News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Sunday October 11, 2026 @07:25PM (#50049153)
> at login time it's not possible to retroactively require attestation if it wasn't obtained during registration.

Of course it is, the site will reject the passkey and require you to create one that is attested.

> Are Netflix and Twitter currently requesting attestation when people register passkeys, and rejecting the registration if the user declines the permission prompt?

They could start tomorrow.

> a hypothetical and unlikely scenario.

You have not been paying attention, that scenario is where this whole thing is building towards.

> If consumer-facing sites start requesting attestation when registering passkeys, they deserve to be vigorously called out

It's going to be the banks first.

Why called out, it's all for your safety, to make sure you are not using an insecure client that might leak your data.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by agwa on Sunday October 11, 2026 @07:31PM (#50049218)
So they're gonna stop supporting Apple users?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Sunday October 11, 2026 @07:45PM (#50049354)
Nah, Apple is going to provide attestation, and since you can't or won't be able to share keys between accounts, no harm no foul.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by EA-3167 on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:18PM (#50049615)
For a lot of people Apple is the ecosystem they access everything through, including payment processing. That cuts both ways, but Apple has shown a clear preference for protecting user privacy when they could have chosen to do otherwise, presumably because it makes them more money in the long run.

Why would that suddenly change in Netflix or some other company's favor at Apple's direct expense?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:32PM (#50049747)
It's not in Apples expense, it's actually in it's benefit, your keys would be in their system, and impossible for anyone (including you) to get them out of it.

So you are now locked in to the apple ecosystem forever. You now need Apple to watch Netflix from your Samsung TV.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by WorldMaker on Sunday October 11, 2026 @10:42PM (#50050694)
Apple has very good support for Passkey storage in third party password managers/wallets. They don't seem to want Passkeys to be a lock in. They've also made it clear that they see attestation as a consumer privacy violation and won't support it.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by makeitdouble on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:24AM (#50051362)
> They've also made it clear that they see attestation as a consumer privacy violation and won't support it.

I'm trying to get a source on this but failing, do you have a link or some wwwdc sessions where Apple detail their stance ?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by WorldMaker on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:47AM (#50052257)
This is some of my notes from the last time this came up: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43988852
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by makeitdouble on Monday October 12, 2026 @07:09AM (#50054607)
Thanks a lot !

I see your angle, but would take their comments more at face value: their concern is really sync, anything privacy probably being the nice side effect.

Sync has been part of their strategy for a while now, from revamping the whole iMessage stack to allow for sync, to their work on eSim etc. so the move doesn't break with their recent trends either.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by WorldMaker on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:01PM (#50062167)
It seems a case of both. It's easier to find more written documentation than spoken documentation. Unfortunately I have no idea how to search WWDC talks or the like, because they have brought up privacy concerns many times.

That comment reminded me too that Apple had briefly talked about supporting consumer attestation if they thought they could make it private enough and the compromise they ended up supporting and delivering were the uvi and uvm extensions, which is nothing like Attestation, are not attested claims (and can be "lied" about by passkeys), but are a much more privacy preserving alternative. Since uvi and uvm were accepted as standards I've not heard of Apple mentioning consumer attestation again.

(uvi and uvm are the CYA assertions that "this key was involved in a multi-factor process such as biometric unlock" which RPs like banks can use for "due diligence" and "regulatory compliance" to require keys be MFA in some way without requiring a full Attestation. Because they aren't attested they are "I solemnly swear a biometric unlock was used" claims, but in terms of regulatory compliance that should be enough in most jurisdictions especially if you can prosecute liars as in-breach-of-contract or felony misdemeanors, which a bank can in cases of banking fraud. So these extensions are huge and another big reason this article is wrong about the slippery slope here, because Apple already made huge progress in standing up bulwarks against it, uvi and uvm extensions being big bulwarks against attestation requirements for consumers.)

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by EA-3167 on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:36PM (#50049780)
You make it sound like Apple needs to lock the door instead of just opening it while everyone else shoots themselves in the foot. For people who want "it just works" as the highest function of their device, nothing comes close to Apple. It's only people with a technical inclination or specific needs who chaff at that, or people like me who are just cranky old bastards who don't want their own media collection apart from i/Apple/Everything.

But man... I cannot tell you how many people don't even notice the walls of the garden. Besides Apple is in competition with some huge players, more than capable of offering "Done with Apple literally trapping you? Follow this link and we'll transfer your passkeys."

