No, it doesn’t. Because the Court expressly declined to examine the question, the CAFC decision is binding only where it would have been without the Supreme Court decision, i.e., those courts bound by the CAFC’s interpration of how Ninth Circuit law applies. As it turns out, that is exactly zero courts.
The reason the Supreme Court often likes to find the narrowest grounds possible for a decision is to avoid making more binding case law than is called for; giving the lower court rulings on all questions not addressed (including those the Supreme Court explicitly avoids) the same binding effect as the actual Supreme Court holding would defeat the purpose, and it is very much not how things work.
CAFC does not have natural jurisdiction over copyright and thus always applies circuit law.
Here, this was also a 3-judge panel of the federal circuit, and en banc review was denied.
Those decisions are already not binding on future 3-judge panels IIRC (it's been a while, honestly), and definitely not binding on the circuits
Right, and I think this played an important role in why the Supreme Court ducked API copyrightability; they’d rather not do so absent a binding lower circuit decision, or especially a conflict between circuits, preferring to let the issue percolate (and also provide Congress more time to intervene) of there is another basis dor resolving particular cases with less sweeping impact.
Federal Circuit's ruling would only be precedent in the 9th circuit. As it does not have original jurisdiction in copyright disputes (only patent cases), it doesn't supercede any copyrightability rulings in other circuits, for instance the 1st circuit's holding in Lotus v Borland that the Lotus macros were not copyrightable as a "method of operation". And today's opinion cites Lotus v Borland several times even though the original 1996 Supreme Court case was deadlocked at 4-4.
I think it's even narrower than that: the Federal Circuit's ruling on non-patent aspects of the case isn't binding precedent outside of Oracle v. Google. District courts in the Ninth Circuit and the appeals court are free to ignore the Federal Circuit ruling in future cases and look to only rulings from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court as binding precedent.
This is similar to when federal courts have to apply state law.
No, not only 9th circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is binding nationwide. And if the case includes claims about patents and/or trademarks, even if those specific claims are thrown out, then the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit becomes the court that the case is appealed to.
Which is how this particular case wound up there in the first place.
The Federal Circuit's copyright decision is binding on the parties to the case at hand, but the precedent for future cases is non-binding at best.
This was one of the arguments that the FSF and SFLC put forth in their amicus brief recommending that the Supreme Court not take up Google's appeal of the API copyright question:
> The court below predicted, on the basis of no compelling evidence, that the Ninth Circuit would depart from settled existing law in a novel direction which, as amici supporting the petition have said at length, would be destructive alike of commercial certainty and freedom to implement, thus inhibiting the progress of science and the useful arts. Neither the Ninth Circuit nor any other regional Court of Appeals is likely to defer to this improbable supposition, so the error is largely self-limiting. Such erroneous predictions of other courts’ holdings are not a suitable employment of this Court’s scarce resources in review by certiorari.
Not even the 9th Circuit. For cases arising from thr 9th Cir., 9th Cir. case law binds the CAFC, not the other way around, on issues that are outside ofnthe subject-matter for which the CAFC has nationwide jurisdiction.
> The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is binding nationwide
No, it’s decisions are only binding nationwide on the issues within its special jurisdiction, which copyright is not. On other issues, it is instead bound by the case law of the circuit that would otherwise be responsible for the case, and notionally is just an interpreter of that circuit's case law. It’s decisions on those collateral matters on cases brought before it because they also touch on one of the issues reserved to the CAFC aren’t binding on any other court.
How are those issues defined?
Lotus was at a crossroads. DOS was obsolete, was the future OS/2 or Windows? They chose OS/2.
Lotus was a big, cash rich company at the time. Their fatal error was not realizing they should have ported 1-2-3 to both OS/2 and Windows. Then they would have been secure regardless of which prevailed.
If the choice was between 2 options, 'both' might be a viable response. But 3 or more, especially with a market expectancy that everything DOS-based would disappear?
In hindsight it is much more obvious that Microsoft's involvement in OS/2 was something of a trojan horse to fund early NT development and a short-term hedge in case people did trust the IBM brand more than the Microsoft brand, but at the time it was much more confusing.
That’s...optimistic. The transition to GUIs undermined a major hold they had, which was user-familiarity-lock-in. That transition was going to be an opening no matter what, especially for a competitor that also controlled the platform that won out underneath the application.
Lotus was bigger than Microsoft for most (all?) of the 1980s.
Wordstar was another company that failed to understand the shift to GUIs.
Of course, Wordstar had another major marketing problem. Despite its dominance, nobody knew the name of the company (MicroPro) that made it. Far too late they realized the mistake and changed the company name to Wordstar. Microsoft never made that mistake.
Internet Explorer wasn't the first browser on the market but by the time Chrome had come around Microsoft had let it languish and it became pretty awful. For a long time Microsoft had convincingly won the browser war.
Same with MSN messenger, it didn't keep up. And nobody has ever decisively won that chat app war anyways .
