When things are booming, WeWork is advantageous for landlords, and appraisers/the market/potential buyers will underwrite that space positively.
However, there's minimal guarantees that WeWork will actually pay long term, or that you'll have any legal recourse. On top of that there are significant capital costs to a WeWork lease that landlords have to shell out up front. Their leases are typically structured with a lot of free rent up front, so the break even point for a landlord may be many months or years farther out than a typical tenant leasing comparable space.
The losers in the WeWork deal are the landlords, as they're bearing a lot of the risk, and get minimal upside. I'd expect to see a high degree of correlation between WeWork's IPO/stock price and REIT valuations. Underwriting will push the value of a WeWork lease if they can, which will only give more momentum to the bubble.
Source: Worked at a nationally invested REIT that had several WeWork leases in our portfolio
Couldn't this be interpreted differently? That is, landlords are having less and less choice. Something from WW is better than an empty building. Is WW a canary of sorts? It tells us about changes in the economy (less growing small to mid-size companies in major metro area?), as well as the health and strength there of?
And if building owners are own details space their choices are less robust. WW might not pay out well, but it's better than nothing.
So you get an extra $1m in rent but it now costs you an additional $2m in interest costs financing your building and your share price (or the building capital valuation) has now dropped 15%.
Sorry totally simplified example...
In such times you see all kinds of shenanigans such as landlords giving massive concessions and tenant improvements, effectively dropping the economic price of the rent drastically but preserving the “headline” rent number. Go figure.
I understand that, and thus the question about WW being a canary in the economic coal mine. If there are more and more building owners who literally can't afford to "preserve the valuation" - and WW's success seems to hint at that - then doesn't that say something about the economy that aggregate numbers aren't seeing?
I understand the theory of "preserve the valuation", what I suggesting is that in reality less and less building owners are able to preserve that theory. And some of that is direct result of demand (read: the lack there of) not being in parity with demand.
I am no expert on real estate I used to be a property accountant at an international commercial property company and so used to compute out growth rates on rent and valuations for owners.
I do find WW's business model difficult to follow, there maybe something I fail to appreciate, I guess time will tell.
>Something from WW is better than an empty building...WW might not pay out well, but it's better than nothing.
The deals, if they go through to the end of the lease, are a net positive for the landlord, and they are better than sitting on the empty space. One of the benefits to a WeWork lease is that sometimes they can aggregate hard to lease space under a single lease where the individual spaces might be hard to lease, or there might not be a tenant in the market to take all the space.
The flip side is that WeWork spends a LOT of money on their build outs, and expects the landlord to subsidize that through high TIs (tenant improvements) and a lot of free rent. This means that a WeWork lease will generally wind up costing a landlord a lot of money up front, and it will take longer for that lease to break even.
Yes it might be great to have a tenant like WeWork in the later stages of their lease, but it's always a question of whether they'll have the income in those later years to make it pay off. The other aspect of this is that if WeWork goes dark, your left with space that's like too big for the market (WeWork will take a lot of space off your hands) which is problematic, but their build outs will likely not be very useful for the next tenant. This means capital outlays by the landlord to break up and possibly "whitebox" the space.
The valuation side gets more complicated, so I'll just put that aside for now.
>Couldn't this be interpreted differently? That is, landlords are having less and less choice... It tells us about changes in the economy, as well as the health and strength there of?
I think it does, in a similar way to Uber and Lyft ushering in the "gig economy", but as a company, WeWork doesn't have the tech side of it to back it up. Landlords having less choice is partially of their own doing, and partially a response from companies themselves. Landlords have been pushing rents like crazy, and in many markets tenants are just tapped out. Some of the rent growth seen several years after the recession has moderated, but it's still out of the reach of many tenants that don't have the kind of credit or strong balance sheets that landlords love.
Companies, on the other hand, are changing their strategies and thinking about the utilization of real estate much differently than they were 10 years ago. Open floor plans are the biggest indicator of this, as it allows for more employees to be places in the same square footage. With the high rents of class A office in the city and significant commute times in many metros, companies are now more likely to entertain the idea of having multiple offices, with secondary offices leveraging cheaper spaces either in the suburbs or cheaper markets. Remote work and remote only companies go along with that, in that you need less space if you have a portion of your workforce that is never in the office.
In a way, WeWork is supposed to assist companies by providing them this flex space or their remote employees with a place to work. The problem is that it trades flexibility for cost in a way takes away a good amount of it's value proposition.
Tenant defaults on their lease? OK, kick them out and get someone else in. What's the big deal?
So for an investor who looks at your rent roll, they will see that you have an increased rent arrears and they will value your asset at a reduced rate.
