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Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:50PM (#50569917)
I think CVSS 9.8 is exaggerated. This is not remotely anywhere near as serious as Heartbleed. It's an internal function which will fail if its input is far too long, but exploitability rests on how untrusted input can reach it; the key word being "untrusted". E.g. if you operate a base64 encoding service on the Internet that just reads all the data into memory at once and calls EVP_EncodeBlock(), that's exploitable. If you have a protocol that involves a block of data with a 16-bit length field which is passed to EVP_EncodeBlock(), that's 100% safe.

For those wondering about TLS: speaking as someone who has written a TLS implementation, AFAIK neither base64 encoding nor decoding occurs in the protocol itself, and the longest length field is 24 bits (Hello stream). Certificate processing involves ASN.1 which does support arbitrarily-long integers, but that's a big hint to check that they're within a sensical range.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:52PM (#50569929)
(I'm a broken record on this so I'll keep it brief). The problem here is that the CVSS score is in the headline, as if it meant anything. But CVSS doesn't mean anything. It's a Ouija board; VR people jack it up to get attention, vendors nerf it to chill their customers out.

Someone should design something better, and less malleable.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by csnover on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:25PM (#50570157)
A few years ago I participated in a study[0] about CVSS and apparently was very much in the minority in feeling that these scores are essentially useless. I have no idea what would actually shift the majority’s opinion on this, but I will at least echo your sentiment that everyone deserves something better.

[0] https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15259

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:35PM (#50570226)
It's not an out-there opinion among vulnerability researchers, though.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pseudohadamard on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:48AM (#50575407)
OpenSSL (I think, or maybe it was Bouncy Castle) no longer submits CVSS values because the final CVEs just end up with some arbitrary value that some random person made up rather than the actual value that the people who wrote the code and know it inside out assigned to it. The scores are actually useless in many cases.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:06AM (#50570398)
I think tiny pieces of isolated code like this function simply cannot be assigned CVSS scores, because it's missing all the context and threat model around how it is used.

Then again, given that I once had to respond to a report which assigned a similar amount of severity to the strlen() function claiming that it will read beyond its bounds if its input is missing a null terminator (DUH!), I'm not surprised at the lack of critical thought among a certain population in this industry.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by solyin on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:35AM (#50570556)
At the end of the day, sysadmins care about "how fucked am I" from an email subject line. A replacement system would be "let me run a daemon on your network telling me what you run" with vendors telling me about the vulnerabilies and I'll tell you if you (the sysadmin) give a shit. Technically that's trivial, but who's gonna trust me to run a daemon like that on their network. Maybe you'd have luck with your public history, but that seems like quite the uphill battle.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JJJollyjim on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:49AM (#50571453)
There are several products like that (Tenable comes to mind). Having used them, I would disagree that "telling you how fucked you are" is straightforward, because they all do a terrible job!

They will statically determine (e.g. by SSHing in and rummaging around) that a library with a known vulnerability exists on the filesystem, but determining the reachability of that bug in the system as a whole (can this be exploited by the entire internet, or 3 sysadmins, or no one at all?) is not really an automatable task.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by fc417fc802 on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:10AM (#50571609)
What if we standardized some sort of representation of known vulnerable combinations instead of a numeric score? As well as a standardized way to record system state regarding which libraries are used together and which of the resultant application stacks have network access or whatever else. That sort of data could be readily analyzed by automated tooling.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vasco on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:15AM (#50571212)
CVSS would be fine if they shared full vector rather than adding up the score. The vector is representative of what. Going from what to "how bad" through making it a single number is where they messed up because the weights usually don't make sense from case to case.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JJJollyjim on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:43AM (#50571412)
I don't see that being at all helpful in this case. Which part of the vector conveys "this is a library function, so everything from the attack vector to authentication requirements to impact depends on how your application is utilising it, if it is at all"? For a bug like this, anything you select for into those fields is a stab in the dark.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by lillesvin on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:12AM (#50572591)
One major issue with CVSS is "attack complexity". It only has two options, high and low, and they're entirely dependent on the time in which it's evaluated.

Something that was super complex a few years ago might be super simple today. And I'm not talking about LLMs, I'm talking about stuff like if some CVE was dependent on you breaking e.g. MD5 in 1998, then it'd be "high", but in 2026 it's most certainly not that. And it doesn't need to take 28 years for something like that to change. It can theoretically happen over night or as the result of some other vulnerability. It even goes the other way too e.g. when ASLR was introduced.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by nizbit on Friday November 20, 2026 @04:47AM (#50572387)
Time is a construct. CVSS is a vibe.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by zzril on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:18AM (#50572647)
"Internal"? It's documented in the `libssl-dev` manpages.

(Although I agree it should be an internal function.)

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jtrn on Friday November 20, 2026 @06:27AM (#50573211)
THIS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THIS times 10000!

