They added back the 'recovery key' feature in iOS 14[0] but I'm not sure if it includes full encryption of backups or other iCloud data. I couldn't find anything on recovery keys in the Platform Security index either[1].

0: https://www.macworld.com/article/234693/apple-id-adds-recove...

1: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web

That option is there, and very simple. You just turn off iCloud backup to get true privacy.

Can I buy a Time Capsule to have iOS Backup then? There are 1B iPhone user, not everyone has a computer for Backup.

No, because if the party you're messaging has iCloud backup on (a good chance), or is on Android, or has their device physically accessed somehow- a third party can read all of the messages that you sent them. There is no 'true privacy'

> No, because if the party you're messaging has iCloud backup on (a good chance), or is on Android, or has their device physically accessed somehow- a third party can read all of the messages that you sent them. There is no 'true privacy'

This is surely true no matter how strong the encryption scheme, though. If you share your content with anyone else, then your security is only as strong as theirs.

Messages are not stored in iCloud Backup by default.

You have to explicitly enable it.

They are actually. iCloud backup stores the messages by default. If you go and set Messages to use iCloud sync, then they're synced end to end encrypted. Apple then removes the messages from the iCloud backup, and instead stores a backup of the end to end encryption key for Messages. If you want your messages to be truly inaccessible to Apple / agencies with warrants (and also unrecoverable after losing end to end encryption access), then you have to turn off iCloud backup.

Apple's documentation needs to be a little clearer on this but the system is basically designed with the accurate notion that the biggest footgun for 90% of users is not "the government was able to access my messages with a warrant" but rather "I lost access to my end to end encrypted messages".

What does Android have to do with anything?

Your messages delivered as standard unencrypted sms/mms instead of encrypted imessages.

What do you define as "standard" on Android when fragmentation is literally the defining point of Android?

Bit of a broad stroke anyway.

Not sure if you're referring to iCloud [device] backup or all iCloud services.

If it's the latter then yes, you can (almost) always choose not to use a service or website. That's a poor argument to defend bad privacy practices.

If it's the former then just disabling iCloud backup does not result in E2E storage of other iCloud data. iCloud photos, drive, etc. are still not E2E.

a) No one is blaming the user.

b) End to end encryption has always meant transport encryption not encryption at rest.

> End to end encryption has always meant transport encryption not encryption at rest.

Sure, but if someone in the middle wants to store, then they don’t have anything unencrypted to store. Ultimately it all depends what one defines the “ends” as. In general for backup, both ends are the user. For chat, the sender and recipient. Apple is not an end, but a provider in the middle.

User A messages user B using iMessages.

User B screenshots all of those messages and uploads them unencrypted to a random FTP server.

Now replace the random FTP server with iCloud. Or Google Drive. Does that change the nature of the messaging between User A and User B? I would say it doesn't. In fact, WhatsApp does basically the same.

No, but it means the backup is not end to end.

End to end encryption usually refers to users being the ends and the service provider being the transport. So while it is sitting on apples servers it is kind of in transport but delayed until you make the request to get it back.

I mean, I'm blaming the user. What's wrong with that in this context? Similarly, if your region hates spicy food and thus spicy is dying in your area, I'd be blaming the region too.

If you think the word "blame" is too morally hot, then we can always go with causal attribution.

a) this feature supposedly exists for the average user who wants to have their data back if they forget their password. Apple points at the user and says they are the reason for having this backdoor.

b) this is just false; whether the data is at rest or not has nothing to do with the definition of the term. And it is misleading in any case.

a) It's not a backdoor but an explicit design tradeoff. It's hypocritical to be calling people out for using terms correctly and then misuse the term backdoor.

b) The etymology of the term has been blurred by WhatsApp referring to it as both transport and encryption at rest. But historically it has not included the latter part.

> It's hypocritical to be calling people out for using terms correctly and then misuse the term backdoor.

No, it's not because it is another instance. Someone can have one thing right and another thing wrong. And whatever the true meaning of "E2EE", its use in this case is misleading at best, so I'm pretty sure that the profession does not approve of it.

> a) No one is blaming the user.

The user is being used as an excuse: "we compromise your privacy because that user over there wants it". This is not blame in the obvious sense of "it's that user's fault that they lost their data", but it is blame: "the responsibility for this thing isn't ours, the people who wrote the code, but yours."

E2ee, transport encryption, encryption at rest and client side encryption are all different things.

OP is quite literally blaming the user.