Few weeks ago, I reported to your team that some of the yahoo servers' SSL cert were expired, acknowledged but no one want to fix it (until I post it here and finally get them updated...your site was showing security warning to your users for 2 weeks)
One of your awesome engineers replied the issue with expired SSL cert: "there do not appear to be any security implications as a direct result of this behavior"
How on earth do you manage that? Surely you have a process for monitoring and maintaining them?
Why wouldn't Yahoo set this up to email the group responsible or a ticketing email?
This is not the real issue here, the thing is their engineers think expired SSL cert is okay and no action being done. I told them you are now training your users to `feel` comfortable with browser warnings when they edit their Yahoo profile and risk your users in future's phishing attacks. I asked them why you are not using a self-signed cert if you think expired SSL cert is okay (of coz they didn't reply)
Util I raise this up in another hackernews' thread on their product's announcement and maybe this time it really made them feel embarrassing and finally they fixed it with a day.
The real problem here is actually not on the expired SSL cert, it is their mindset - you should treat every little reports seriously and it is your responsibility, because you are running one of the world's largest web sites.
Not knocking on you or anything, just more interested to know if all exploits have been patched against, more than the # of patches applied.
His team also recently poached Chris Rohlf, from his own company no less!, and Chris is probably one of the best vulnerability researchers working.
(I have no affiliation whatsoever with Yahoo and while I like Alex fine, we're not close friends. I'm pretty biased about Chris, though.)
This is more "vote of confidence" than your comment asked for; I'm just heading off a potentially unproductive thread at the pass. :)
However, genuine question - how does the laymen (like myself) rate infosec specialists? Imagine for a second I'm a senior exec at Target and IBN (IBM's fake arch-competitor) comes to me and says "no worries about security, we use 256-bit encryption, bank grade security, etc etc". Do I believe him?
I feel like infosec is a "I don't know what I don't know" industry and the consequences could be potentially dire.
It gets better: you can't even depend on the large players generally getting it right. If a large organization makes a bad decision with their first infosec hire, it's not a self-correcting problem - the next hires will be cut from the same cloth, and unless something blows up, almost nobody will know.
As far as I can tell the best information provided by a certificate is that you should avoid applicants who brag about them (and for applicants, avoid employers who list them as job qualifications).
The whole point of those audits is to show that, while every company of any importance will eventually have some sort of breach/break-in/hack, the company takes all reasonable steps to prevent it and mitigate the possible effects of such an event.
Infosec isn't a fool-proof thing. There's no way to prevent everything, and all you can do is keep on top of things and take steps to ensure you're doing everything you can to protect your systems.
You WILL get hacked eventually.
This is no guarantee, of course, which is why the pen-test team that Chris Rohlf runs has to stay abreast of and continuously test the latest available exploits as well as the attempts that we see in our logs.
Now, I'm a bit stumped how any obvious variant of the CVE-2014-6271 or CVE-2014-6278 RCE payloads could lead to accidental code execution somewhere else, since they generally produce a parser-breaking syntax error when executed outside an env-encoded function definition. Also, because of an unusual fixed-string prefix required to carry out the attack, there is not a lot you can really do to avoid any half-baked IDS/IPS. Anyway, for the sake of my idle curiosity, I secretly hope that Alex shares the buggy line of code, even though that's unlikely =)
[1] http://lcamtuf.blogspot.com/2014/09/bash-bug-apply-unofficia...
For example, way back in the day before ISS bought my company, somebody claimed their IDS was vulnerable to an IMAP evasion. They actually weren't, but that specific test triggered a wholly separate (and much worse) bug that made it look like it was evadable. I laughed and laughed.
Thank you
In contrast, if you've ever tried to responsibly disclose a vulnerability and gotten a threat from the legal department in response (still common practice in a lot of companies), a bug bounty program can be a very encouraging show of good faith.
I personally think that the opening created for those without the educational or economic opportunities available to developed world researchers is the best side effects of bug bounties.
Now, I have not seen too many people who would be doing it consistently for many years - simply because it gets tiresome. But it's the same thing for security consulting - at most consultancies, pentesters come and go.