And as the sibling comment has mentioned, if you discount up front you haven't received any money.
Or worse still you provide a rent incentive in the case of a capex fitout and are now left with an office fit out a future tenant may or may not want but you have spent significant amounts of money on.
If there's a shortage of space, having WeWork take a chunk of it off the market is only going to move rents higher. Also, whatever you sign WeWork at is going to set a significant comp in the market, which can again push rents. Businesses do like the idea of being close to a WeWork, so that's going to put more pressure on rents.
There are tenants that are great in bull markets, some that are great in bear markets, and others that are great in both. I would very much describe WeWork as a tenant that is a great bull market tenant, but that's about it.
Disclaimer: Landlord
The thing is that the SPE is absolute requirement for WeWork. They will walk away if you try to challenge them on it. It's ultimately not an issue unless shit hits the fan. Smart underwriters will recognize that and price it accordingly. Unfortunately, there will be many that don't and execs that are trying to push value, so won't want a conservative view on those leases.
The biggest risk (outside of WeWork itself) is bullish investors buying properties at inflated values due to WeWork being on the rent roll, not doing their due diligence on the WeWork lease, and the bottom dropping out.
As polygotdomain wrote landlords know that want We on the lease, ask for it, don't get it, and sign anyway. Short of a smoking gun showing outright fraud courts are unlikely to disregard that bargain.
You yourself said "long term promises to suppliers keep going", which sounds like borrowing to me?
I could just be dense here, feel free to correct me
There is a lot of ideology around homeownership both for and against, I am on the for side, so when asked about the social value of banking, that’s my go-to answer.
But maturity transformation requires FRB.
Stripe isn't tech, it is a payment processor.
Airbnb isn't tech, it is a hotel.
SpaceX isn't tech, it is a defense contractor.
Uber isn't at taxi company, since it doesn't own or operate taxis. Conceptually it's a platform for connecting independent taxi operators with customers, like Expedia or Craigslist or eBay.
Airbnb isn't a hotel company, since it doesn't own or operate hotels. Conceptually it's a platform for connecting independent hotel operators with customers, like Expedia or Craigslist or eBay.
SpaceX isn't a tech company any more than NASA is. They require science and technology but they sell rides on space ships that they own and operate.
Uber is a moonshot bet on re-imagining transportation when autonomous vehicles become a reality. If that reality never materializes, Uber either raises prices and sees its growth rate and valuation crash back down to earth or it goes out of business.
IBM owned everything in sight in computing, amd when PCs cam along, it improbably wound up owning them for a short while too...
Then MS took over. They owned everything in sight, but stumbled when the Internet came around, and then again in mobile. They’ve roared back, but they don’t own everything in sight.
Uber’s valuation doesn’t leave room for stumbles and settling for roaring profitability. It’s a bet that when the inflection point comes, they will own everything and keep owning everything.
It could happen, but it takes more than just autonomous vehicles becoming a reality for their valuation to become real.
When you get to the point of saying space rockets are not technology, it's time to acknowledge that somewhere in the construction of your ontology, something has gone wrong.
“Technology” means the same thing it always has, but the abbreviation “Tech” is slang for computing, the subject of the current industrial revolution.
- Low variable costs
- Low capital investments
- A lot of customer data and customer intimacy
- Network effects
- Ecosystems that boost expansion with little cost
Based on those features, of the companies that you listed here, Uber and Airbnb are definitely tech companies. So is Stripe, I think most of us would agree, although I'm not sure whether there are many network effects with their platform. SpaceX is not.
As such, the only way your point really stands is if one can make a valid argument that WeWork is doing something material and tech-focused that makes it different from a standard commercial real estate company. If it were leasing space and successfully executing on a model with low variable costs, low capital investments, lots of data, network effects and expansion-boosting ecosystems, that would be one thing. That doesn't appear to be the case.
Business and social changes aside, WeWork could have happened 20 years ago.
I'm not sure why Uber is a tech company because you can order a taxi using your phone, but WeWork is not ... because you can reserve a room or space using your phone?
Not all members pay for an office. Some of us are nomads and stay at whichever WeWork is convenient. We make reservations for space using our phone.
The value prop of Uber was that you could be instantly and automatically matched with a nearby taxi (minimizing cost and time) and see those costs / timings in advance. That required[1] the internet and software, i.e. "tech".
[1] Ok, so hypothetically, you could've implemented Uber 60 years ago if the taxi company called every single one of their cabbies every time they got a phone booking, figured out which one was closest, sent them to your location, and then called you back to tell you "your cab will be there in 5 minutes". But tech made it VASTLY more efficient. Tech makes WeWork only marginally more efficient. Hence, not really a tech company.
