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Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @10:52PM (#50569929)
(I'm a broken record on this so I'll keep it brief). The problem here is that the CVSS score is in the headline, as if it meant anything. But CVSS doesn't mean anything. It's a Ouija board; VR people jack it up to get attention, vendors nerf it to chill their customers out.

Someone should design something better, and less malleable.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by csnover on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:25PM (#50570157)
A few years ago I participated in a study[0] about CVSS and apparently was very much in the minority in feeling that these scores are essentially useless. I have no idea what would actually shift the majority’s opinion on this, but I will at least echo your sentiment that everyone deserves something better.

[0] https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15259

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by tptacek on Thursday November 19, 2026 @11:35PM (#50570226)
It's not an out-there opinion among vulnerability researchers, though.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by pseudohadamard on Friday November 20, 2026 @09:48AM (#50575407)
OpenSSL (I think, or maybe it was Bouncy Castle) no longer submits CVSS values because the final CVEs just end up with some arbitrary value that some random person made up rather than the actual value that the people who wrote the code and know it inside out assigned to it. The scores are actually useless in many cases.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by userbinator on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:06AM (#50570398)
I think tiny pieces of isolated code like this function simply cannot be assigned CVSS scores, because it's missing all the context and threat model around how it is used.

Then again, given that I once had to respond to a report which assigned a similar amount of severity to the strlen() function claiming that it will read beyond its bounds if its input is missing a null terminator (DUH!), I'm not surprised at the lack of critical thought among a certain population in this industry.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by solyin on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:35AM (#50570556)
At the end of the day, sysadmins care about "how fucked am I" from an email subject line. A replacement system would be "let me run a daemon on your network telling me what you run" with vendors telling me about the vulnerabilies and I'll tell you if you (the sysadmin) give a shit. Technically that's trivial, but who's gonna trust me to run a daemon like that on their network. Maybe you'd have luck with your public history, but that seems like quite the uphill battle.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JJJollyjim on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:49AM (#50571453)
There are several products like that (Tenable comes to mind). Having used them, I would disagree that "telling you how fucked you are" is straightforward, because they all do a terrible job!

They will statically determine (e.g. by SSHing in and rummaging around) that a library with a known vulnerability exists on the filesystem, but determining the reachability of that bug in the system as a whole (can this be exploited by the entire internet, or 3 sysadmins, or no one at all?) is not really an automatable task.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by fc417fc802 on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:10AM (#50571609)
What if we standardized some sort of representation of known vulnerable combinations instead of a numeric score? As well as a standardized way to record system state regarding which libraries are used together and which of the resultant application stacks have network access or whatever else. That sort of data could be readily analyzed by automated tooling.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by vasco on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:15AM (#50571212)
CVSS would be fine if they shared full vector rather than adding up the score. The vector is representative of what. Going from what to "how bad" through making it a single number is where they messed up because the weights usually don't make sense from case to case.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by JJJollyjim on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:43AM (#50571412)
I don't see that being at all helpful in this case. Which part of the vector conveys "this is a library function, so everything from the attack vector to authentication requirements to impact depends on how your application is utilising it, if it is at all"? For a bug like this, anything you select for into those fields is a stab in the dark.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by lillesvin on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:12AM (#50572591)
One major issue with CVSS is "attack complexity". It only has two options, high and low, and they're entirely dependent on the time in which it's evaluated.

Something that was super complex a few years ago might be super simple today. And I'm not talking about LLMs, I'm talking about stuff like if some CVE was dependent on you breaking e.g. MD5 in 1998, then it'd be "high", but in 2026 it's most certainly not that. And it doesn't need to take 28 years for something like that to change. It can theoretically happen over night or as the result of some other vulnerability. It even goes the other way too e.g. when ASLR was introduced.