And that assumes that FBI will continue to remain "the good guys" from now on. Looking at the institution's past deeds I'm not convinced that will be the case: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Hampton#Raid_and_assassina... and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Luther_King,_Jr.#FBI_sur... , just to name a few.
The examples you gave and several others, including instances of using agents provocateur to entrap people who only came to their attention because of lawful and peaceful anti-government activities.
There have been numerous cases of informants working at the behest of the federal government being involved in some highly objectionable activities and direct involvement of federal agencies in the suppression of domestic dissidents.
Your carrier has access to every URL you visit (http or https) and the entire packets sent to/from them (if http), regardless of the password on your phone.
Those Carriers have been MORE THAN eager to bend over backwards & give up the farm to the feds. Just check Verizon, AT&T's history with NSA/FBI/etc.
So, YES, the article is golden, Schneir is golden, but the fact that weaker links exists should still install vigilance & outrage amongst civil libertarians / freedom lovers.
And, even if there are weaker links in the chain, we should still applaud & support strengthening any/all links, while still vigilant/aware of where the weakest link remains.
All good points, & my only point was that while we strengthen each link in the chain, we can't assume we're secure while weaker links exist.
The hostname is a special case, as it's present in the certificate presented by the host, as well as in the client hello if SNI is in use. (Both of these are unencrypted, as they're sent in the process of negotiating the secure channel.)
Exploiting Lawful Intercept to Wiretap the Internet
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-10/Cross_Tom/Bl...
The DUAL_EC_DRBG is a great example of how "golden keys" can be implemented securely, because the underlying problem is the same one that a lot of elliptic curve cryptosystems rely on.
Only the NSA could predict the output of the generator with the same level of security as ECDH or ECDSA.
I think it was Schneier who described encryption algorithms as being like a single fence post which is a thousand miles high. The vulnerability is not the encryption algorithm. The attacker is not going to break the encryption, the attacker is going to get access to the key.
The ways attackers might do that have very little to do with cryptography. Espionage, corruption, social engineering, bureaucratic incompetence, completely unrelated vulnerabilities in government networks, etc.
People are repulsed when you call it a back door or a "golden key," but "secure golden keys" are simply key escrows. Escrows are one of the first things you learn to build after asymmetric crypto.
Escrows are well understood, secure, and generally regarded as a good idea. However, "back doors" are scary, sordid, and insecure?
The encryption is using the usual cryptographic primitives. The problem is that the encryption is not the problem.
> Escrows are well understood, secure, and generally regarded as a good idea.
They are not. Because they're the same thing as back doors.
Using key escrow as a method of e.g. password recovery is a security vulnerability. And at least then you're choosing who you trust and the trusted party doesn't have a nuclear neon target painted on it because the keys in escrow are only for specific parties rather than everybody everywhere.
That's really the main issue. It is manifestly unwise to create a system which, if broken, yields the keys to everything. Because it makes the ROI of breaking it so enormous that the quantity and strength of the attackers you attract will overwhelm any imperfect system, and all systems are imperfect.
I have no idea what you mean by "security vulnerability" in this case. Key escrows are the primary way asymmetric crypto is used in practice. An escrow recovers the symmetric key a message was encrypted with and you proceed as normal.
> the trusted party doesn't have a nuclear neon target painted on it
By that logic, government agencies should operate exclusively by typewriter. They don't because crypto primitives are designed to be secure against unrealistically strong adversaries. No crypto paper has ever said, "Our construction is secure in the standard model as long as the ROI is less than epsilon."
You can go down the path of "what if there's another Snowden, and it's a snow day in Kentucky...," but you aren't doing cryptography anymore--you're just developing mild paranoia.
You're using an unusually broad definition of what "key escrow" means.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow
And your definition is covering the scenarios that nobody would call a back door, so I'm not sure what point you're trying to make.
Giving a third party access to your private information is a security vulnerability unless you can trust the third party, and "you can trust the government" is a statement contrary to evidence.
> By that logic, government agencies should operate exclusively by typewriter. They don't because crypto primitives are designed to be secure against unrealistically strong adversaries. No crypto paper has ever said, "Our construction is secure in the standard model as long as the ROI is less than epsilon."
