The difference is that a smartphone or tablet is an always on device and are also usually personal devices. In addition they are carried round in pockets or bags.

Taking over a mobile device remotely and activating the camera and microphone is a real thing (citations available but https://www.wired.com/story/whatsapp-hack-phone-call-voip-bu... from 2019 provides a solid 'is possible to do' example).

I have worked in more than a few sites where all cell-phones needed to be placed in to faraday cage lockers located outside the highly secure areas prior to entering but laptops were ok to take in and use (subject to high contrast stickers over cameras, dummy jacks placed in mic sockets and wi-fi switched off).

Given that these were a mixture of national infrastructure, military and embassy type sites and was a thing ten+ years ago I think the various governments are well aware of their own abilities and assume that the opposition have equal capabilities.

I take your point regarding “Unless this is advice for state-level institutions discussing state secrets” but knowledge leaks and filters down in to the corporate world. Those same C-Suits that have to attend meetings discussing restricted information projects go away thinking – Huh, I wonder if it could be done to us by a competitor.

When you consider the difficulties of verifying the supply chain of a random mobile device (from the chipset through to all installed apps) it leaves so many security holes that it is best to assume that anything a nation state can do so can a well skilled hacker (or group).

> I think the various governments are well aware of their own abilities and assume that the opposition have equal capabilities.

Exactly. From most people, "smartphones are spying on us" sounds a little tinfoil hat. Coming from the Director of Military Intelligence, however, gives the message some credence.

Which still needs to be read with nuance though: militaries and governments are worried about targeted, specific efforts directed at specific individuals, and the general difficulty of securing random electronic devices which exist outside of high-security environments sometimes (close to impossible).

This is probably a reasonable threat for executives to worry about, but it's still ultimately an expression of "we're concerned about a threat where breaking into a home and bugging the device or swapping it with a compromised one is a real concern".

Execs are definitely subjected to targeted attacks on a regular basis, but they don’t need to be exploits on physical devices to be effective. For a high profile example: see the Bezos hack. There’s enough money in this space that zero-days are within budget.

Considering the lengths to which people go to get an edge on the stock market (like using satellite feeds to observe parking lots, factories and tracking executives), I think the concern should be real for executives of large multinationals. On top of that, industrial espionage is a thing.

I mean absolutely. What I'm cautioning against is reading too much into the overall security posture of mass market devices (or intelligence agency intercept capabilities) from this advice.

This is closer to "if you can pay a team to go and find a way into that specific person there" then they're going to succeed.

But you're already close to "infiltrate the window washing company, and stick solar powered listening bugs to every window on the upper floor suites".

Fun Fact. I've been in to places where it was an almost impossible feat to achieve without substantial background clearance checks. Chatting to the cleaners around the coffee machine during down times showed a shocking disparity between the checks run on 'obvious people' vs. the 'invisible people'. (My personal viewpoint on life is that we are all just people doing equally important jobs, i.e. Cogs in the Machine, regardless of pay rates).

Pen-Testers use the 'cloned cleaners' pass' thing all the time and it works surprisingly well.

We were told by our IT department that its now SOP by both nation states and hacker groups to target all executives of MNCs. Even those in "visible" technical roles are targeted as a standard matter of procedure.

True, but somewhat irrelevant to most people. There are so many lower-hanging and juicier fruit than recording audio from your phone that I just don't understand why this would be a relevant case.

Most people have their email, personal photos, medical records, financial records, chats etc. on their phones. If you believe your phone is likely compromised, you should first move all of those off your phone before being concerned about realtime audio recording.

I'm debating about whether or not to post this but if it makes it this far then I opted to do so.

A year or so back I stayed over with some extended family, one of which was 'In to IT and earns a living from it. During that time (using the I.T guy's network) I noticed that one of my phones was eating through the battery at a crazy-stupid-mad rate. A quick check showed that this particular phone had begun uploading a metric shit-ton of data on an otherwise normally asymetric data profile (in other words Data Uploaded vs Data Downloaded Ratio).

A check with the 'family IT guy' confirmed that he had Remoted In to a high value clients' system to trouble shoot something at around the same time that one of my phones began to furiously upload any and every thing on its' memory card.

Sounds like one of those "Cool Story Bro" types stories right?