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:51PM (#50049893)
> Done with Apple literally trapping you? Follow this link and we'll transfer your passkeys.

That's the whole point of the FIDO specs. This is now literally impossible to do. All the vendors are weirdly okay with this I believe it's because it cuts both ways.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by rufo on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:17AM (#50052030)
Except that this is not true. There is a FIDO specification for both a format and secure protocol for exchanging passwords and passkey information between password managers, with support on all Apple platforms, and implemented by 1Password, Bitwarden, Dashlane, and more:

https://rmondello.com/2026/09/07/switching-password-managers...

https://fidoalliance.org/download-credential-exchange-specif...

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by FireBeyond on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:36PM (#50058945)
Oh, that's good. They've moved on from threatening password managers of their ability to be considered a trusted app if they offer that functionality, like they did to KeePass. "We'd hate to have to blacklist KeePass".
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by tennysont on Tuesday October 13, 2026 @07:15PM (#50080299)
> for both a format and secure protocol

No, there is a working draft of a protocol. The "format" is only for use in the protocol, not a separate thing. Thus, giving the user a file is disallowed under the spec as per §5.1.1.1 which reads

  > Explicitly state that the orchestrating party only transmits the credential exchange data between the exporting provider and importing provider.
And, in accordance with the spec, 1Password refuses to export passkeys directly to users for manual import on another platform or app. FIDO developers have complained about Keepassxc violating the spec and threatened to blacklist them as a result[1].

Furthermore, 1Password (who is apparently leading the way on the FIDO exchange protocol design) has not implemented _any_ passkey export on _any_ desktop platform.

It is interesting that you listed Bitwarden, since I believe that FIDO developers have specifically disavowed Bitwarden's behavior of allowing users to access their passkeys.

[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

[2] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by makeitdouble on Sunday October 11, 2026 @11:22PM (#50051009)
> "it just works"

That ship has sailed a long time ago.

Most people still hanging to that part have already built a whole way of life around the Apple ecosystem and the boundaries and how to work around them have become second nature to them.

The iPhone is now near 20y old, the world also changed, most got enshitificated, and looking at kids and elderlies dealing with their iPhones and macs none of it "just works".

Looking at Japan, it was the bastion of iPhone predominance, but I'm the latest numbers 30+ yo gradually got off the train to move to android as their phone is just becoming another tool to them.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by EA-3167 on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:38AM (#50051449)
You said “it doesn’t” a whole lot, but unless I missed something you didn’t give any examples of what’s failing. From my own experience integration of peripherals is seamless within the ecosystem, and my elderly relatives never need tech support.

I’m sorry you’ve had a bad time though.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by makeitdouble on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:15AM (#50052017)
From the top of my head, try to share your Fitness data to someone on a regular basis. We bought our mother in law an Apple Watch and she asked us to remotely check her data from time to time. We gave up pretty fast.

I'm on Android and my kid got my old iPhone. Parental controls can't be set by me.

My Apple ID still tried to contact my old iPhone when logging in as a dev.

I don't need to expand on iMessage and where messages go, it's part of the lore at this point. My wife's airport auto-swirching was also a mess to the point she disabled it.

Google Maps' time line features get randomly shut off and you only know it way after the fact.

The list just goes on and on. I also have my frustrations on other platforms, I'm just pointing out Apple is far from being great. People just get used to the rough edges after a while and tout it as "good enough".

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by qlte on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:06AM (#50052422)
Both Android and iOS support 3rd party password managers as the passkey store. Bitwarden with passkeys works seamlessly on both my iOS and Android devices (along with MacOS, Windows, and ChromeOS).

If passkeys are intended for platform lock-in then Big Tech is doing a really bad job...

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:04AM (#50052997)
Apple used to support attestation, but has removed it from recent iOS versions.

I really wish WebAuthN critics could finally update on this point. There is so much else to complain about, but nobody will listen to somebody regurgitating points stale by several years.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by simoncion on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:18AM (#50054170)
> Apple used to support attestation, but has removed it from recent iOS versions [therefore, Passkey attestation isn't going to happen].

From [0] (via [1]), we have the following statement from an unnamed Apple Systems Engineer:

  Passkeys do not provide an attestation statement, as the attestation model currently defined in WebAuthn wasn't designed with syncing credentials in mind.
  