In fact, I think "efficiency gains from developing tech" is probably the best way to determine if something is a tech company or not. SpaceX is a tech company because they're using advances in technology over the past 60 years, combined with their own advances in technology, in order to deliver a product (re-usable rockets) that is far more efficient than what we had before (and brings down cost appropriately).
If WeWork was AirBnB for work spaces then I'd call them a tech company. But they're not.
So by that logic if Uber ever does migrate completely to a self-driving taxi system, it is no longer a tech company.
That seems fair to say. If Uber transitions to self-driving taxis the whole business model will be radically different. They'll have to employ hordes of mechanics, and lease huge garages to store vehicles and run repair bays. They'll have massive capital expenses, a complex supply chain to manage, and a large distributed and probably unionized workforce to negotiate with. Their geographic distribution, legal exposure, exposure to economic shifts like tariffs, reliance on capital markets, number of employees, etc... will all be radically different. It seems fairly obvious to say that pre-self-driving and hypothetical post-self-driving Uber are totally different kinds of companies.
Uber’s primary business is finding and exploiting legal loopholes, and ignoring regulators. They happen to have an app, that’s all.
An analogy would be a pizza company where you order a pizza with an app but it actually gets made in some random person’s house.
Marginal Cost of Servicing an Extra Uber Driver is $0 Marginal Cost of Servicing an Extra Uber Passenger is $0
Uber is a Tech Company.
Early on, one of the UX joys of Uber was being able to see where your driver was and how soon before they would arrive. SMS wouldn't be quite the same, would it?
Even if AirBnB isn't "tech company" it definitely is NOT a hotel.
We-work gets short-term monetary commitments from renters and turns them into long-term monetary commitments towards landlords
borrow-long then?
Every airline that takes a loan to buy a plane is banking on future demand for air travel, for example.
Or take Amazon Web Services, which is building data centers to lease out on a short term basis.
Yes, there are tremendous risks involved, depending on the lease terms. But it's not at all unusual.
The Amazon example is less relevant on that specific point as AWS owns and operates its own equipment.
I don't see why it would be any harder than selling off a plane in case of market downturn. Both are hard, and in both cases the owners of the asset (whether it's a lease or a plane) will likely incur a loss, so I don't really see any difference here at all.
You are really pushing this point hard, when it does not fit.
No such lock-in exists with WeWork. In fact the entire reason for WeWork's existence is it doesn't have lock-in.
This isn't true for their expanding customer base: Businesses who are paying for blocks of co-working memberships to expand through services rather than finding new leases themselves. There is significant lock-in when this occurs, as people may move close to those WeWork locations, arrange their life around it, etc.
WeWork might be able to survive long term on two factors
1. Prestige & Environs - working in this sort of shared space may be viewed as luxurious in the long term due to rubbing elbows with other well-to-do folks, sorta like going to the opera.
2. Reliability of cost - Owning a condo is a strictly better decision than renting an apartment, but there are spikes in costs when appliances break down and building work needs to be done... though I think to properly reap the benefit of this WeWork needs to be and remain extremely proactive in maintenance, if some vulture capitalists get into the decision making process and let maintenance slip for a bit it'll erase all of this value by forcing the cost (in terms of inconvenience and unavailability) onto the consumer - it's possible this could also be lost if they fail to keep a nice margin of capacity above usage... again, as soon as someone wants to go to work and is unable to secure the space and is forced to either rent or lease conventional office space their competitive edge will dissolve.
I am highly skeptical of the long term prospects if WeWork fails to maintain their prestige and banking your company on prestige is an inherently risky approach IMO.
You are right in that there is risk to what WeWork is doing, but if it's a hard enough problem, the premium paid by owners may be big enough to provide an acceptable margin of error. Secondly, perhaps there is a valid hedging mechanism? Third, does their large network and brand give them a competitive advantage at top of the funnel such that they can charge a higher risk-premium (spread) to owners?
We shall see.
No, that is the market. Just like airbnb compared to normal renting.
WeWork's business model is "borrow short, lend long." That is, they accept very short term promises to pay (month to month leases from customers), and aggregate them to make very long term promises to pay (mutli year leases from suppliers). Keep the spread.
This works as long as there are lots of customers who will pay a premium for short term flexibility. We can presume that will be somewhat cyclical, although in fairness they also probably have caught a secular trend toward remote / coworking / flexibility.
When the cycle turns down, those short termers are done but the long term promises to suppliers keep going ...
That also leaves aside the question of leases with escalators. I have heard a rumor that some WeWork locations have substantial out-year escalator clauses (meaning the rates they owe to suppliers sharply increase in future), meaning that even if customers stay on board, WeWork will face a need to raise prices substantially to meet its obligations.