All I will say is that because one of my 'Low Hanging Fruit' thangs got p0wned I was able to alert the $corp of the problem (since the probe originated on their end not mine).

As with all things in Life, YMMV.

I absolutely believe that such attacks are possible - no doubt about that.

But most corporate networks likely have much more likely vulnerabilities that are worth much more thought than this, in my opinion. If your phone has been taken over to the extent that an audio/video stream can be recorded without your permission, I would bet also that much more valuable information than that audio/video stream can usually be obtained as well, for most people who are not used to high security.

This is very sound advice for anyone who wants to feel more secure about their surroundings and mobile devices.

People underestimate the spying potentially of mobile phones very often. They are always on, have a data connection, and run software that is abysmal for security.

I would bet that at least an iPhone is much safer than a regular company laptop in 90% of companies. It is quite likely safer than the internal network. Security is often a second rate citizen in most companies.

Also, strict security practices that affect productivity often get worked around - for example, if I want to examine a diagnostics archive I got by mail on my phone, but the IT policy won't let me, I may well forward it to my personal mail, open that though Firefox, and get the archive this way. It's much worse for overall security, but pretty hard to prevent, and less important to me when I get a call about blocked builds at 10 o'clock.

They wonder sure. But tells us also what happens after you give them a budget of what its going to cost the org.

"...if you're really that paranoid?"

No, you can not call me a paranoid anymore. Before Snowden you could call me like that. But today, it is not secret anymore...

The British capability to monitor webcams (Optic Nerve) was leaked even before Snowden, in 2012 FWIW:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optic_Nerve_(GCHQ)

What Snowden has shown us is that we shouldn't have phones or other internet-connected devices at all if we deeply care about privacy and security.

However, if, as most companies, you have already chosen to move the vast majority of internal communications, records and documentation in the cloud, it makes little sense to then be afraid that they'll listen to your meetings through your phone.

Snowden just told us to re-read EU's report on ECHELON or to just check what the Patriot act authorized.

Oh, you can be paranoid, even though they are after you ..

Phones have a GPS chip and an internet connection that can bypass the corporate network. They are a slightly worse threat than a standard laptop.

At least a laptop there is a chance of corporate IT noticing unusual network traffic.

The best ThinkPads - which are used in many corporations - use Intel's vPro technology. Intel is offering those corporations to "remotely wipe the hard disk - even if laptop is turned off and not connected to the internet - in case the laptop is stolen". This technology requires presence of WLAN and SIM card. So it bypasses the corporate IT completely...

The concern is not literally who owns the network, but whether or not the organization can effectively manage the traffic. There are secure ways to manage that setup, as opposed to, a personal phone where the organization has zero control.

This comparison is absurd.

A minority of laptops are thinkpads, a fraction of those have SIM cards, and, finally, attacking that subsystem requires serious skills and the benefits are dubious.

Compare that with android/ios phones, which 99% of people have, and have a large underground market of backdoors that anybody can buy and install. Not to mention all the spyware that users and OEM install.

It's the difference between finding an expliot for gmail vs finding one for a small discord server. Your attack on gmail has a bigger universe of targets if successful.

Uh, discord is a centralized service. You find an exploit for a "small discord server" you can probably use it on all servers.

Yes, and that's why NSA successfully intercepted google's fiber optic cables and so on.

This is not equivalent, though.

Here are some questions I don't have the answer to, but would be relevant:

- Are these SIMs always active?

- Do they communicate broadly with the internet, or just specific servers?

- If they communicate with specific servers, where does an attacker have to be exploit these communications?

- Does this technology allow for the arbitrary execution of code, or can it only wipe the hard drive?

There are probably more contraints here, but the basic point I'm driving at is that the challenge here is not equivalent to the challenge of exploiting an old android or iOS device. Is there some risk, yes, but it really doesn't seem to be the same amount of risk.

Last century we had low bitrate codecs for full bandwidth speech over dialup modems. I think that little traffic would be shapeable.

Bonus clip: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CRA_yE4D-s&t=35

====

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(most Expanse asteroid belters prefer dubs to subs)

Leya: Setashang Lando?

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...

Leya: To tenye timting mali to. Wamali, ye to tenye imalowda.

I agree about the 3rd party internet connection.