  Attestation was designed to attest to a specific device, exclusively at the point of creation, with a specific set of security properties. It doesn't make sense for synced credentials for a number of reasons, including syncing to devices with different security properties, changes in security properties that happen after key creation, security properties of the sync fabric, sharing the passkey, or exporting to other passkey providers. We're working hard with W3C and FIDO to solve these problems.
Sounds to me like Apple is working hard to enable attestation. It also sounds like attestation _might_ also require sharply restricting -if not preventing- freedom to sync the attested credential.

[0] <https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/708982> (FYI: You'll need to click a button to see the second paragraph in my pull quote)

[1] <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43988852>

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by yencabulator on Wednesday October 14, 2026 @02:37PM (#50092724)
> sharply restricting -if not preventing- freedom to sync the attested credential

They already did that! That was the first round! It is only through community outcry that "Credential Exchange Format (CXF)" came to existence.

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

This one is specifically about 1Password: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37836783

There was a similar thing about what Google did with Android (basically making only the built-in manager viable, for a while), but I can't find a good link.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by somerandom2407 on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:21PM (#50049642)
Any site/service could easily implement their own proprietary solution to force compliance around usage of said service. Whether they can abuse Passkeys or not is irrelevant. If the service does something inappropriate, you can stop using it and, if necessary, build a competing service that is not abusive.

To suggest that people should stop using Passkeys over this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. All of these features of Passkeys are appropriate in a given context. The only concern is where a service that might not need/justify "high security" Passkeys starts demanding them anyway, and no-one is forcing you to use said service in that case.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Sunday October 11, 2026 @09:31PM (#50050214)
I kind of agree, the problem is not individual sites consuming passkeys.

The main problem in my mind is on the side of the vendors, attestation, secure hardware, etc is all an excuse to lock you in to their device/ecosystem.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by skulk on Sunday October 11, 2026 @09:07PM (#50050027)
Any government can spy on a few people, and we're generally fine with that. But when they build a robust network of surveillance devices but pinky promise that they're only being used to spy on those same few people, we bring out the electric saws. It's a very similar situation with normalizing passkeys.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by somerandom2407 on Sunday October 11, 2026 @10:52PM (#50050764)
The concern you're raising here is that the government might secretly force big companies like Facebook or Google to require attested passkeys that restrict usage to only approved first-party keystores right?

Passkeys exist now and there's no taking them back. However, even if they did not, the government might well just develop its own authentication system and require that it be used under policies that require age verification for social media, for example. Hell, they might end up doing that anyway, and that would be no different. If the government wants to force tracking/verification on certain websites, it won't simply be something they walk away from if Passkeys don't exist. You can only fight this with your vote and by not using those services once they implement such controls.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by AnthonyMouse on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:58AM (#50051886)
> Passkeys exist now and there's no taking them back.

I mean, we can take them back. Everybody refuse to use them and cause as much trouble as possible for anyone who tries to make you. Use TOTP or similar instead.

> If the government wants to force tracking/verification on certain websites, it won't simply be something they walk away from if Passkeys don't exist.

The way you fight things like this is by making it so the current technology is incapable of doing it and then if they try to legislate it, you have more time to roll back the policy before the technology to support it can be developed and imposed on everyone.

Implementing support for the dystopian technology before the law even requires it is the opposite of that.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by hubbahubbahubba on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:03PM (#50059358)
Id.me tells peasant to record a video and like it.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by devsda on Sunday October 11, 2026 @09:30PM (#50050208)
> If the service does something inappropriate, you can stop using it and, if necessary, build a competing service that is not abusive.

Like how everyone stopped using Google/Gmail, Facebook/Instagram and Windows/Office365 and flocked to alternatives?

Let's flip your suggestion. What if someone says if you need "high security" build a competing service that enforces it, no one is forcing you to use a "low security" service ?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by somerandom2407 on Sunday October 11, 2026 @10:40PM (#50050680)
The people don't care enough to bother, and that's fine - it's not your (or my) place to force other people to do anything.

My point was not about getting critical mass, it's that the service can already do anything they like to lock people into whatever they want and gatekeep their service. They can do it with Passkeys, or they can do it with a proprietary alternative and if they're big enough, they'll get away with it. Neither of us can sway them at all - I wasn't saying they should do this, only that they can.

Blaming Passkeys is aiming at the wrong target. Passkeys rightly offer features that have valid use-cases, even the attestation in the right context. Can they be abused? Probably, but so can just about anything. Passkeys do, on the other hand, offer some real tangible benefits that other mainstream solutions do not.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by devsda on Sunday October 11, 2026 @11:29PM (#50051055)
> Can they be abused? Probably, but so can just about anything. Passkeys do, on the other hand, offer some real tangible benefits that other mainstream solutions do not.

