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Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Arathorn on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:35AM (#29000944)
(Element CEO here). Honestly, it depends on your threat profile. Any kind of bridge has to inevitably MITM your conversations in order to work, and we’ve tried to spell that out in all the product info about Element One.

If you want to avoid your E2EE conversations on Signal or WhatsApp being relayed via a service like Element One (because you’re an activist or whatever), then your options are to not bridge at all, or run a bridge yourself. Clientside bridging may be an option in future, but reliably running a bridge in the background on mobile is somewhere between non-trivial and impossible.

Finally, we are currently crunching on getting E2EE to work nicely between the bridges and the Matrix clients (so bridged conversations are stored E2EE on the Element One server) and it should be coming in the coming weeks. It’s worth noting again that even when that lands the bridge will still necessarily be able to see bridged conversations at the point of bridging.

TL;DR: if you don’t trust Element with your Signal conversations for whatever reason, don’t hook up Signal to your Element One account :)

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:52AM (#29001146)
That's all well and good, but I believe the original complaint was more concerning the second party in the conversation. There's no way for me, a hypothetical person who wants to keep my Signal messages 100% encrypted in the Signal ecosystem, to opt out of my contacts using an Element bridge.

Sure, I can go around and tell everyone I know that they shouldn't bridge Signal to Element One because <cryptonerd rant>, but there's no way for me to tell that my advice has been followed. Previously, the chances that someone had set up such a bridge were small, but by nature of making these things accessible, Element One also increases the risk of my conversations being (benevolently?) MITM'd.

I think it's a great offering, but I share GP's reticence about a system that puts what used to be zero-knowledge conversations in plaintext on a third-party server...all without me realizing.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by _red on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @12:44PM (#29002678)
>There's no way for me, a hypothetical person who wants to keep my Signal messages 100% encrypted in the Signal ecosystem, to opt out of my contacts using an Element bridge.

This sounds like a made-up concern.

How do you stop me from screenshotting your convo and posting on twitter, or just copying and pasting from one app to the next?

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @02:19PM (#29004114)
Those are distinct from my concern. In your scenarios, I have trusted you to keep the conversation secret, and you betrayed that trust.

My concern is about giving messages in an automatic fashion to a third party, which I'm completely unaware of and have no way of making an informed decision about. The third party could be breached (they run an online service, which is much, much easier to attack than some dude's iPhone).

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tshaddox on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @04:46PM (#29006044)
How much do you know about your conversation partner's cyber hygiene? They might leave their phone unlocked at the library or even unknowingly install malware.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:07PM (#29006269)
All of that is true, and remains true if they're using a bridge service as well. The bridge service is strictly reducing the security of messages.

Look, I'm not up in arms or anything, I just can immediately see a drawback to bridging Signal specifically. There exist many other services (Telegram, Slack, Discord, the list goes on) that can be bridged to Matrix without compromising the security posture in any terrificly meaningful way, IMO. So the idea is great in principle.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tshaddox on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:11PM (#29006309)
> The bridge service is strictly reducing the security of messages.

Perhaps in some sense, yes, but in precisely the same sense that you reduce the security of your messages each time you send a new message, or each time you start a conversation with a new person, or each time any of your contacts reads a message on the train where someone might be looking over their shoulder. None of these things strike me as a meaningful reduction in security, at least in the threat models that are appropriate for most average people (namely where you don't expect to be personally targeted by an attacker with resources).

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:21PM (#29006434)
The Matrix bridge service is compromised (their infra has been successfully attacked before, and other similar platforms have had catastrophic data breaches as well)? That doesn't require a targeted attack, involves complete history disclosure and probably far more metadata than Signal even stores on their servers.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by feanaro on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @02:57PM (#29004679)
Just ask your conversation partner?

An Element bridge is just a Signal client hosted on Element's infrastructure. Them using an Element bridge is no different than them using an extra device you didn't know about. That device could've well been insecure, or shared by many people, or hosted in the cloud. If you care about this, you should ask.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Strom on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:25PM (#29006486)
> Them using an Element bridge is no different than them using an extra device you didn't know about.

It is different in a big way. That extra device would most likely only transit this one user's messages. The Element bridge transits a ton of users and as such is an attractive target for mass surveillance.

> That device could've well been [..] hosted in the cloud.

