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Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by bren2013 on Wednesday October 08, 2014 @09:56PM (#8430431)
There is a subfield of cryptography called kleptography, which studies the "secure golden keys" talked about.

The DUAL_EC_DRBG is a great example of how "golden keys" can be implemented securely, because the underlying problem is the same one that a lot of elliptic curve cryptosystems rely on.

Only the NSA could predict the output of the generator with the same level of security as ECDH or ECDSA.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by AnthonyMouse on Thursday October 09, 2014 @12:17AM (#8430798)
> The DUAL_EC_DRBG is a great example of how "golden keys" can be implemented securely, because the underlying problem is the same one that a lot of elliptic curve cryptosystems rely on.

I think it was Schneier who described encryption algorithms as being like a single fence post which is a thousand miles high. The vulnerability is not the encryption algorithm. The attacker is not going to break the encryption, the attacker is going to get access to the key.

The ways attackers might do that have very little to do with cryptography. Espionage, corruption, social engineering, bureaucratic incompetence, completely unrelated vulnerabilities in government networks, etc.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by yuhong on Thursday October 09, 2014 @07:10PM (#8435468)
I still remember the SecurID fiasco, where RSA had the "golden keys" to all SecurID tokens, and hackers managed to get a hold of them by hacking RSA.
Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by chacham15 on Thursday October 09, 2014 @01:56PM (#8434012)
Obligatory xkcd: http://xkcd.com/538/
Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by bren2013 on Thursday October 09, 2014 @12:28AM (#8430829)
So what you're saying is, "golden keys" are no less secure than any other form of encryption.

People are repulsed when you call it a back door or a "golden key," but "secure golden keys" are simply key escrows. Escrows are one of the first things you learn to build after asymmetric crypto.

Escrows are well understood, secure, and generally regarded as a good idea. However, "back doors" are scary, sordid, and insecure?

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by AnthonyMouse on Thursday October 09, 2014 @12:48AM (#8430876)
> So what you're saying is, "golden keys" are no less secure than any other form of encryption.

The encryption is using the usual cryptographic primitives. The problem is that the encryption is not the problem.

> Escrows are well understood, secure, and generally regarded as a good idea.

They are not. Because they're the same thing as back doors.

Using key escrow as a method of e.g. password recovery is a security vulnerability. And at least then you're choosing who you trust and the trusted party doesn't have a nuclear neon target painted on it because the keys in escrow are only for specific parties rather than everybody everywhere.

That's really the main issue. It is manifestly unwise to create a system which, if broken, yields the keys to everything. Because it makes the ROI of breaking it so enormous that the quantity and strength of the attackers you attract will overwhelm any imperfect system, and all systems are imperfect.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by bren2013 on Thursday October 09, 2014 @01:09AM (#8430919)
> Using key escrow as a method of e.g. password recovery is a security vulnerability.

I have no idea what you mean by "security vulnerability" in this case. Key escrows are the primary way asymmetric crypto is used in practice. An escrow recovers the symmetric key a message was encrypted with and you proceed as normal.

> the trusted party doesn't have a nuclear neon target painted on it

By that logic, government agencies should operate exclusively by typewriter. They don't because crypto primitives are designed to be secure against unrealistically strong adversaries. No crypto paper has ever said, "Our construction is secure in the standard model as long as the ROI is less than epsilon."

You can go down the path of "what if there's another Snowden, and it's a snow day in Kentucky...," but you aren't doing cryptography anymore--you're just developing mild paranoia.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by AnthonyMouse on Thursday October 09, 2014 @01:34AM (#8430964)
> I have no idea what you mean by "security vulnerability" in this case. Key escrows are the primary way asymmetric crypto is used in practice. An escrow recovers the symmetric key a message was encrypted with and you proceed as normal.

You're using an unusually broad definition of what "key escrow" means.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_escrow

And your definition is covering the scenarios that nobody would call a back door, so I'm not sure what point you're trying to make.

Giving a third party access to your private information is a security vulnerability unless you can trust the third party, and "you can trust the government" is a statement contrary to evidence.

> By that logic, government agencies should operate exclusively by typewriter. They don't because crypto primitives are designed to be secure against unrealistically strong adversaries. No crypto paper has ever said, "Our construction is secure in the standard model as long as the ROI is less than epsilon."

Once again, the crypto is not the issue. Nobody is expecting the attacker to solve the discrete logarithm problem. But breaking the cryptosystem is not the only way to obtain the encryption keys. You have a serious security vulnerability if the expected value of the attacker obtaining the secret key is larger than the amount of money required to bribe the relevant government employee(s). Or if the servers the government keeps the keys on are vulnerable to heartbleed/shellshock/whatever at any point after attackers learn of the vulnerability, regardless of the strength of the escrow cryptosystem.

> You can go down the path of "what if there's another Snowden, and it's a snow day in Kentucky...," but you aren't doing cryptography anymore--you're just developing mild paranoia.

It's not doing cryptography at all. It isn't a cryptographic problem. The strength of the cryptography makes little difference because the cryptography is not the weakest link.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by simonh on Thursday October 09, 2014 @10:10AM (#8432431)
That's an excellent rebuttal and I agree completely, but there is another issue with the golden key concept. If the key was only ever goign to be kept ina secure vault burried under Fort Knox forever, it woudl probably not constitute a significant vulnerability. That's the picture golden key proponent paint when they describe such a system.