Once again, the crypto is not the issue. Nobody is expecting the attacker to solve the discrete logarithm problem. But breaking the cryptosystem is not the only way to obtain the encryption keys. You have a serious security vulnerability if the expected value of the attacker obtaining the secret key is larger than the amount of money required to bribe the relevant government employee(s). Or if the servers the government keeps the keys on are vulnerable to heartbleed/shellshock/whatever at any point after attackers learn of the vulnerability, regardless of the strength of the escrow cryptosystem.
> You can go down the path of "what if there's another Snowden, and it's a snow day in Kentucky...," but you aren't doing cryptography anymore--you're just developing mild paranoia.
It's not doing cryptography at all. It isn't a cryptographic problem. The strength of the cryptography makes little difference because the cryptography is not the weakest link.
The problem is that government agencies have demonstrated very clearly that they will use such a key as often and as liberally as they can get away with. Every time the key is brought out and used, it becomes vulnerable to interception or disclosure to the point where pretending that it is sure to be safe is just completely out of touch with reality.
I think that's the main point when people disagree about this kind of thing. One side says "but theoretically our fort knox vault solution would be secure" and the other side says "What I just heard you say is 'If I sprinkle magic pixie dust around this intentional vulnerability and ignore it then it would be secure' and that's ridiculous, a group of humans would not almost certainly not act securely around that vault because they never have".
Of course the "other side" is right, but people don't think that way naturally so this kind of proposal/argument keeps coming up.
Key escrow is a back door.
Schneier has generally moved focus from designing and breaking cryptography (although he was a key contributor to the Skein SHA3 candidate) to the bigger aspects of risk. And trusting the government or any third party is risk.
You'll like his blog.
Only the NSA could generate the key initially. After that, who knows who will get access to it? You still have the same fundamental problem as with all backdoors, you've just eliminated one that most of them have (the fact that they're crap enough that you don't even need the back-door key to access them).
"The NSA" isn't a person. If "the NSA" has access to a backdoor that means there are possibly hundreds of people who have access to that backdoor, every single one being a mere human being.
It's not a secure golden key in a glass box with the label "in case of emergency break glass". It's a note on a shared whiteboard in an open plan office.
Predicting the generator's output reduces to solving the discrete logarithm on elliptic curves, which is incredibly hard unless you chose the private key.
Just like in any asymmetric crypto scheme, given only the public key, it's very difficult to find the private key.
(Actually doing it requires knowledge of how the generator works. I promise you it is easy given the private key, but you can go into its internals if you don't believe me.)
> Isn't it just trivial for someone to "recover" your data by pretent to be you by court order, NSL or other means?
Without a "golden key," somebody would have to ask you. With the "golden key," somebody would have to ask the organization in charge OR you.
Edward Snowden proved how this is far from secure. There are people from the NSA, who if they wanted to spy on a girlfriend, could walk out with those keys.
The underlying problem is that you're no longer relying on technological security and mathematical certainty, but rather on human security and the capriciousness of people who earn $65,000/year to keep secrets.
There's no security at all there.
Your assumption that ""golden keys" can be implemented securely" is wrong. The only secure golden keys are those not used. Which means, in order for such keys to be really secure they mustn't be created.
Isn't is true that today, I can easily clone iPhone's data by declaring I loss my phone and need to buy a new one and recover everything from iCloud?
Isn't it just trivial for someone to "recover" your data by pretent to be you by court order, NSL or other means?
Steve's thought on how safe the data in cloud storage is by asking a question: "How easy is it for me to recover the data from your cloud service if I loss/forgot my password?"
On iDevice, it is NOT that hard for the phone owner to do it. It is trivial for any government agencies fake the owner's phone #, txt Msg, email to recover or reset the iCould password.
How do we know, and be sure that this is true?
Implementing the "back door" might be a difficult problem, but stating a priori that it's an intractable problem is just lazy thinking.
1) Have the device manufacturer, FBI and Federal Court system all create their own public/private key pairs. FBI and the courts publish their public keys; the device manufacturer includes their public key, the FBI's and the court's on each device.
2) Each of these organizations stores their private key in a their own central secure facility. The key is only to exist in airgapped systems, further encrypted using a secure multi-party scheme so that multiple people are needed any time the private keys are accessed. Include personnel vetting, logging, video cameras, secure vaults, etc. to add further security.
