>Get a physically isolated instance of Azure for your cloud computing services—operated by 21Vianet, a company based in China.
Besides censorship and spying on users, China probably doesn't want it's company's data hosted in a place the US's 3 letter agencies can access it via an NSL.
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/global-infrastructure/chin...
I would be asking AWS about the future of AWS Hong Kong which has historically has had special freedoms from China. See current events for more on that.
Typical issue is the ICP License ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICP_license ), which is why Western companies set up shop in Hong Kong.
I'm hopeful China would have a lot to lose by pulling the plug, since Hong Kong is a valuable interface to the West, but it might happen sooner or later with how unstable geopolitics is becoming.
https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/10/chinas-new-cybersecurit...
The inspection team has complete access to the network system. Inspection can cover both the technical aspects of the network system and the data/information maintained on the servers. See Article 10. The inspectors can fully access the system and they are permitted to copy any data they find. See Article 15. The only restriction on the inspectors copying the data in your company’s system is that the inspectors must provide you with a receipt. Though Article 10 “restricts” access to matters involving national security, the definition of national security in China is so broad that there is no real limitation on what can be accessed, copied and removed.
I remember a hilarious 24h trip to Shanghai because the Chinese law firm had found somebody who was well connected and willing to talk to us. It was somebody's cousin. In the day long meeting, the lawyers were entirely tight lipped and refused to give any legal opinion, merely reading the letter of the law back to us (which is not useful at all in China). The only person who was willing to give any guidance (and preciously little at that) was the cousin.
It was simultaneously very serious, with lots of money at stake, hilarious, exhausting, exhilarating, difficult, full of (cultural, not legal) learnings, and very, very frustrating.
As someone who is going through this process currently (WFOE), the easiness of the thing was probably exaggerated by your lawyers ;). The most annoying thing is that it is quite hard to get a definitive answer of the kind of licenses one needs, who grants them, and especially the criteria to meet.
Yeah, it's qualitatively the same problem. Just there is prior art for physical goods. And I put the "easy" in scare quotes for a reason! Good luck!
Apple has been kind of marginal quality wise for awhile, mostly being better than the alternative because the alternative is garbage. But their handling of this makes much of what they say suspect.
I personally think it's a bit more complicated than that.
Although register an account is easy, maintain such account is a pain. First, not all Chinese citizen can get an international credit card that support US dollars, so no way to purchase apps; second, for those who can get one, App Store may not allow to use it because it’s not a valid US card; third, even they can use that card for purchasing apps, US App Store, iTunes Store may not have those Chinese specific apps or music; last not to mention that the behavior of an US account using non US card outside US for a really lone time may trigger anti fraud protection.
Would that also mean an individual wanting to avoid five eyes surveillance can register their account in China?
How do I know if my data is on the Chinese iCloud? I've been to China once and connected to iCloud.
As one can log in and out of multiple Apple IDs (from different countries) in the App Store without breaking anything synced with one's primary iCloud account, it's very likely that Apple encourages this as a best practice.
Quietly? They issued a support article and it was big news in most news outlets when it was released.
>Apple has already publicly said in court filings, and under threat of perjury, that they don't make any exceptions for China. From Apple's filing [1]:
>Finally, the government attempts to disclaim the obvious international implications of its demand, asserting that any pressure to hand over the same software to foreign agents “flows from [Apple’s] decision to do business in foreign countries . . . .” Opp. 26. Contrary to the government’s misleading statistics (Opp. 26), which had to do with lawful process and did not compel the creation of software that undermines the security of its users, Apple has never built a back door of any kind into iOS, or otherwise made data stored on the iPhone or in iCloud more technically accessible to any country’s government. See Dkt. 16-28 [Apple Inc., Privacy, Gov’t Info. Requests]; Federighi Decl. ¶¶ 6–7. The government is wrong in asserting that Apple made “special accommodations” for China (Opp. 26), as Apple uses the same security protocols everywhere in the world and follows the same standards for responding to law enforcement requests. See Federighi Decl. ¶ 5.
and a declaration from Craig Federighi personally [2]:
>Apple uses the same security protocols everywhere in the world.
>Apple has never made user data, whether stored on the iPhone or in iCloud, more technologically accessible to any country's government. We believe any such access is too dangerous to allow. Apple has also not provided any government with its proprietary iOS source code. While governmental agencies in various countries, including the United States, perform regulatory reviews of new iPhone releases, all that Apple provides in those circumstances is an unmodified iPhone device.
>It is my understanding that Apple has never worked with any government agency from any country to create a "backdoor" in any of our products and services.
>I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
When China wants something from iCloud they do it the same way that law enforcement does it everywhere in the world, which is through Apple.
[1] https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2762131/C-D-Cal-1...
[2] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2762118-Federighi-De...
"...You understand and agree that Apple and GCBD will have access to all data that you store on this service, including the right to share, exchange and disclose all user data, including Content, to and between each other under applicable law."
Shouldn't this be cause for concern?
[1] https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/gcbd...
[2] https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/term...
>Originally, iCloud data was stored on Apple-controlled servers, with the Cupertino company holding the encryption keys. Apple announced a year ago that this would change to comply with new laws in China, and that data for Chinese iCloud accounts would be moved to a server run by Guizhou-Cloud Big Data (GCBD), a company owned by the provincial government.
>However, I have spoken to Apple today, who confirmed that it still holds the encryption keys, and states categorically that they have not been made available to either GCBD or China Telecom.
https://9to5mac.com/2018/07/18/chinese-icloud-data-china-tel...
Because in the vice interview you keep citing he specifically dances around answering that question.
The servers were nationalized and the TOS agreement was changed since that 9-to-5 article came out.
Maybe Apple isn't giving access, but forcing the users to move to data centers which are later nationalized, and Then forcing users to agree to give access to that same state-owned company doesn't sound like they are restricting access anymore.
Also note your documents are from 2016, these events mostly started in 2017.
At least in China, you can probably assume iMessage is back-doored given that iCloud content in mainland China is operated by a Chinese internet company. Apple quietly posted this last week on their support page:
"iCloud services in China mainland are now operated by Chinese internet services company Guizhou on the Cloud Big Data Industrial Development Co., Ltd., (GCBD). This allows us to continue to improve iCloud services in China mainland and comply with Chinese regulations."
It goes on to say:
"iCloud services and all the data you store with iCloud, including photos, videos, documents, and backups, will be subject to the new terms and conditions of iCloud operated by GCBD."
Source: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208351
EDIT: After some research, it looks like the iCloud handover actually happened last year (https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/11/icloud_china_goes_t...).