcement, and it's just utterly dishonest to claim otherwise. What we're seeing is that on the one issue where law enforcement has less access than they used to have, that's suddenly an existential problem. And my takeaway from that is that what law enforcement is asking for is not to be met halfway, law enforcement is asking to weaken and disrupt literally any tool that makes their job harder in any way at all. Any technology that weakens their level of access to anything is an existential problem to them.
It is not Libertarian to ask for end to end encryption, that is a normal, moderate position for people across all political spectrums to take. The characterization of "maybe police shouldn't be able to access everything about me at time, including my location and every single one of my conversations" as a Libertarian view is just so utterly disingenuous and dishonest. So what is a halfway position where people in the government will stop calling to weaken encryption? I do not believe that position exists, and I have never heard anyone try to articulate it using measurable criteria that don't boil down to "we'll constantly balance and use the courts". I have never seen law enforcement as a unified group argue, "you know what, we have too much access here and maybe we should have less, and it's good that this technology makes our job harder." It doesn't happen.
There is not a solution to this problem that law enforcement will ever be satisfied with other than complete surveillance of everyone in the United States. And these are the people that whine that privacy advocates are "absolutists." I carry a hecking cell phone already; you have monitoring tools, stop acting like you don't. Stop pretending that an era of unprecedented surveillance at a level that has never before been seen in all of human history is actually super awful and hard for you because you can't also read every single text message I've ever sent across all of time.
Your points are well-heard, even by those in the IC. What isn't occurring, is a good-faith discussion on solving the issues faced by law enforcement and the IC related to the growing entropy of E2EE wielded at scale by folks, a large subset of whom are engaging in criminal behavior. I strongly believe that fighting this issue with a hard-line no compromise response will result in an undesirable outcome for your agenda.
I am not a fan of kneecapped cybersecurity in consumer endpoints, which is the elephant in the room. It's a compromise borne of the E2EE entropy problem, intentional or not. I don't support unchecked recoverable encryption in any centralized fashion, nor do I support covert backdoors or skeleton keys.
Unfortunately, too many folks defend their position from libertarian ideals, a position which does have a technical justification. It just misses the bigger picture - that most folks in govt are just doing their job. A compromise will seek to enable those doing their job correctly while preventing abuses with technological means.
Telling the govt "too bad, you can't stop math" will backfire. The law can be used to force tech companies to literally stop doing math at scale.