They don't need to be: they just need to communicate their priorities to that manager. In this case, they communicated that they value short-term goals over long-term.
> it should be sustainable and be based on genuine business fundamentals and not short termism
Probably. I actually agree on that. My point is, that's shareholder's decision. And if you want to argue about that, you should talk to shareholders and explain that they decision hurt themselves. Don't talk to the manager and say that he's in the wrong, because that's not his level of responsibility.
> If share values are driven up by short term financial tricks, new shareholders are being ripped off.
Shareholders, by buying and selling the share values, dictate them. So, they are ripping off themselves. Again, I agree with that: but you should talk to them, not CEOs.
> The role of regulation here is to make sure that apropriate controls and disclosure is in place to make sure that those prospective new shareholders have the information they need to apropriately value what they are buying. Yes the onus on them is to research and understand their investment decisions, but equaly the onus is on the business and regulators to make sure it's possible for them to do obtain that information in clear and transparent way and that management incentives and corporate governanace rules are fit for purpose.
I must admit, I read the article on my phone, so I may have missed it, but did this discussion involve regulations?
That's one of the beautiful things about shareholder democracy in liquid, public markets - exit is always an easy option. (Compare and contrast to, e.g., political democracy, where exit is highly costly and sometimes impossible.)
Stay with me here. It's not fully fleshed out- just kind of a spark: What if, in some fair way I don't know yet, the employees of a public company had some (40%? 51%? I don't know but significant) power to force a shareholder to sell his or her share of the company in a short time frame (30 days?).
This would bring the analogy to political democracy a little closer because the "subjects" would have the direct power to throw out their "governors." We could argue that they have the indirect power now (especially in small companies), but this would make it explicit.
Batshit crazy?
Employees aren't "subjects" and their boss isn't their governor. Shareholders are owners, that's why they get a vote. Employees, SAAS vendors, janitorial service companies, etc, are just people selling stuff.
Overall, employee involvement in decisionmaking creates significant principal/agent problems. Consider this article, which suggests many employees care so little about shareholder value that they will sacrifice the latter for petty revenge against third parties (their boss): http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/is-your-bos...
As to the idea that employees will sacrifice shareholder value (of which they have, roughly, zero) in order to feel better about working (revenge feels good, after all), perhaps that is not unexpected. In my scenario, the employees would have another outlet: they could make it clear to the board that they won't tolerate toxic managers. As things stand, a smart board (I would argue) understands this today, but things get awfully muddy in the real world.
What the proposal does is broaden the conversation from just considering shareholders to another group of stakeholders.
Nobody said they should be, silly. But writing like this implies that the writer thinks so. Otherwise ("they communicated their varied and opposing priorities to their manager who was more confused than ever") the point is lost.
As with our political leaders, the manager made a decision. In his case it was based on his board interaction. He can certainly be judged based on his decision. Just allowing him to wash his hands of it and simply say "I'm doing what I'm told" is way too straightforward in a situation in which there is nuance. [I'm referencing here your comment in which you expressed gratitude to a deity that managers didn't have to worry about things like (quoted from comment you responded to) "ethics, legality, fairness, product quality...".]
Perhaps ethics and fairness shouldn't be lumped with legality and product quality. I don't know how to measure ethics and fairness; I don't really know how to hold a manager accountable for those unless it's written in SOPs or bylaws somewhere (B-Corp?).
FWIW, I find the article entertaining in the same way I find pre-game sports analyses entertaining. Time may tell us whether this decision was a short-term or long-term decision. I'm not convinced that Qualcomm actually 'succumb[ed] to the cult....'" But I find the idea that activist investors can come along and screw up a good thing for their personal short-term benefit and the other stakeholders are for all practical purposes powerless against it frightening. But, hey, it's a scary world.
> They don't need to be: they just need to communicate their priorities to that manager. In this case, they communicated that they value short-term goals over long-term.
Consider copyright: extending copyright helps the owners of copyright, reducing it provides a smaller benefit to every member of the public. Because the copyright holders are better organised as a class they are better equipped to lobby congress and influence politics, leading to the indefinite extension of copyright.
I think the parent was arguing something similar. It's not at all clear that the shareholders at large prefer short term goals. Instead, an influential minority appears to have coordinated on this issue for their own benefit. The disadvantages are spread over a much larger group of passive shareholders, employees, customers, etc.
The regulators already ensure this in various ways:
a) It's illegal for Qualcomm to transmit any information to the activists before it's transmitted to the global markets. For instance, back in April, Qualcomm publicly responded to Jana: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/04/13/qualcomm-responds-to-...
It would be insider trading if Jana were told anything that was not told to everyone.
b) Folks who own significant shares of a public company (I think 5%), i.e. activists, are obligated to disclose it.
c) Activists generally publish their activism. For example, here is a higher up at Jana talking to CNBC about Qualcomm: http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/13/qualcomm-should-consider-brea... The reason they do this is in order to encourage other shareholders to vote the same way they do.
No one is being ripped off. Share values are being driven up because the market believes Qualcomm's prospects for long term cash are lower than the prospects for short term cash. If you disagree with this claim, feel free to get rich with a short position.
That's why shareholders don't make management decisions. They elect a board for it.