Not to get too meta, but this 'lack of surprise' thing has become a too-common reaction. I mean, objectively, what's more important - that the NSA is labeling Tor users as extremists, or whether or not you found this new information 'surprising'? Apart from being a distasteful brag, I don't think the assumption is correct. I'd imagine most people's response to be 'anger' or 'depression' or 'concern', although of course it's impossible to know for sure.
But what I really object to, and why I hope people stop using this language, is that it asserts that our collective reaction (however it is characterized) is more important than the story itself. In a very subtle way, it refocuses the argument and lets the NSA off the hook, and indeed, blames us for our having silly, outdated ideas like that our government might value and even protect our right to anonymous speech, rather than criminalize it.
As for the rest, it's possibly true that ubiquity is the only way forward.
I mean, do we really expect anyone else to seriously care about this stuff, when we kind of subtly mock them for having initially cared at all?
"I'm not sure why anyone's surprised" is the nerd version of being too "cool" to ever care about something.
I don;t intend to come over as bragging, but given what is widely know surprise is simply not a sensible reaction if you keep up with the relevant news.
Constantly being surprised by this sort of thing means people simply aren't learning from the recent past. People seem to go from surprised, to offended/angry/disgusted, to apathetic, to completely forgetting until next time, to being surprised again.
I'm not sure what the answer is unfortunately, aside from maybe "stay offended/angry/disgusted and nag and nag and nag and nag and nag until things change or you are arrested".
You lost me here. Privacy, yes, anonymity? Where is that in the Constitution (assuming you're a USA-ian).
I'm too lazy to do my own citations, but the courts have repeatedly struck down bans on anonymous speech on these grounds.
Backed up by the supreme court in the right for group memberships not to be revealed.
You have the right to anonymously assemble and associate with a political group. I hope you don't lose it.
I may be stretching here, but I think most of us would probably agree that monitoring or outright shutting down Tor would be OK if the nefarious usage was 100%. More interesting is, at which point do we consider monitoring morally wrong as that percentage approaches zero?
"The proportion of nefarious types (relative to the total user-base) routinely using Tor is going to be significantly higher then the proportion of such who are not..."
He is claiming that nefarious usage is significantly higher than non-nefarious usage. That's the exact meaning of majority.
That is to say that your odds of finding a nefarious packet is greater on Tor than on the broader internet.
That is certainly the view of the security services: anyone using encryption we can't break is a potential enemy hiding something we want to know.
That is why there were export restrictions on encryption technology until it became obvious that was detrimental (crypto developed elsewhere wan't covered, so the restrictions put allied commercial users at a disadvantage to other countries in the industrial espionage stakes without actually affecting the people the restrictions were aimed at at all).
It is also why services that offer encryption are pressured into giving authorities access to the private keys, and those that refuse (or can't due to the design meaning the keys are only in their users hands) tend to get shut down.
I don't know about exit nodes, but at least for hidden services that seems to be true (assuming you count torrents and drugs as 'nefarious'). See http://www.verisigninc.com/assets/labs/Measuring-the-Leakage... / http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a080.pdf / http://donncha.is/2013/05/trawling-tor-hidden-services/
Doing anything that the NSA do not like, is "cool"; even more so in the global scene.
Seriously, if you want to get people to use Tor, all you have to say is that the NSA do not like it.
> It also records details about visits to a popular internet journal for Linux operating system users called "the Linux Journal - the Original Magazine of the Linux Community", and calls it an "extremist forum". [1]
Hush puppy, it's okay to call absurd that which is absurd. It won't bite you.
Oh, wait...
[1] http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/NSA-targets-the-priv...
1. Putting the state-actor threat in the too-hard pile is a viable security plan.
2. If you sell to governments, especially the US government, you can also sell internationally to strategically important customers and not provide a "trust nobody" level of security. "Trust that I have implemented no back doors."
Going dark simply means providing the level of security that was always needed against mafia-connected state-actors and other high-level threats. And it means adapting to the level of trust (i.e. none) required to do business across multiple sovereign nations that want real autonomy of action.
Yes, you are right. This entire NSA thing is bad business for American companies. Even an erstwhile global darling such as Google suffers from this. They are now being viewed with suspicion ...
The problem with that is there is a minimum threshold: Web-of-trust for key exchange; open clients; encryption the default, etc.
Google can be lauded for being 5% of the way there while everyone else is dawdling and hoping the toothpaste goes back in the tube. But that's not the same as actually equipping their users to trust nobody as the usual day to day way of working.
Any sufficiently (i.e. correctly) encrypted content/traffic should be indiscernible from any other of the same scale. While there are ways to infer what sort of traffic is being carried from certain packed inspection and statistical techniques (a bulk HTTP transfer will look different to a peer-to-peer one and both will look very different to an interactive SSH session, and so on) you can't do that for the content.
There are five groups using Tor and similar by my understanding (in no particular order): criminals (including terrorists, people trafficers, illegal drug industry people, and so forth), the oppressed and freedom fighters (depending on your point of view a lot of people in this category might belong in the first one instead and vice-versa), the paranoid who think the whole world is out to get them, those wanting to protect all their content+comms whether secret or not out of principal, and those who are simply experimenting with it (out of "random" interest, academic interest, or because they work in a relevant/related field).
The proportion of nefarious types (relative to the total user-base) routinely using Tor is going to be significantly higher then the proportion of such who are not, so the authorities are naturally going to look to Tor for that reason. They are not saying that they think everyone using Tor is a terrorist, they are saying some are but we can't tell who so we are going to check everyone.
The only way this will change is if everything is thusly protected, so there will be no difference between the diversity of Tor users and the diversity of the overall population.