The problem is that government agencies have demonstrated very clearly that they will use such a key as often and as liberally as they can get away with. Every time the key is brought out and used, it becomes vulnerable to interception or disclosure to the point where pretending that it is sure to be safe is just completely out of touch with reality.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by freshhawk on Thursday October 09, 2014 @05:03PM (#8435013)
> If the key was only ever going to be kept in a secure vault buried under Fort Knox forever, it would probably not constitute a significant vulnerability

I think that's the main point when people disagree about this kind of thing. One side says "but theoretically our fort knox vault solution would be secure" and the other side says "What I just heard you say is 'If I sprinkle magic pixie dust around this intentional vulnerability and ignore it then it would be secure' and that's ridiculous, a group of humans would not almost certainly not act securely around that vault because they never have".

Of course the "other side" is right, but people don't think that way naturally so this kind of proposal/argument keeps coming up.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by SixSigma on Thursday October 09, 2014 @04:59AM (#8431388)
Every crypto system and physical security includes a caveat that states ROI < epsilon.
Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by willvarfar on Thursday October 09, 2014 @01:53AM (#8431006)
Schneier's blog explains his stance on this in great detail consistently over many years.

Key escrow is a back door.

Schneier has generally moved focus from designing and breaking cryptography (although he was a key contributor to the Skein SHA3 candidate) to the bigger aspects of risk. And trusting the government or any third party is risk.

You'll like his blog.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by Zigurd on Thursday October 09, 2014 @01:42AM (#8430977)
This many years after Clipper, you are really claiming key escrow as a legal requirement for doing business in the US is a practical idea? You really don't know how many bad outcomes would have arisen from Clipper?
Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by rcxdude on Thursday October 09, 2014 @03:31AM (#8431204)
>Only the NSA could predict the output of the generator with the same level of security as ECDH or ECDSA.

Only the NSA could generate the key initially. After that, who knows who will get access to it? You still have the same fundamental problem as with all backdoors, you've just eliminated one that most of them have (the fact that they're crap enough that you don't even need the back-door key to access them).

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by pluma on Thursday October 09, 2014 @04:03AM (#8431279)
IOW, it's not a technical problem, it's a social one.

"The NSA" isn't a person. If "the NSA" has access to a backdoor that means there are possibly hundreds of people who have access to that backdoor, every single one being a mere human being.

It's not a secure golden key in a glass box with the label "in case of emergency break glass". It's a note on a shared whiteboard in an open plan office.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by bren2013 on Wednesday October 08, 2014 @10:36PM (#8430527)
> How do we know, and be sure that this is true?

Predicting the generator's output reduces to solving the discrete logarithm on elliptic curves, which is incredibly hard unless you chose the private key.

Just like in any asymmetric crypto scheme, given only the public key, it's very difficult to find the private key.

(Actually doing it requires knowledge of how the generator works. I promise you it is easy given the private key, but you can go into its internals if you don't believe me.)

> Isn't it just trivial for someone to "recover" your data by pretent to be you by court order, NSL or other means?

Without a "golden key," somebody would have to ask you. With the "golden key," somebody would have to ask the organization in charge OR you.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by NoMoreNicksLeft on Thursday October 09, 2014 @02:22PM (#8434182)
> The DUAL_EC_DRBG is a great example of how "golden keys" can be implemented securely,

Edward Snowden proved how this is far from secure. There are people from the NSA, who if they wanted to spy on a girlfriend, could walk out with those keys.

The underlying problem is that you're no longer relying on technological security and mathematical certainty, but rather on human security and the capriciousness of people who earn $65,000/year to keep secrets.

There's no security at all there.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by acqq on Thursday October 09, 2014 @04:47AM (#8431364)
Not only NSA, everybody who gets to have a key could predict the output of the generator. In order for a key to be used, and those that promote it always want to use it, there would be enough copies of that key that very soon it would leak.

Your assumption that ""golden keys" can be implemented securely" is wrong. The only secure golden keys are those not used. Which means, in order for such keys to be really secure they mustn't be created.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by srcmap on Wednesday October 08, 2014 @10:35PM (#8430525)
How real is this issue?

Isn't is true that today, I can easily clone iPhone's data by declaring I loss my phone and need to buy a new one and recover everything from iCloud?

Isn't it just trivial for someone to "recover" your data by pretent to be you by court order, NSL or other means?

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by tonyplee on Thursday October 09, 2014 @11:21AM (#8432907)
I agree! Just listen to "Security Now" popcast from Steve Gibson.

Steve's thought on how safe the data in cloud storage is by asking a question: "How easy is it for me to recover the data from your cloud service if I loss/forgot my password?"

On iDevice, it is NOT that hard for the phone owner to do it. It is trivial for any government agencies fake the owner's phone #, txt Msg, email to recover or reset the iCould password.

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by saganus on Wednesday October 08, 2014 @10:31PM (#8430514)
>Only the NSA could predict the output of the generator with the same level of security as ECDH or ECDSA.

How do we know, and be sure that this is true?

Re:The Horror of a 'Secure Golden Key' by saganus on Saturday October 11, 2014 @03:31PM (#8443211)
I don't know why I got downvoted and I love how people don't give the slightest explanation.