I'm starting to get annoyed about the OMG OMG BREAKING BREAKING ALARM-EMOJI crap that's not a real emergency.

Four times in the last month, I dropped everything and started investigating whether a serious CVE related to any of our dependencies warranted an emergency bump, only to be frustrated that images, even from AWS, did not have the fix yet. So then I had to worry about whether I should build from source. We actually built PHP from source and deployed it to prod, just to get ahead of the PHP2Shell vulnerability

But yesterday's PHP vulnerability, CVE-2026-115560, didn't even apply to us or most people running PHP, and I don't think there are any realistic working exploits out there. I'm not saying that it's not possible, but I'm starting to feel that there's a large difference between what's theoretically possible and what's practically possible. And given the storm of patches and vulnerabilities found, this will become increasingly important to ask.

I think everything above a CVE score of 9.0 should warrant some level of “how exploitable is this in real life,” and anything above 9.5 should be proven to be easy for an attacker to execute, not just “possible in theory.” I don't see how we will survive as developers if there isn't some sort of better triage for vulnerability severity assessment. If everything is an emergency, then nothing is an emergency.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by stingraycharles on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:32AM (#50574410)
Yes, and this also causes inertia, as if everything is super highly critical it means nothing is, and people will stop caring when something is actually serious.

Heartbleed, Spectre, log4shell, they were all worthy of a 9.8.

This isn’t.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by ylk on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:50AM (#50575431)
There are more values in the CVSS vector you can fill in yourself: environmental and threat scores

So you can take e.g. a 9.3 critical down to 6.5 medium by setting CIA requirements to low and exploit maturity to Unreported.

I’m not saying CVSS is perfect but if you want to have a score that applies to your environment, you have to input some info about your environment into it.

“how exploitable is this in real life” is answered by the exploitability score, which is calculated from Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Attack Requirements, Privileges Required, and User Interaction scores.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jtrn on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:01AM (#50576745)
Good info, thanks.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dboreham on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:35AM (#50576256)
Yes. Lots of this. E.g. the nginx flap yesterday depended on http/2 being enabled, which it isn't by default. AI can be helpful with the analysis though.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by guipsp on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:57PM (#50579009)
No one runs nginx in the default configuration
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jeroenhd on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:16AM (#50574234)
CVSS scores do not indicate priority. They give a baseline so you can pick what CVEs affecting you you should do risk analysis for first.

The score is just fine. The people misinterpreting everything with a CVSS score higher than 8 as the end of the world are panicking over nothing.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by npongratz on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:41AM (#50574507)
> The people misinterpreting everything with a CVSS score higher than 8 as the end of the world are panicking over nothing.

They are indeed, but that means CVSS has turned into a trigger for The Boy Who Cried Wolf. So we need a different metric. The problem, of course, is that adding a new score creates an xkcd 927 issue.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jeroenhd on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:51AM (#50575450)
It's impossible to create such a score if you want to represent it somewhat objectively in a somewhat simple number.

If you want a quick overview of the risk: CVE-2026-121481 is listed as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H which is what calculates the CVE score. This is missing the temporal/environmental components (which rarely ever seems to get entered).

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by da_chicken on Friday November 20, 2026 @08:56AM (#50574717)
This. It's a calculated score based on pretty objective measures. Yes, the CVE[0] notes that "The severity is Low because no attacker-controlled path to the overflow is known."

But risk or severity is not what CVSS measures. It's a score intended for security professionals who know the context, graded against a fixed algorithm, with a fixed definition for each answer. The nvd.nist.gov site isn't always the easiest to use, so grab a good CVSS calculator[1] and look at what it means. That's why the alphabet soup vector string is there: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

I'm sorry, CVSS wasn't meant to eliminate your need to think or understand your environment. Yes, if it's a 9.8 CVSS you should look at it. Triggering you to look at it is all the CVSS is meant to do!

Now, whether you think CVSS scores mark too many things as High or Critical is a little secondary. There is a reason we're at CVSS v4. Defining metrics and keeping them useful while remaining objective is difficult. This vulnerability, however, is exactly the kind a chain exploit would take advantage of.

[0]: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-121481 [1]: https://www.metaeffekt.com/security/cvss/calculator/

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dns_snek on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:19AM (#50575902)
[delayed]
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by da_chicken on Friday November 20, 2026 @10:56AM (#50576657)
Exactly, yes.

And CVSS v4 does add criteria that let's the provider specify how urgent it is, if it can be automated, etc.

I think the bigger problem is that the scoring system lets you specify a small number of factors and still reach a 10.0, and all the optional and supplemental factors reduce it. Like if you try to enter this vulnerability into v4 and fill out more factors, you easily drop it into the 8s.

So essentially everyone submitting the vulnerability is doing the bare minimum, contributing to the perception that the scores are inflated.

And then people don't use the current version of the score. CVSS 3.1 came out in 2021. CVSS 4.0 came out in 2023. Why the hell is everyone still using 3.1?