Smartwatches have been around for a very very long time. What Apple did was get smartphone integration right.
Zune Pass isn't a streaming service, its a DRM laden online music store. So more akin to iTunes than Spotify or Apple Music. And it was very late to the game.
iOS is a good example though. Windows Mobile had not yet come to dominate the market.
Commercial users were paying for Netscape in 1995. It was only free for personal use. Even articles from 1996 mention the cost of Netscape as $49. [1]
So at least part of the reason IE displaced Netscape was that it was free for enterprises. And Netscape was not, until it was too late.
It may be hard to believe, but the first iteration of Internet Explorer on Macintosh (back on System 8) was __solid__. IE, at least on PowerMacs, was way faster and more reliable than either NCSA Mosaic or Navigator.
That makes it sound like Netscape had no say in the matter. Netscape sold itself to AOL.
Similarly, if the D compiler crashes when compiling a D source file, it's the D core team's fault.
if (NetscapeIsRunning()) corrupt_data();
in their OS API calls. If they had, I'm sure it would have come out at the anti-trust trial, and would have made it an open and shut case. Did that happen?As I recall, the anti-trust case revolved around Microsoft including IE for free with Windows, not sabotage. (Of course, every OS comes with a free browser these days. Even my Kindle.)
While it would arguably be Netscape's fault if Netscape actually crashes (rather than simply failing to display a malformed input) at that time in the browser wars there were plenty of energy going into creating incompatible new 'features' - such as Microsoft's own JavaScript competitor, VBScript [1], vector imaging format (AutoShapes) and animation tags (DHTML)
And Microsoft did intentionally sabotage competitors products in the 1990s with approval from the highest levels of the business - such as DR-DOS [2].
So while I'm not aware of any claims Microsoft sabotaged the OS to make Netscape crash, they'd sabotaged the OS to make other competing products crash, and they certainly added a lot of 'features' so web pages wouldn't render right on Netscape.
[1] http://www.gbengasesan.com/fyp/43/ch5.htm [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AARD_code
There's zero evidence Microsoft sabotaged Netflix.
There's zero evidence Netscape crashed for any reason other than buggy Netflix code. Making a web page that crashes Netflix is a bug in Netflix. Microsoft is under zero obligation to work around Netflix bugs.
IE4 is where ActiveX and browser bloat started to become more obvious, then IE5 was an improvement again.. but we were only a short time from the launch of what would become Firefox. By that point, people were tired of the constant IE issues.
1. Google did not copy Java APIs strictly for the purpose of interoperability (they specifically did not want interoperability with other Java environments).
2. Ninth Circuit court precedent does not apply in the Federal Circuit, which is the only reason why Oracle even had a leg to stand on.
Had Oracle not had a patent claim in this lawsuit, it would have wound up in the Ninth Circuit, we would have gotten another respectable decision limiting software copyright from that court, and the only thing SCOTUS would have had to have done would have been to deny cert to Oracle after they lost. It's entirely due to the Federal Circuit not respecting basic concepts of how software works and ruling on something that shouldn't have been in their jurisdiction that we got here.
Lotus couldn't make the transition to Windows, and so lost to Excel (and perhaps Quattro Pro... it's been a long time and I don't remember details). This had nothing to do with copying APIs. Of course, it probably had everything to do with Microsoft's anti-competitive advantage by having access to Windows internals and undocumented features, but that's another matter.
What happens when an API is co-created by different software developers which each creates their own software under different licenses, through communications which themselves aren't explicitly licensed (like over email lists), and then summarize what they agree on in text instead of code (like the RFC process)?
At no point have either one of them explicitly given permission to use their respective contributions under another license. Even if they agree that the RFC text is public domain, that technically do not extend to implementations of the API which it describes (as those are different works!). And there exists no official reference code with legal approval from all contributors, whose license could be adopted by other developers.
It would be such a mess...
Huh, I had no idea the React license wasn't still "you're free to use React unless you ever assert a patent against Facebook".
It is even less decisive than you're saying.
The fact that the Supreme Court decided not to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that APIs are copyrightable means that binding precedent on every court except the Supreme is that they are. And for fair use, one of the statutory factors is the "effect" of the copying on the "market for or value of the copyrighted work."
That said, this case does establish a precedent that if your copying of an API is primarily for purposes of matching an interface so that developers can reimplement it, you're in fair use territory:
The fact that one statutory factor points one way doesn't stop another from pointing the other. And part of their decision is the conclusion that Google's copying increased the value of Java. That will generally not be true when APIs get copied.
In particular if I am trying to create a product that competes with yours, and I copy your API for the purpose of interoperability, I'm going to have an uphill battle claiming fair use. Because my product directly reduces the market for your product.
To name some historically important examples, Microsoft copied the APIs for JavaScript from Netscape, Microsoft copied APIs from Lotus 1-2-3 for Excel, and Wine copied APIs from Windows for Linux. The outcomes famously were that Netscape went out of business, Lotus 1-2-3 was discontinued, and Linux became somewhat more viable.