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Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vasco on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:15AM (#50571212)
CVSS would be fine if they shared full vector rather than adding up the score. The vector is representative of what. Going from what to "how bad" through making it a single number is where they messed up because the weights usually don't make sense from case to case.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JJJollyjim on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:43AM (#50571412)
I don't see that being at all helpful in this case. Which part of the vector conveys "this is a library function, so everything from the attack vector to authentication requirements to impact depends on how your application is utilising it, if it is at all"? For a bug like this, anything you select for into those fields is a stab in the dark.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by lillesvin on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:12AM (#50572591)
One major issue with CVSS is "attack complexity". It only has two options, high and low, and they're entirely dependent on the time in which it's evaluated.

Something that was super complex a few years ago might be super simple today. And I'm not talking about LLMs, I'm talking about stuff like if some CVE was dependent on you breaking e.g. MD5 in 1998, then it'd be "high", but in 2026 it's most certainly not that. And it doesn't need to take 28 years for something like that to change. It can theoretically happen over night or as the result of some other vulnerability. It even goes the other way too e.g. when ASLR was introduced.