The capability of self-hosting is very niche. Only technical people could pull that off. Element is working hard to make using this bridge so easy that your grandmother could do it.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:16PM (#29006349)
I thought I addressed that in my original comment: I _could_ go to each of my contacts and explain why I don't want them to do things like use the cool new Element service with Signal. But 1) I (finally) have a lot of contacts using Signal, so that would be a pain to manage; 2) to me, the entire idea of Signal is that I can pretty much set it and forget it on any relatively-modern smartphone for friends, family, etc. and not have to worry about anything but the biennial phone migration for my mother.

In the end it isn't a huge deal, as most conversations are extremely innocuous, and those I care about I'll take the time to verify. But after all the trouble to proselytize Signal, I get nervous about large public projects that could, in my opinion, strictly reduce the security of my secure messaging system.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tshaddox on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:30PM (#29006531)
> I _could_ go to each of my contacts and explain why I don't want them to do things like use the cool new Element service with Signal. But 1) I (finally) have a lot of contacts using Signal, so that would be a pain to manage; 2) to me, the entire idea of Signal is that I can pretty much set it and forget it on any relatively-modern smartphone for friends, family, etc. and not have to worry about anything but the biennial phone migration for my mother.

Yes, I totally agree that this would be a huge hassle. But what's your proposed alternative? Reaching out to every programmer in the world and convincing them to never write any software that can act as a Signal client? Or pushing for legal prohibition on any non-Signal developers creating software that can act as a Signal client?

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KAMSPioneer on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @05:38PM (#29006643)
Hahaha of course not. I don't really propose an alternative. I'm just lamenting the situation and trying to provide context to the Element CEO about why the original commenter, and people like him, might not be 100% jazzed about the democratization of technology that, in terms of message _security_, is a step backwards.

Doesn't mean I'm in favor of such ridiculous things as you've suggested here.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by feanaro on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @06:03PM (#29006924)
> jazzed about the democratization of technology that, in terms of message _security_, is a step backwards.

Well, you can always switch to Matrix and have democratized and secure native messaging which uses a cryptographic protocol comparable to Signal. ;)

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by juliansark on Wednesday October 27, 2021 @07:32AM (#29011793)
Many of us have, and painfully if I might add, finally convinced people to abandon insecure messengers and move to something like Signal. Now the solution is to tell them to abandon Signal in favor of Matrix? I'll pass.

Also, obligatory xkcd: https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/standards.png

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by feanaro on Thursday October 28, 2021 @07:27AM (#29024771)
The problem is Signal is not a standard unless they open up their ecosystem, so we're not actually increasing the number of standards here.

I've been through the pain of convincing people to Signal due to lack of better alternatives at the time. And I've done it yet again for Matrix. In this case, each move brought us closer to a global optimum so I'm not sorry for it.

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Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by anticensor on Wednesday October 27, 2021 @10:19AM (#29013605)
The username of the actual Element CEO is "Arathorn".
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by xanaxagoras on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:54AM (#29001163)
> (because you’re an activist or whatever)

How about because I'm a regular person, and I don't want everything I say analyzed by the federal government and stored in perpetuity? I'm increasingly repulsed by this notion that unless I'm doing something illegal or in opposition the the ruling party, encryption is just a luxury. Encryption is for anyone with any desire to express themselves honestly without modifying their behavior because someone is watching.

People flock to Signal for a reason and a lot of them will use this "bridge" without understanding what they're giving up. You're doing more harm that good to try to usher people towards your platform.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by fsflover on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @11:35AM (#29001676)
> People flock to Signal for a reason

Why would you go to a walled garden if you want more freedom/control? You should just go to Matrix and host it yourself (and keep all the metadata to yourself, too!).

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by xanaxagoras on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @12:28PM (#29002418)
People available to communicate with is a key metric of a communications platform. All of these services lack a large number of regular people. For better or for worse, Signal is the one with the most.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Steltek on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @03:52PM (#29005403)
If you self-host Matrix, you can still bridge to Signal while avoiding the walled garden trap and having complete control of your data?

If you don't want to self-host, then you must be comfortable extending trust to someone. SaaS Matrix and Signal seem to be two sides of the same coin, in that case.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by xanaxagoras on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @09:06PM (#29008474)
Except my messages are E2EE and signal can't read them. This bridge breaks that encryption before it's reached the intended recipient, which if that recipient is me, I very much don't appreciate it.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by fsflover on Wednesday October 27, 2021 @04:53AM (#29010902)
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by grassjumper on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @11:45AM (#29001834)
I very much agree with you.

