They claim they solved the software problem, but they didn't solve the physics problems created by the engine position (which necessitated the software in the first place).
The engine position, in itself, isn't terribly unusual; the 757 and 767 both have engines in similar forward positions on the wings and have a similar pitch up moment due to the engines at high angles of attack. So do a number of Airbus models. Designing flight controls to deal with this issue is not new and has been well tested.
The particular issue with the 737 MAX was that Boeing wanted to change the engine position on an existing aircraft, without requiring a new type certification and pilot retraining. That meant that the flight controls had to not just properly account for the engine position, but to do so while keeping the same stick force curve vs. angle of attack as existing 737 models. That is what drove the MCAS software system that caused all the trouble. If the plane had been designed as a new type from the start, the engine position would not have been an issue; and the redesign is basically doing what a new type design would have done, as far as I can tell from the documents the FAA has published.
Because the engineers would not have positioned the engines there in the first place.
That would have been one possible approach, yes, but it would have involved other changes, the main one being longer landing gear and a higher ground clearance.
My point is that even having the engines in a similar position to the existing one would not have posed a problem if the plane had been a new type. Other planes in service have engines in a similar position. What caused the problem was having the engines in that position and having to match the stick force curve of the existing 737 in order to keep the same type rating.
Not only is that a single point of failure, it is more easily sabotaged or easily damaged.
Besides the fact the plane has engines too big for it and needed this MCAS system simply to retrofit and route around regulations and deal with that by constantly checking the AoA to trigger nose down adjustments, this is bad engineering/product design by management.
The software now takes two sensors into account in case of a failure of one but is still a problem potentially. Not sure if software can solve this.
[1] https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-ma...
Presumably as part of the update, this optional feature has become standard?
I'd also like to see a list of all the airlines that chose not to spec the additional sensor in their initial order of the aircraft. It probably says a lot about their safety culture.
No rational person would think this system wouldn't kill people. The people responsible committed manslaughter.
In a way what you described is worse: a known bug that they decided not to fix.
I'm surprised that displaying the sensor value wouldn't be a standard feature.
In general I think a prosumer-oriented flight search engine would do well. Something like ITA Matrix, before Google absorbed it into Google Flights.
Boeing delivered 387 Max 8 aircraft to their customers before they were grounded in 2019. Two were destroyed, killing everyone aboard. That's half a percent of the aircraft they delivered destroyed within two years. That's obviously much worse that most other aircraft, and far worse than any car currently for sale. You wouldn't buy a car that had a one in 200 chance of killing you and your family before the lease was up, would you?
But to continue down this path, let's compare the 737 Max to its predecessor, the 737NG. Out of the 7,065 737NGs delivered, 22 have been completely destroyed, for a rate of 0.3%. If we only look at fatal accidents, we find 12 (0.16%). If we limit this to accidents that were caused by some failing of the aircraft, even if it was made worse by pilot error, you end up with two fatal accidents (0.027%).
So in order to believe that the 737 Max is no more or less dangerous than the 737NG, you have to believe that the 387 delivered 737 Max aircraft were flown enough in 2 years to cover the massive difference in their fatal hull loss rate. I'm sure that the 737 Max was flown a lot, the reduction in fuel consumption means that airlines would want to use it as much as they could, but there is over an 18x difference between the rate of fatal accidents caused by those two aircraft; do you really think that the 737 Max flew 18x more on average than the 737NG has?
Oh, and Airbus has delivered 1,499 airplanes in their a320neo series. None have crashed so far.
Think about the fact that you're flying what is essentially a management designed plane. No reasonable engineer would chose to build this plane.
Flightradar24 has the information: https://www.flightradar24.com/data/flights/aa9750/#26332420
Admittedly, there are times it gets changed at the last minute for whatever reason, but when you book you see what you're getting, and have for years.
It's probably far safer now than other models.
