That's one of the beautiful things about shareholder democracy in liquid, public markets - exit is always an easy option. (Compare and contrast to, e.g., political democracy, where exit is highly costly and sometimes impossible.)
Stay with me here. It's not fully fleshed out- just kind of a spark: What if, in some fair way I don't know yet, the employees of a public company had some (40%? 51%? I don't know but significant) power to force a shareholder to sell his or her share of the company in a short time frame (30 days?).
This would bring the analogy to political democracy a little closer because the "subjects" would have the direct power to throw out their "governors." We could argue that they have the indirect power now (especially in small companies), but this would make it explicit.
Batshit crazy?
Employees aren't "subjects" and their boss isn't their governor. Shareholders are owners, that's why they get a vote. Employees, SAAS vendors, janitorial service companies, etc, are just people selling stuff.
Overall, employee involvement in decisionmaking creates significant principal/agent problems. Consider this article, which suggests many employees care so little about shareholder value that they will sacrifice the latter for petty revenge against third parties (their boss): http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/is-your-bos...
As to the idea that employees will sacrifice shareholder value (of which they have, roughly, zero) in order to feel better about working (revenge feels good, after all), perhaps that is not unexpected. In my scenario, the employees would have another outlet: they could make it clear to the board that they won't tolerate toxic managers. As things stand, a smart board (I would argue) understands this today, but things get awfully muddy in the real world.
What the proposal does is broaden the conversation from just considering shareholders to another group of stakeholders.
Nobody said they should be, silly. But writing like this implies that the writer thinks so. Otherwise ("they communicated their varied and opposing priorities to their manager who was more confused than ever") the point is lost.
As with our political leaders, the manager made a decision. In his case it was based on his board interaction. He can certainly be judged based on his decision. Just allowing him to wash his hands of it and simply say "I'm doing what I'm told" is way too straightforward in a situation in which there is nuance. [I'm referencing here your comment in which you expressed gratitude to a deity that managers didn't have to worry about things like (quoted from comment you responded to) "ethics, legality, fairness, product quality...".]
Perhaps ethics and fairness shouldn't be lumped with legality and product quality. I don't know how to measure ethics and fairness; I don't really know how to hold a manager accountable for those unless it's written in SOPs or bylaws somewhere (B-Corp?).
FWIW, I find the article entertaining in the same way I find pre-game sports analyses entertaining. Time may tell us whether this decision was a short-term or long-term decision. I'm not convinced that Qualcomm actually 'succumb[ed] to the cult....'" But I find the idea that activist investors can come along and screw up a good thing for their personal short-term benefit and the other stakeholders are for all practical purposes powerless against it frightening. But, hey, it's a scary world.