Let the usecases that need passkeys use it.

Why can't there be a parallel standard with similar features that doesn't have the parts that can potentially be abused. If the difference between abuse and non-abuse is a vague promise and the good graces of corporate structures, it is better to err on the side of caution and demand solutions that make it impossible.

> The people don't care enough to bother, and that's fine - it's not your (or my) place to force other people to do anything.

Yeah it wasn't your place or anyone else's. How can you or I force anyone. Not sure why that even came up.

Debate is how we evolve new and alternate solutions. Handwaving by saying not your place or mine is not how we affect change if needed.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by akersten on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:39AM (#50051786)
What baby? Oh boy, a new authentication method just as secure as my unique per-site random password that I keep in my password manager already anyway, except I also completely lose access to it if I ever get locked out of my Google devices. The future is truly revolutionary.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by dfabulich on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:33AM (#50052148)
Passkeys are stored in your password manager, too. You'll only lose access to your passkeys if Google is your password manager and you get locked out of your Google account. So, if you don't trust Google, use another password manager. (May I recommend Bitwarden?)

The advantage of passkeys is that no one can trick you into giving your passkeys to the wrong person. Every time this comes up, people say "I don't need that! I've got a password manager. I'm too smart to get tricked." But they are wrong.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by takluyver on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:57AM (#50054510)
The concern is that the site you're logging into can tell the difference between a passkey created by Google on a (recent, non-rooted, locked bootloader) Android device using its cryptoprocessor, and a passkey created by Bitwarden which you can sync/backup as you like. And Google, Apple & Microsoft are well positioned to encourage people towards the former over the latter.

The possibility that sites will require attested keys does seem pretty remote at the moment, but if passkeys take off and >95% of people use keys tied to their phone, I could totally see sites starting to prevent you using a key from Bitwarden. I don't think there's a conspiracy trying to achieve this, but the incentives of security & lock-in could push us there.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by raxxorraxor on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:50AM (#50055703)
Exactly. We saw this with banking apps forcing use to use insecure but attested devices for their insurances. Fool me once... no thank you to passkeys for now.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by quacktopia on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:12AM (#50051985)
I believe passkeys can be made phishing resistant, as they can be cryptographically bound to a given application, and the application has to attest itself to your system too.

You won't be able to use your google account passkey to log into the perfect clone of "gmail.com" where the 'a' is actually a greek or cyrillic letter or something, and neither will your ageing parents. You could still paste your password into the fake site from your password manager, or the spyware on your computer could still sniff it from your clipboard.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by pkulak on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:44AM (#50052234)
Password managers check the domain before they fill.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by qlte on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:00AM (#50052362)
...until you login to, say, your Microsoft account on one of like 27 domains that use the same SSO and your autofill doesn't trigger so you just grumble to yourself "man I hate the modern web" and manually copy/paste it in.

Hopefully after thoroughly checking the URL but you only have two minutes before the Uber gets here and just need to get this one last thing done ASAP...

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:11AM (#50053547)
But users can and do override this decision. "Huh, why isn't 1Password autofilling my password on bank0f4merica.com? Let me quickly select 'autofill and remember'..."

I'm somewhat desensitized to this myself for non-bank use cases. It's unfortunately necessary with corporate merges and rebrands. After all, how is my password manager supposed to know that it's safe to fill my hulu.com password on disneyplus.com? The same applies to mobile apps providing some-outsourcing-vendor.com instead of my-actual-service-provider.com etc.

For passkeys, there's native support for that type of thing using "related origin requests": https://web.dev/articles/webauthn-related-origin-requests

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by TeMPOraL on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:33AM (#50055500)
> But users can and do override this decision.

Yes. That is a feature, not a bug.

Transferability and delegation of authority are features. Calling them "phishing vectors" only makes them seem like a bug.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:51AM (#50055723)
Being able to enter my Hulu password on disneyplus.com is a feature, being able to enter my Bank of America password on bank0famerica.com is a bug. The problem is that the same behavior causes both.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by TeMPOraL on Monday October 12, 2026 @10:42AM (#50057131)
I'll raise you a better one:

Being able to give your Hulu or Bank of America password to your spouse is a feature, but giving it to a scammer is a bug.