I won’t sit here and say that I think they are lying. To make such an accusation would only prove me to be a fool not having ammunition in the weapon before I fire it. I will, however, say that I believe – in my opinion – that this is a wordplay and a game of semantics. First off, there are several “shellshock” exploits. The term “shellshock” as the media has portrayed it is to execute the vulnerability or vulnerabilities recently discovered in bash by means of delivering the following payload: () { :; }; <commands>
When we look at this payload, what we are actually seeing is a function definition, not the execution of or calling of that function, with the regards to the following: () { :; };
The actual “arbitrary code” to be executed last past that point, where we’re no longer defining a function, but instead – giving instructions to be executed on the operating system via Bash. One could inevitable argue that taking the payload, and modifying it to look like: () { whatever; }; /bin/bash –c ‘id;uname –a’ could, or even could not, be identified as “shellshock” in the manner of which it was portrayed to be by the media. However, the fact still remains that this “payload” would cause the execution of the commands proceeding the {};
When we look at the other SIX (6) payloads that essentially accomplish the same exact thing: https://shellshocker.net – we see that modification of the “payload” does not stop the blatant fact that the same underlying results are achieved via the same exact vulnerable code in the Bash shell.
My response to Yahoo! : Please issue out the UNTAMPERED and UNMODIFIED apache logs, showing the payload delivered to your “sports API’s” - and other researchers, and potentially shareholders, determine what the underlying cause was. Furthermore, to state that this resulted in bypassing your “IDS/IDP” and “WAF filters” makes me wonder exactly what kind of IDS/IDP and WAF filtering you’re imploring. I’m willing to bet there were exact phrase match filters looking for what most sites have identified as the “Shellshock” vulnerability, I.e. “() { :; };” and preventing the scripts and/or bash from being executed once that string was identified. That could have been with something as simple as a wrapper for bash… And considering the IPS/IDS didn’t pick up on outbound IRC connections on port(s) 6660 and/or 6667, which NO internal server would have a reason to be connecting to, I can only say that your concept of IDS/IDP is seemingly inadequate in my professional opinion. So, once again, since the vulnerability has seemingly been “patched,” I urge you to release the details of the vulnerability in the script, and also explain why it is that the initial compromise appears to have been on a web-facing box with public access to it, and found amongst a botnet running a perl script that had self-spreading and searching capabilities based around the “shellshock” vulnerability? You are comparing apples and oranges, when in all actuality, you should be comparing “to-may-to” to “to-mah-toh."
Who do you think you are? lol.
Earlier today, we reported that we isolated a handful of servers that were detected to have been impacted by a security flaw. After investigating the situation fully, it turns out that the servers were in fact not affected by Shellshock.
Three of our Sports API servers had malicious code executed on them this weekend by attackers looking for vulnerable Shellshock servers. These attackers had mutated their exploit, likely with the goal of bypassing IDS/IDP or WAF filters. This mutation happened to exactly fit a command injection bug in a monitoring script our Sports team was using at that moment to parse and debug their web logs.
Regardless of the cause our course of action remained the same: to isolate the servers at risk and protect our users' data. The affected API servers are used to provide live game streaming data to our Sports front-end and do not store user data. At this time we have found no evidence that the attackers compromised any other machines or that any user data was affected. This flaw was specific to a small number of machines and has been fixed, and we have added this pattern to our CI/CD code scanners to catch future issues.
As you can imagine this episode caused some confusion in our team, since the servers in question had been successfully patched (twice!!) immediately after the Bash issue became public. Once we ensured that the impacted servers were isolated from the network, we conducted a comprehensive trace of the attack code through our entire stack which revealed the root cause: not Shellshock. Let this be a lesson to defenders and attackers alike: just because exploit code works doesn’t mean it triggered the bug you expected!
I also want to address another issue: Yahoo takes external security reports seriously and we strive to respond immediately to credible tips. We monitor our Bug Bounty (bugbounty.yahoo.com) and security aliases ([email protected]) 24x7, and our records show no attempt by this researcher to contact us using those means. Within an hour of our CEO being emailed directly we had isolated these systems and begun our investigation. We run one of the most successful Bug Bounty programs in the world and I hope everybody here will participate and help us keep our users safe.
We’re always looking for people who want to keep nearly a billion users safe at scale. [email protected]