All 737 have an obsolescent fuselage design. It could not be certified given modern regulation and relies on being grandfathered for new production. The consequence is the fuselage can shatter on crash landings or runway overruns whereas more modern designs will hold together and protect passengers.
The relatively minor training, hardware and software revisions of 737 MAX do not make it safer than other models. Reading the FAA documents one learns there is little interest in pursuing more fundamental problems.
For instance, the trim wheel control force issue has been officially handwaved. This means your 737 pilot may need to be an athlete in the midst of dealing with failed systems and reading flight manuals. Modern designs have flight proven fly-by-wire systems and don't involve wrestling with crazy naval vessel-like mechanical wheels to control pitch.
It's the most scrutinized plane in aviation history, and has been vetted by multiple regulatory bodies and received thousands of test flights since fixes were made.
Honest question: if this isn't enough for you, what is? All other planes have been scrutinized far less. The bar for the Max to return was much much higher.
No, I do not disagree with any conclusion that the 737, including the MAX, is safe to operate. I disagree with the characterization that, as a result of recent scrutiny, the 737 is now 'far safer than other models.' It is not and no amount of additional scrutiny, and no signoffs by any number of pilots in any nation will change that.
> It's the most scrutinized plane in aviation history, and has been vetted by multiple regulatory bodies and received thousands of test flights since fixes were made.
I don't disagree with any of this.
> Honest question: if this isn't enough for you, what is? All other planes have been scrutinized far less.
It's plenty for me. I would happily fly on an 737 MAX. However, I do question whether some count of hours of scrutiny (or whatever you mean by 'far less') is a good proxy for safety. Things that operate safely tend not require so much scrutiny.
I don't understand this statement, it seems fundamentally wrong. Aviation is full of scrutiny. Aircraft maintenance checks happy every 500 flight hours. Engines get overhauled completely every 1,500 hours.
Maintenance and scrutiny ensure safety.
If the Max has received, at a guess, 200x the scrutiny of any other plane in history, then I'd wager it is the safest. And at this point, pilots will know the Max back to front and front to back in order to avoid issues. Do pilots have such deep knowledge of other planes which almost assuredly have latent bugs which rarely or never crop up due to exceedingly rare conditions?
Maintenance and overhauls don't address design issues. Exactly the opposite; the people that perform checks and maintenance are expressly not supposed to deviate from approved designs and published processes. Conflating these tasks with regulatory scrutiny shows a fundamental misunderstanding about this discussion.
And airliner engines are not 'completely overhauled' every 1,500 hours. Figures that low are related to small aircraft engines, usually piston engines.
[citation needed] It was never said that it was an unsafe design.
[google it]
I never claimed it was unsafe. I argued with the claim that, due to the additional scrutiny the 737 was now somehow 'far safer than other models.' It is not and no amount of additional scrutiny will change that.
No other plane in the history of aviation has had this level of scrutiny.
[1] https://www.airlineratings.com/news/boeing-737-max-safe-fly-...
> “While the software upgrades and changes are enough to get the plane back in the air, the agency is still demanding the development of a so-called synthetic sensor (that will be ready in 20 to 24 months) to reach even higher safety levels.”
This seems clear that we're talking about a conditional airworthiness rather than absolute confidence, safest plane ever made, etc etc. Recall that you said "It's probably far safer now than other models". Why are you saying that given that the experts you quoted are using the paragraph above for this plane, when they don't have similar concerns and requirements for other models?
If other planes received this level of scrutiny, changes would similarly be demanded. The practice of re-badging old models is widespread.
I'm telling you that personally, I'd exclusively travel on just the Max for the rest of my days and wouldn't lose sleep.
That isn't a response to my actual position, or something I expected to happen.
Boeing is a company that needs to take the long view, and the only way to make that happen is to vote with your dollars.
If they can wave this away, then the necessary lessons haven’t been learned and the Jack Welch protege currently at the helm will be allowed to continue business as usual.