> I'm increasingly repulsed by this notion that unless I'm doing something illegal or in opposition the the ruling party, encryption is just a luxury.

Making encryption and privacy a common thing is important to maintain the anonymity of those who have something to hide for various reasons. It's the same as law enforcement using dubious methods: We don't object because we're criminal, we object because we're not (i.e. and don't want to risk false charges).

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Forbo on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @07:10PM (#29007570)
All your comments appear dead to me, I think it's because you're a fresh account and have been shadow banned. Just guessing, I'm not sure about that but I saw similar behavior for another user on a different topic. I vouched because it looks like you're making points in good faith.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by superdisk on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:58AM (#29001208)
Sure, but this defeats the entire point of Signal. You don't use it to get the maximum amount of reach to other contacts, you use it because you're confident that what you send ISN'T being MITMed... that's the entire value of the app! So unfortunately if this takes off, you never know if the reason you're even using the application is just being violated. It destroys the entire purpose. That said, I love Matrix more than Signal and enjoy its E2EE capabilities.... but I also wish this doesn't take off.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by dunefox on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @11:01AM (#29001242)
It's still a chat app and if I can't reach enough people it's useless.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tshaddox on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @04:47PM (#29006062)
> You don't use it to get the maximum amount of reach to other contacts, you use it because you're confident that what you send ISN'T being MITMed...

Sure, but this doesn't actually introduce a new party in the middle of two Signal clients. Someone has to just decide to authorize a Signal client running on a server somewhere to receive messages from you and forward them onward outside of Signal.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by allset_ on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @11:35AM (#29001681)
Your cavilier tone here about casually introducing a MiTM threat that many people won't understand to the e2e encrypted messaging ecosystem is pretty disgusting. As others have noted, the issue is that I can't opt out of other people using this which breaks the security guarantees of the chat system.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by stryan on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @11:40AM (#29001774)
That's not part of the security guarantee; The message was encrypted from user-controlled end to user-controlled end. It's neither Signal nor Element's fault that your conversation partner has decided to move conversations un-encrypted afterward. That was always allowed.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by gfodor on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @06:26PM (#29007173)
Signal's core value proposition is radically increasing the expectation that one is having an e2e encrypted conversation. I love Element's product and mission, but a product which explicitly is eroding and complexifying privacy around a 3rd party product which is about privacy seems to be a bad tradeoff, and also stands to undermine the public perception of what Element is all about. I would suggest either carving out the e2e platforms (particularly Signal), or introduce functionality that will ensure conversations had through the bridge inform the counter party that the messages are not e2e encrypted. It's the right thing to do.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by fsflover on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:46AM (#29001070)
> Any kind of bridge has to inevitably MITM your conversations in order to work

Can't you just pass the encrypted message further without decrypting it? Of course, there needs to be the same decryption mechanism on both sides, but it doesn't make it impossible.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Arathorn on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:52AM (#29001148)
At that point it’s basically clientside bridging (or multihead messagering), given having decrypted the message (even if you had the right keys available) you’d need to speak the protocol of the remote service.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by KingMachiavelli on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @06:22PM (#29007116)
It's possible but a lot harder. If the keys/tokens for fetching messages are similar/interlinked to those used to decrypt the messages then you can't separate the two. In this case you would have to do the message 'fetching' and decryption on the client side which would be very difficult for any JS based clients.

Then there's the issue of syncing those messages between Element One clients which means the client now has to re-encrypt the messages and send them back to the server. And if the client is responsible for fetching messages then providing push notifications will be very difficult.

So if you can actually decouple polling/listening for messages from decryption then it would probably be possible.

A brute force approach would be to provide an open source, self-hostable server but can be configured from the centralized Element One service. This server would hold the actual service tokens & decryption keys and would just be sending re-encrypted messages back to Element/Matrix.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by knocte on Thursday October 28, 2021 @12:48AM (#29022485)
> A brute force approach would be to provide an open source, self-hostable server

The server/bridge is not opensource? I see their github account has lots of code.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by knocte on Thursday October 28, 2021 @12:46AM (#29022475)
> or run a bridge yourself

Quick question, is the code for the bridge opensource?

