The flips side can be pretty dark too. For example, there are are plenty of stories of poorer communities, especially African American tenant ones, being broken up and priced out by gentrification of rental markets.
Ownership is less economically efficient, but much more resilient. Once a mortgage is paid off, you've always got a roof overhead. You just need to earn enough for food, clothing, and medicine.
I think the trick would be to implement significant differences in land tax based on:
* a home you live in; versus
* an individual investment property (e.g. if you own 2-3 homes); versus
* an institutional investment property (e.g. investment fund owns hundreds of homes)
Here in the UK we have started imposing tax penalties on buy to rent that disincentivizes owning more than one or two rental properties. The problem with punishing institutional investors is it would take huge amounts on investment out of the housing market, just as we have a massive need for more housing. We need more houses for people to buy and more new housing available to rent. Rental properties by themselves aren’t a problem, it’s taking houses out of individual ownership and transferring them to the rental sector that’s the problem.
You can no longer claim a mortgage as an 'expense' when calculating your profits.
That's not how it works for other companies, loan repayments are not classified as an expense to reduce your profits.
So now they have to pay the same tax rate as other businesses, where before they were getting a huge tax break.
You can waive the higher taxes for very high density developments. Skyscrapers to require investors, and that is beneficial.
An LVT might work but I think it is only ethical if you advantage primary residences with a complete lack of tax.
One of the points of an LVT, among other things, is to encourage little old ladies living in 4 bedroom houses to move somewhere smaller. It’s actually a very equitable tax that reduces distortions in markets and reduces inequality. I highly encourage you to read up on it.
Homes don't even need to be that small. Buying a chunk of land with enough trees to build a home is <$5k, if you're willing to live in the middle of nowhere.
You need the equivalent of a Ph.D in zoning, permitting, and municipal regulations to do that, though.
And if each high school class, as a year-long class project, build a home, I think my kid would get a better education and we'd have more homes.
Plus, most people need to bring in specialists to do all the maintenance because we have no idea how our homes work. I'd like to run ethernet in my house, and I have no idea what's inside my walls, how to get in there, or how not to break things. That's embarrassing.
The sad reality is that people want their own BBQ and not really mix with their neighbours. That’s what poor people have to put up with, so to speak.
When millenials reach retirement age, a house, as for all previous generations, is the best option for financial security for retirement/end of life. Fewer and fewer of us will have that option I think.
What is stupid is promoting Homeownership as a personal investment for the individual home-owner. A home is already a great thing to own financially, because it 'produces' not having to pay rent. There is no need to also have it pay 5% a year for people who have 100% leverage (which is very common in the Netherlands for mortgages).
But politicians get lots of votes by making the current middle class richer for owning homes. Nevermind that it is bad long-term as people have been saying for the last 20 years.
A typical 20% down-payment in the US gets you 400% leverage (you used your 20% ownership 4 times over in order to purchase the other 80%).
5% down gets you 1900% leverage.
If you put $50000 down (5%) on a $1M home, it rises by 1% ($10000) and you sell it, then you just made a 20% return on your initial investment. You were leveraged 1900%, and so you got a return 1900% above what you would have without borrowing any $. Nobody serious advises that kind of leverage on any asset except for real-estate, AFAIK.
There are some fixed cost: transfer tax, mortgage fee, notary fees, etc. (It used to be you could also finance these). But the full amount that will be transferred to the seller can be financed.
Of course there is the usual issue of the definition of "enough" but those kind of questions are solved all the time in parliaments. This all or nothing behavior is what harms the prospect of land tax.
For example one way it aligns incentives is pressuring land to be put to more productive use. Aka if someone can’t afford the taxes they might have to sell it to someone who can and likely that second entity will build more units on the land which utilizes the land more efficiently. Not in every instance perhaps but enough to matter. Its a way of forcing communally central land to be put to good use and for the profitability to feed back into the community.
I’m not sure it’s helped, but it might be worse without it.
https://www.cambridgema.gov/departments/finance/propertytaxi...
In this case, why not just be direct and have the land owned by the state, and have density requirements for use of that land based on population of the area?
London and other metropolitan areas still have a lot of low income housing in very high value areas, there are current/former council houses in Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea for example that sit on land worth billions.
LVT in the UK would likely just increase cost of ownership for leaseholders which would make flats in cities even more expensive (and since many newly developed terraced, detached and townhouses also come as leasehold these days even buying a house won’t help) and just push for further gentrification as housing like this https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallfield_Estate would become economically non-viable.
This relationship has always reminding me of medieval surfdom, i think it's deeply unfair and rigged and needs to be abolished.
>Lords and Knights - The lords ran the local manors. They also were the king's knights and could be called into battle at any moment by their Baron. The lords owned everything on their land including the peasants, crops, and village.
It was not the king (the government) but the local lord (the property owner) that abused his subjects the most.
Increasing the cost of ownership makes it more expensive to speculate on real estate which would drive prices down. The most speculative assets have no maintenance costs.
Current ubran policies in the western world, coupled with the normalization of remote working already do this to some extent.
As population density increases, desirability increases, and people may try investing with the goal of renting, which with an LVT will more sharply decrease the desirability of population density.
LVT is paid by the owner of the land. That is the whole point of a LVT, that you cannot avoid it.
If he raises his rents to the maximum that renters are willing to pay then the value of the land grows and he has to pay more land value taxes. He actually cannot make land more expensive. He can only make the land as expensive as it already is.