Can't have one without the other, but I disagree making credentials non-transferrable is the right choice.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by account42 on Tuesday October 13, 2026 @04:12AM (#50068351)
Name one password manager with an "autofill and remember..." action that fills passwords from unrelated domains.

You're spreading nothing more than FUD. This is a completely imaginary threat vector that doesn't exist. And even threats that do exist don't always justfity security at every cost. The optimum amount of security is never 100%.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by AnthonyMouse on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:47AM (#50051828)
> To suggest that people should stop using Passkeys over this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Nah, it's fair to regard anything that supports remote attestation as toxic and aggressively thrust it into the biohazard waste incinerator. Any whiff of remote attestation, even being adjacent to it, and an angry mob should appear to burn your entire castle to the ground. Deters companies from wanting to be associated with it.

Also impedes the motte and bailey where they claim you can opt out of it until it's entrenched enough that you can't.

> no-one is forcing you to use said service in that case.

Until something with a monopoly or both halves of a duopoly or a strong network effect starts demanding it.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by ethbr1 on Monday October 12, 2026 @07:46AM (#50054970)
>> no-one is forcing you to use said service in that case

What remotely attested passkeys will really start being adopted for -- blocking consumer AI agent use.

Think about how many billable products are essentially convenience automation on top of a user's existing access in a platform?

What if consumers start using AI agents to interact with platforms in ways that skip those billing toll gates (because their agents are remixing actions / data on the user side)?

Both the intended (I'm skipping a premium charge) and unintended (I used a hacked agent and/or my agent went awry) are going to become major issues for companies in the next 5 years.

And the question will be asked "Can't we just ban user AI from using our app?"

Attested passkeys are going to be an awfully tempting option to reach for as an answer. Especially for banks. (Fuck banks' technology stacks)

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by supertrope on Sunday October 11, 2026 @08:48PM (#50049869)
Banks want attested terminals and for the customer to pay for them. An even better deal for the bank than ATMs, kind of like of how cable TV boxes enforce DRM on the customer and are paid for by the customer.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by monksy on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:27AM (#50051382)
I've been menionting this a lot and it feels like no one is listening. These 3rd and 2nd party actors are expecting for you to pay for equipment for them. It's insane.

More context: I've been saying this a lot about this in the scan and go at sams club and how there are fanatics that act like it's a good thing and to be the only way to pay.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by podocarp on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:53AM (#50051857)
Just gotta hope that based on how economic theory is supposed to work, if doing these things result in saving costs during procurement of specialized equipment, the savings are passed on to the consumer… hopefully…
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by monksy on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:33PM (#50061756)
In this case it's not. It's removing employees, but there is no notice cost decrease in product. There's just re-enforcement of "you didn't rob us". (Checks at the end, etc).
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:03AM (#50053476)
You'll pay for their security measures either way. Does it really matter that much if you see the line item charge or if it's baked into your interest rate spread?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by account42 on Tuesday October 13, 2026 @04:05AM (#50068298)
It does matter though. If the cost comes out of their budget they have different incentives than if the cost is born by the customers in some semi-hidden fashion.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by charcircuit on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:55AM (#50051868)
The benefit of modern computers is that we can virtualize such an attested terminal without needing to have it be a separate device.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by hubbahubbahubba on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:09PM (#50058477)
Great. Another place where passthru of a hardware dongle needs to be supported.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by MBCook on Sunday October 11, 2026 @10:49PM (#50050744)
We have more than enough technology in browsers to allow JavaScript reading live video from your webcam. A website could use that so they can see if you’re looking at the ads enough.

They could start doing it tomorrow. They just have to flip the switch.

What’s your point?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by dugite-code on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:08AM (#50051279)
The banks are also a commonly mentioned reason to not use Grapheneos when it comes up on this site.

Attestation is already putting the screws onto open computing, and the frog is already on the boil.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:10AM (#50052463)
> They could start tomorrow.

They could also start requiring you to mail a DNA sample to create an account tomorrow.

> It's going to be the banks first.

The same banks that (in the US) largely don’t even systematically use 2FA for online banking logins and completely ignore 3DS for card payments? Attestation usually requires customers to buy and carry extra hardware, so I highly doubt it.

The only place I’ve seen mandatory attestation is in enterprise IT, where admins can supply and enforce usage of e.g. Yubikeys.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by mschuster91 on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:35AM (#50052691)
Just go into r/Magisk, about 9 of 10 posts is a user whose banking app fails attestation.