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by asymmetric on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @10:58AM (#29001210)
> TL;DR: if you don’t trust Element with your Signal conversations for whatever reason, don’t hook up Signal to your Element One account :)

AFAIU GP’s point was that even if I don’t bridge, the recipient of the message might, thereby diluting the trust all users have in E2E on Signal, since you can’t know who’s bridging and who isn’t.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by monkeywork on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @12:46PM (#29002713)
That has always been the case no? You can't know what the person you are sending the message to is doing with it, the status of their device, or anything else.

I fail to see anything that Element is doing "wrong" here, the issues you are describing are issues between you and your conversation partner

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by asymmetric on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @02:05PM (#29003895)
That is true, but there is a difference between some messages being screenshotted, and a service that acts as a bridge storing all communication that passes through an account. It's a matter of how likely it is that the assumption "my communication is not going to leak beyond the two participants" is broken. Every step in the wrong direction counts, IMO.

Also, AFAIK it wouldn't be trivial to extract all the Signal chat histories from an iPhone device - this new service makes that much, much easier (not least because they'd be remotely accessible).

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by ThatGeoGuy on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @03:14PM (#29004906)
It seems like you're trying to hold Element to some kind of impossible standard here. It's not like the tech they used to build the bridge didn't already exist.

The bridge itself serves a specific purpose (opening up Signal to the Matrix API, allowing for the use of a single app), and succeeds at that. Of course there's a trade-off, and the team (at least allegedly) appears to be working on encrypted bridges so that even if the bridge decrypts from Signal, it re-encrypts on the homeserver at rest in a way that only the user (not the bridge) can decrypt in the future.

I think the complaint here is "you advertised a service doing a thing that was already possible, people might use this." I may be mis-characterizing that, but I think it's worth stepping back and thinking a bit more on the actual threat model you face, and how the proposed product (Element One) somehow subverts that. Sure it can do so at scale, but that just means this is one incremental improvement that needs more work, not that the idea needs to be thrown out entirely.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by gfodor on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @06:19PM (#29007083)
Companies whose mission is centered on user control and privacy can be held to a higher standard than other companies when it comes to these kinds of questions. It's perfectly reasonable to suggest that Element should have tossed out the idea of supporting Signal for this specific software offering, given the potential for collateral damage in the form of person A using it without person B being aware of this, particularly if person A does not grok that they are compromising person B's communications if they are using it.

Disclaimers and warnings are not universal solutions to questions on ethics since they are not certain to be read or understood and will have some failure %. If the residual negative effects are likely to exceed the kinds of outcomes a company's core values can tolerate, then making those states unrepresentable by abandoning product ideas is sane.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by acomar on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @12:44PM (#29002692)
because "trust us" has such a great track record.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by sneak on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @12:32PM (#29002486)
You misunderstood what he said if that is your TLDR.

Furthermore, this is not the first time privacy issues with Matrix have been brought up to you and dismissed without understanding.

I am going to begin recommending that people actively avoid adopting Matrix/Element.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tentacleuno on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @03:04PM (#29004776)
Could you expand on the "privacy issues", please? Not sealioning or whatever, I am genuinely interested.
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by colbyhub on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @03:40PM (#29005278)
Not sure what exactly they were referring to, but here are some of them: https://github.com/libremonde-org/paper-research-privacy-mat...
Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by Arathorn on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @04:54PM (#29006117)
sneak’s pet issue is https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/11655: that element web assumes that you want to log into the matrix.org homeserver by default unless you change its config to default to a different one.

The libremonde research is over 2 years old now, and the valid bits of it were addressed at the time (https://matrix.org/blog/2019/09/27/privacy-improvements-in-s...)

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by sneak on Tuesday October 26, 2021 @07:03PM (#29007496)
I've user accounts on 3 different servers, run by 3 different groups.

Every single one of them has a configuration, despite a selfhosted instance, that phones home to centralized servers run by your for-profit company.

I'm not sure if this systemic problem is in your config files, your documentation, your defaults, your js client, or what. It's a failing of some part (or multiple parts) of the process.

Re:Element One – All of Matrix, WhatsApp, Signal and Telegra... by tentacleuno on Wednesday October 27, 2021 @07:55AM (#29011998)
> element web assumes that you want to log into the matrix.org homeserver

Ahh. Seems like an easier problem to fix then. Doesn't Element Android remove that assumption and let you choose?