I disagree about the GPS chip. GPS chips are receivers only. You cannot track someone through GPS unless you bug their device and make it send location through another channel. Yeah, that 3rd party internet connection :)

Also, GPS only works outdoors. Not in a corporate boardroom.

Mobile phones use GPS, to be sure, but they also discern location by WiFi radio locations. If your phone is connected to BigCorpWiFi, then we know where you are. Even if you are in the BigCorp building connected to BigCorpWiFi with SmallCorpWiFi from next door detectable, we know which side of the building of BigCorp you are located. If you're on the street corner and your phone can see the WiFi networks of WiFi-1, WiFi-2, WiFi-3, we now know which street corner you are on without accessing the GPS chip. If the WiFi-2 signal is stronger, we know which side of the street you are on.

Forget WiFi. Walking down a street with lots of retail shops while Bluetooth is enabled receives pings from all sorts of trackers/beacons. We know where you are.

TL;DR: If you think location data is only discernible by using GPS, you are incorrect.

I'm thinking about that "OK Google" feature that's probably designed to be listening 100% of the time.

That's present on many Windows laptops now too, isn't it?

The other thing is that executives commonly carry a corporate and a personal device for various reasons.

I generally agree with you, but one argument might be that corporate laptops can have strict security policies enforced, but people generally bring their unmanaged personal/private smartphones with them into meeting rooms.

My managed corporate smartphone is not significantly more secure than my personal one.

You are probably not who they are worried about. My work phone has a corporate curated app store, corporate imessage server, and always on monitoring software. My private phone is full of sideloaded apks and runs as root.

Depends on your field, I guess. Been working for investment banks in front office engineering roles and the only more paranoid organisations I had experience with were exchanges (FX).

Even as a power user you will never get admin rights on your machine, neither will you be permitted to download anything lest install it.

Makes it a bit hard to work though doesn’t it?

> How are smartphones and tablets different from laptops and regular phones in this regard?

At least when it comes to smartphones, there is the baseband circuitry that tends to run completely independently of the OS:

* https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/08/android-baseband-flaws/

* https://threatpost.com/baseband-zero-day-exposes-millions-of...

Some people do worry about the Intel Management Engine having similar issues:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine#Securi...

> too paranoid

It's a known risk from the Snowden leaks. So it's not fair to characterize it as paranoia.

It's a known risk from the Snowden leaks for any internet - connected device.

> How are smartphones and tablets different from laptops and regular phones in this regard?

They are more likely to be attacked because they are better targets. They are more often carried around, have GPS and more cameras.

They are MUCH more difficult to manage centrally (e.g. company-managed antivirus/vpn/firewall, locked-down software installation, secure boot...), or inspect or modify.

They are more often used to all sort of untrusted networks (cafe', airport, hotel...)

Personal phones often have tons of untrusted apps with access to microphones.

> Unless this is advice for state-level institutions discussing state secrets, this seems like completely useless advice

citation needed, especially after Snowden revelations

If you take the Snowden revelations seriously enough to worry about snooping on your board meetings, you should take them seriously enough to drastically reduce online communication and record keeping - as I'm sure stae-level institutions do.

If you're a company whose financial reports, email and documents all reside in the cloud, having your boardroom meetings snooped on through your phone is the last of your worries.

I think his point is that everyone underestimates the chance they’ll be targeted.

Most people have out of date android, and the ecosystem for malware is much larger there than on an old Nokia dumbphone.

> How are smartphones and tablets different from laptops and regular phones in this regard?

Smartphone location tracking data is extremely high-dimensional and sensitive. It is capable of revealing a lot of things which you might not even want to tell to your family. I think for a company such as Google, getting a list of CEOS in e.g. The Netherlands which visit psychotherapists, or occasionally spend the night at the home of their secretary when their wife is on business travel, is little more than an elaborate database query.

What does this have to do with bringing smartphones to boardroom meetings?

> How are smartphones and tablets different from laptops and regular phones in this regard?

Tech aside, one scenario: C level exec parent - or any parent - hands phone or tablet to child in backseat as a pacifier. That's much less likely with reg phone or laptop.

Also, the fact that he didn't specifically mention laptops might simply be an oversight. That is, pretty much everyone will bring their phones or tablets. An exec with a laptop? In a meeting? Probably a rarity.