Of course, it is entirely possible that the effective tax burden on the tenant has risen in the process. For that reason I would encourage the government to reduce income taxes.
For some landlords that would cover their tax bill. Others not so much.
It would precipitate a collapse in property values, but not a rise in rents.
As population density increases, desirability increases, and people may try investing with the goal of renting, which with an LVT will more sharply decrease the desirability of population density.
An LVT can incentivize sprawl because all else equal the LVT would ultimately be passed on to renters.
With a property tax, the total tax bill increases when you build upward and make the apartment block. If you take a lot with a single home on it, and then stack 9 identical homes on top, the resulting property might be worth 9x as much. That’d mean the renters of that bottom home still have to pay 90% of their old property tax.
With LVT, the tax bill is based on whether you could build up productively, whether or not you actually choose to do so. So if you stack 10 family homes on top of one another, the renters of those homes would pay 1/10th the land tax.
This shifts the relative tax burden toward lots which are less dense than their surroundings. Encouraging infill and discouraging sprawl. If it pushes some to build their single family home in the exurbs so that an apartment block can be built in the suburbs, that’s a net win.
This is the core distinction between LVT and property tax.
If you put 10 family dwellings on land, then its value is at least that of 10 family dwellings. So each individual renter is somehow paying 1/10th the 10x greater cost. You haven't reduced the LVT by sharing it between the LVT between the renters, they're all paying the same or more.
In theory, it still has whatever value the optimal use would provide.
In reality we don’t have an optimal land use oracle, and valuation techniques would take the vacant lot as a data point suggesting that the area is bad. The assessed land value might decrease a tiny bit – along with that of your entire suburb, and similar regions. But it’s not going to zero.
Similarly, if you take a block of land, put 10 apartments on there, and fill them with renters, you’ll create property value where there was none, but the land value isn’t going to go up 10x.
I dont see how that follows - you stated it but did not explain the mechanism by which it happens.
Population density would flow from the land value as it does now, albeit more efficiently since inefficiently used land would not just mean minimized profits but large losses.
That's also why there shouldn't be an exemption for first home.
Obviously made up those numbers but hope you get the idea.
Obviously in real life, people care about other things besides just pure acreage, but you can see the argument.
As I explained in another comment[1], a property tax discourages density and encourages sprawl. A land value tax, on the other hand, does not have these adverse effects on density because it taxes only the fixed supply of land, not the variable supply of buildings.
It would certainly discourage the building of houses in the city centre.
No, that's not how it works. The value of a property is made up of the value of the land and the value of the buildings on it. If one of these two components is taxed, its value is reduced. However, it is important to remember that the supply of land is fixed, but the supply of buildings is not. If one taxes buildings, as is the case with a traditional property tax, construction activity is reduced, but if one taxes only land, as is the case with a land value tax, construction activity is not impeded at all. That's the beauty of a land value tax: it doesn't distort anything.
With a property tax, an undeveloped lot in the center of town is taxed less than a high-rise. With a land value tax, both are taxed at the same rate. Relatively speaking, a property tax promotes sprawl, a land value tax promotes density.
Who would want that house with that tax bill?
The easier thing is just make is easier to build more housing, denser if needed, to fulfill demand.
As a concession the debt can be reassessed at any time during those 3 years. If there is a boom that makes the tax excessive followed by a bust that reduces the value of the land by 50% then your tax bill would also go down by 50%.
>The easier thing is just make is easier to build more housing, denser if needed, to fulfill demand.
That's the entire goal behind the land value tax.
This same type of thinking drives me crazy in CA where Prop 13 exists because someone might have to move because they’ve made a million dollars in house value (simply by existing) that they might have to realize.
1) The buyer is pricing the house at its worth minus its future tax liabilities (which is what the seller receives), and the seller will use that money to purchase another house which also has tax liabilities. That house has to be worse, or the tax liabilities lower (or in the same general tax area, both.)
2) The seller is in an appreciating asset, but can't choose when to sell. They must sell when the tax liabilities become too much[*]. Meaning they must regardless of whether the property will probably continue to appreciate. This is a wealthy buyer's advantage over the seller, although this is partially ameliorated by competition between wealthy buyers who have priced in likely appreciation. But a very wealthy buyer can create appreciation through buying nearby properties to control the area, and through lobbying.
3) Also, real estate tax law tends to benefit wealthy buyers who leave rental properties empty, and can use those liabilities to offset profits they make in another area.
This seems like a formula for downward mobility. And for people to be forced out of the neighborhoods where they have networks and jobs, and have to move to worse places where they have no networks, and are farther from jobs.
[*] In the worst case, they mortgage the home in order to pay the tax liabilities, and to extend the time before they must sell - meaning that when they sell, they're actually paying off back taxes with the money, meaning they have even less (or no) money for their next residence.
I admit I don’t have a lot of attachment to a given plot of land, and understand some people place more value on that. But it’s also pretty selfish for one person/family to claim a plot in a productive market to the exclusion of ten others by standing in the way of densification. It’s a question of singular good vs that of the collective, and there is no right answer there at which point I guess it’s agree to disagree?
If anything, it might end up being lower tax on residential housing, and much higher on commercial/retail.
[0] In 1879, a man asked "How come all this new economic development and industrialized technology hasn't eliminated poverty and oppression?" That man was Henry George, his answer came in the form of a book called Progress & Poverty, and this is a review of that book - https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/your-book-review-progr...
[1] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/01/16/home-ownership-...