3) When the user selects their password, the storage media is encrypted using that password, and the password is stored in a separate location on the device encrypted using the FBI's public key, the device manufacturer's public key and finally the courts' public key.
4) When law enforcement needs to decrypt the phone, they request a warrant from the court. When the warrant is approved, they send a copy of the encrypted password to the court's secure facility. The court decrypts it using their private key and hands it back.
5) The FBI (or the court, whichever) brings a copy of the warrant and the partially decrypted password to the device manufacturer. If the device manufacturer wishes to contest the warrant, they go through the normal appeals process. If not, they decrypt again using their private key and hands the resulting encrypting password over to the FBI.
6) The FBI takes the resulting encrypted password back to their own secure facility and decrypts it once more using their own private key, giving them the plaintext password. They now have access to the device, and could only have done so with a valid warrant and further given a third party trusted by the suspect (the device manufacturer) a further say in whether or not to appeal the warrant.
There's my quick solution. Feel free to further the discussion by critiquing or improving it rather than downvoting to oblivion.
2) If you have jurisdiction over someone, you can force them to decrypt something based on a warrant, so it isn't even desireable for a backdoor to exist. Rather than hoping they follow the rules in their ultra-secret room that normal people will never see, they can work through the court system, publicly.
3) There's a concept called "attack surface." A backdoor increases that, by increasing the number of secrets.
4) The article goes into detail over the real-world failures of systems like these.
5) The device manufacturer does not necessarily have our interests at heart and should not be the party contesting warrants in any reasonable system.
6) Even if the encryption scheme was sound, human error trumps all. We're introducing all sorts of elements, each of which is a point of failure, and none of which has interests aligned with those of the end user (us). OTP is provably secure, you know. It's the key management that gets you.
So we haven't demonstrated the need for this vs. compelling someone via warrant to decrypt and other means. We have good reason to believe that illegal, dragnet surveillance is the real reason for opposition. Even if you believe that our own government is (and always will be) perfectly virtuous with that power, there are many foreign governments with similar capabilities. Not sending them any traffic? Think again (BGP hijacks). And we have lots of experience showing that such systems leave people vulnerable to bad guys.
So this asks us to take on big risks for bad reasons and we know that. There just aren't any good reasons not to dismiss and oppose such systems outright and there are many good reasons to be suspicious of the motives of anyone telling us otherwise.
I blacklisted WaPo some time ago as not being a credible news source. This editorial only gives me further reason to keep them blacklisted.
A lot of people in IT seem to be blind to this. Encryption is no different from a very good hiding spot. If the authorities know it exists and you know how to access the information within it, there are ways to get you to disclose that information. It's not like they will just let you walk away if you simply say "no".
And that's just for the normal "criminals" argument. For "terrorists" there are even more ways to get them to disclose information. Rubber-hose cryptanalysis is a thing.
Rather than critiquing your specific solution, allow me to explain why no solution is possible in general.
0. Because this is Apple, people are assuming Apple's model, but it is not acceptable to enshrine that model into legislation for all of the reasons I could go into if they don't seem sufficiently obvious to anyone. And if Cyanogen on a Nexus device or Debian on a PC doesn't support the backdoor (or does but the device owner has the power to remove it), it is clearly unreasonable to hold Apple to a different standard, and in any event would be ineffective because the "criminals" (or anyone desiring privacy) could just use non-Apple devices.
1. Even if you are willing to pass a law against general purpose computing, if you have a backdoor that can't be updated you have both a security vulnerability (because flaws can't be fixed) and an ineffective backdoor (because if someone e.g. loses their keys there is nothing you can do about it).
2. If you have a backdoor that can be updated, whatever process is used for updating the backdoor is now a security vulnerability. Having the updates signed by the Director of the FBI and the Pope provides no security because the Director of the FBI and the Pope have neither the expertise nor the time to understand what it is they're signing, and a rubber stamp enforced by digital signatures is still a rubber stamp.
Also, what happens once a key is leaked? Are we supposed to throw away every phone and every computer?
Also, if you allow firmware to reflash its keys, then you have a mechanism that again can be subverted (as well as what you point out). I think we've seen it with games that that sort of DRM doesn't work in the long run -- it's routinely cracked, but manufacturers don't care too much as long as it allows them time-windows long enough to make bank. Making it the basis of all data-handling in the land doesn't seem particularly smart.
Saying "it's not possible to build a secure backdoor" is a cop-out.
The truth is, we can build systems so that your data can be decrypted with either your key, or a master key. And we can build systems where the master key requires multiple coordinated parties.
Such systems can be used to implement secure backdoors, but only if we can trust those parties with the master keys to do their job properly.
That requires:
- Proper key security so their keys don't get exposed
- Proper access controls so that the keys are only used for the purpose for which they're intended.
The problem is that we know with complete confidence that all of the parties involved in that process will fail at one or both of those hurdles.
This isn't a technical problem. "Secure golden keys" are technically feasible, and not even particularly hard. It's simply an issue that there is no one that you ought to trust with such a key.
Your alternative is basically saying "it's theoretically possible, but in practice impossible". If so, the theory is incomplete: it fails to account for the human factor.
We've seen law enforcement abuse every form of power they've been handed (see National Security Letters for one example), so I don't trust them to Do What's Right. Ever.
I think that as N grows, the probability that q >= 1 approaches 1. It strikes me as a self-evident feature of human nature.
[source] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984314...
Russian brides I suppose, in the context of this discussion?
Unlike me stealing your data, there are very legitimate reasons for law enforcement to have access to devices to carry out investigations. The warrant requirement is a check on abuse. If there's an issue regarding abuse of power (e.g.: bribing employees, intimidating judges, overly broad laws), it would be better for everyone to work to address the real problems than taking away means for law enforcement to investigate actual criminals.
Correction: it could work, in theory, if US companies were willing to sacrifice massive amounts of revenue for no reward.
The making of phones is going to get commoditized - everyone could make a phone in a few years, from parts and using open source software. Then we will have choices and never have to use spyware again.
The gov't will be able to get the encrypted input for the device mfr, and the output decrypted from that. Given this data, they will have a huge headstart in backing out a solution to what the mfr's private key is.
Even if this weren't so, it makes every major vendor a very cost-effective target for the government. They'll devote resources to either breaking their private key (as I described above), or just using straightforward human engineering techniques. This apparent extra layer of security will not last long in practice.
EDIT - in my 2nd para above, it assumes that a mfr has a single private key, which is probably not the case. But generating a unique key pair for every discrete device is both an expense problem and introduces difficulties with managing the set of keys, which makes its security even more difficult.
A backdoor is a backdoor is a backdoor: an entrance on which you have no visibility nor control. And this is exactly what a "golden key" would be, regardless of how it's implemented.
> how to reduce the risk of 3rd parties [...] gaining access.
Don't you see the contradiction there? Our systems are already full of holes, so let's create some more...?
You also assume I'm a US citizen, which I am not. The minute the US mandate backdoors to manufacturers, all governments will want in, including some very nasty customers. So what do you do next, have separate keys for each government and country-based firmware, i.e. even more holes? It's a slippery slope.
"The thing to look at" is how to remove the capability for third parties to access your data, regardless of who they are. Say that tomorrow I'll wake up in Nazi Sweden (not terribly unlikely, seeing current Euro trends), I'd rather not have brownshirts with keys to all my data - would you?
With regards to other countries, manufacturers are already required to comply with all laws in any country they operate in. I don't think Americans should have to make a decision as to whether or not their own law enforcement should have the ability to decrypt phones based on what Chinese police might do in their own country.
If you're worried about brownshirts taking over your government, there's nothing preventing you from encrypting the data yourself - nothing prevented you from doing it before. There are legitimate reasons for law enforcement to search a device after being issued a valid warrant; same as your house, place of business, safe deposit boxes, etc. Strong encryption by default on hundreds of millions of devices on which people conduct much of their daily business is something new. Locks and safes will slow down an investigation, but never to the point of bringing it to a halt. Strong encryption will. Given how central these devices have become in our lives, I don't know that it makes much sense to prevent police from searching them when they are legitimately investigating an actual crime.
(1) The Mass. Supreme Court ruling/precedent can compel a suspect, with proper legal protocol, to decrypt a device and is NOT an infringement on one's constitutional rights. This makes the entire argument of "responsible disclosure" null and void.
(2) You seeing security holes as "forgot password functionality" shows how uninformed and inexperienced you are. When you start seeing everything from CPU fans (measuring audible signals to detect an encryption key) to the latest un-patchable USB bug (arbitrary code execution via invisible controller-chip firmware alterations) as attack vectors you will begin to realize just how wide the potential 'surface' is. Care to venture what could happen if someone were to, say, reverse engineer the baseband and had access to all firmware functions of a device within an environment where the decryption key was being used? A "golden key" is simply creating the largest historical hacking bounty, and a fool would think such keys could be kept secure indefinitely.
When you are admittedly an amateur and experts are telling you this is a bad idea, you should listen. Whether human or machine history has PROVEN that there is no "perfect system." Introducing unnecessary holes to accommodate bureaucratic pedantry is wholly unnecessary, and I would venture to say, idiocy.
(2) I'm not even going to bother responding to this one since you apparently couldn't be bothered to phrase your argument without an ad-hominem. If you care (which I doubt), I've already responded to a similar argument elsewhere on the thread.
It's not, of course, literally in the Constitution that you cannot encrypt things and then refuse to decrypt them for law enforcement. Nor is it in the Constitution that people selling encryption devices must include backdoors.
What words in the Constitution do you see as pertaining here?
Of course you can encrypt things yourself, and I would imagine you could probably refuse to hand over the password under your 5th Amendment rights. Nothing's changed there.
I think the issue here is that someone else (Apple) has gone and set up an encrypted environment for you in such a way that actively prevents law enforcement from carrying out legal investigations with a warrant on an incredibly popular series of devices that they were capable of searching before. Let's face it - the number of people who are buying iPhones because they are now encrypted is miniscule. If you really wanted to encrypt all of your data, optional full disk encryption already existed on other phones. The problem the police have with it is that it's now set up by default, they can no longer access it when they do have a valid warrant and this extends to everyone instead of just the handful of criminals that would take extra steps to encrypt their data. John Q. Criminal didn't choose to encrypt his phone, Apple made that decision for him.
Not at all true. The fifth amendment doesn't mean the court can't serve you with a subpoena for your device's unencrypted contents and imprison you until you provide it, for life if necessary.
[1] http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2010/04/passwords-and-5th-ame...
[2] http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/03/5th-amendment-bummer....
Why give law enforcement the ability to arbitrarily circumvent these protections? If the court says, "No, the defendant doesn't have to give it up." Why would you want to have a mechanism in place for the prosecutor to say, "Eff the court, we're taking that information anyway."
I'm no lawyer, but I suspect any evidence gathered that way would be thrown out anyway.
Likewise, you've always been able to encrypt your phone/computer/etc., and for the most part the police aren't able to decrypt it so long as you encrypt it properly. Nothing's changed in that respect. It's not a common enough phenomenon that an inability to decrypt some laptops will affect most cases.
The iPhone issue is different, though - it's not the user choosing to encrypt the device; it's Apple choosing to encrypt the device on the user's behalf. This won't affect the search of just a few suspects' property. Due to the popularity of the iPhone, it will likely affect conducting searches for a significant percentage of cases that wouldn't have been a problem before the last update to iOS. The police already needed a warrant to gather any evidence off of your cell phone, anyway; now Apple has gone and effectively stated that the warrant doesn't matter, the police don't have the right to search it to begin with.
That is the key point here: The moment you introduce a backdoor you have painted a target on the parties that needs to hold those keys big enough to be seen from space.
Meanwhile, with compartmentalised keys, some users accounts get compromised all the time, but no single leak is sufficient to get everyone.
"Ah, but that's the thing: You can't build a "back door" that only the good guys can walk through. Encryption protects against cybercriminals, industrial competitors, the Chinese secret police and the FBI. You're either vulnerable to eavesdropping by any of them, or you're secure from eavesdropping from all of them.
Back-door access built for the good guys is routinely used by the bad guys. In 2005, some unknown group surreptitiously used the lawful-intercept capabilities built into the Greek cell phone system. The same thing happened in Italy in 2006.
In 2010, Chinese hackers subverted an intercept system Google had put into Gmail to comply with U.S. government surveillance requests. Back doors in our cell phone system are currently being exploited by the FBI and unknown others."
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/opinion/schneier-apple-encrypt...