Fuck banks with a cactus for forcing us to relinquish our freedoms as a precondition of interacting with them, which is a precondition to exist in most societies.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @03:58AM (#50052934)
Sure, mobile device app attestation is a big problem for openness, but it has nothing to do with passkeys, where attestation is effectively dead for non-enterprise uses.

Arguably, even passkeys with attestation would be a step forward compared to that, as banks could require an external authenticator tap on a rooted device, or signature of some sandboxed secure element that runs independently from the application OS.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:15AM (#50053079)
> Sure, mobile device app attestation is a big problem for openness, but it has nothing to do with passkeys, where attestation is effectively dead for non-enterprise uses.

It’s dead so far. Again, X.com could ask you to re-enroll your passkey next time you sign in, but this time requiring attestation. It’ll be phrased like “we’re upgrading your account security, please click ‘Accept’ to proceed”.

> banks could require [...a] signature of some sandboxed secure element that runs independently from the application OS

They can. Why don’t they?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:18AM (#50053097)
> Again, X.com could ask you to re-enroll your passkey next time you sign in, but this time requiring attestation.

How? Almost none of their users own an authenticator capable of attestation (i.e., a Yubikey or similar).

> They can. Why don’t they?

They can't, because open/neutral access secure elements do not exist yet, and nobody really wants to carry an external one.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:37AM (#50053275)
> How? Almost none of their users own an authenticator capable of attestation (i.e., a Yubikey or similar).

I haven’t checked, but I suppose both Google and Apple have passkeys implementations capable of attestation? (If not, it should be fairly easy to add, and considering Google has been pushing for various “integrity” bullshit, this would be a no-brainer for them.)

> They can't, because open/neutral access secure elements do not exist yet, and nobody really wants to carry an external one.

I’m not 100% sure if this would work: https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-...

Presumably, banks trust Google, so if Android doesn’t erase attestation information from the HSM when unlocking the bootloader, they could use this process to verify that the key they’ve generated is stored there, regardless of whatever other software the user is running. (If Android does erase attestation info then eh, it’s just as bad as relying on Play Integrity APIs.)

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:47AM (#50053365)
Apple used to support attestation but removed it. That alone makes it non-viable for sites to enforce attestation.

> I’m not 100% sure if this would work: [...]

I believe it might, but like you I'm not sure if they really don't measure some secure boot properties into that keystore these days.

It's also usually implemented in TEEs and attested by the device manufacturer, which means there's a high chance of getting either insecure implementations in the mix or ending up with a heterogeneous mess of supported and non-supported manufacturers varying from bank to bank.

FIDO at least has their manufacturer directory; not sure if Google has something similar for Android (and if it does, whether non Google certified Android OEMs may apply).

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:59AM (#50053439)
Okay, I’ve thought about it a bit, and I’d be okay with attestation in WebAuthn if it required that the keys are transferable between providers, and that if you require attestation you don’t require any specific provider. I.e. ban vendor lock-in: if I have a key, I should be able to use it, and move my passkey to another one if I need to.

> Apple used to support attestation but removed it. That alone makes it non-viable for sites to enforce attestation.

Again, for now. Apple might have less incentives to bring it back than Google, sure, but their products are not really known for being open platforms either.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by fc417fc802 on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:22AM (#50053636)
> the keys are transferable between providers

So I set up my own self hosted provider, and transfer the keys to it, and ... how is this any different from not being attested? The entire point of attestation is to whitelist providers so a requirement for universal transfer would seem to defeat the purpose.

I appreciate an enterprise wanting attestation for certain things, but I don't think consumer oriented protocols should support it. I also think it would make more sense for protocols to support some sort of arbitrarily extensible co-signing scheme instead of device attestation. So corporate keeps a registry of secure elements they own and which users are associated with each one. So there's no way for a vendor to lock authentication (or whatever else) to a specific OEM but corporate IT (or an end user or etc) would still be capable of binding credentials to some subset of physical devices.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:57AM (#50053981)
> So I set up my own self hosted provider

...get it certified, then transfer the keys to it. Or more likely you get an HSM and use its certification.

> I don't think consumer oriented protocols should support it.

Ideally yeah, that’s my point of view as well. In the corporate land however...

> binding credentials to some subset of physical devices

I don’t think that’s the goal. My guess is, they want to be able to transfer some passkeys but not allow any copies, and this only works if one device trusts another. It could work still with your scheme (store a private key on each device; when transferring a secret, make one device encrypt it to the other and immediately destroy its own copy, and make IT department sign any transfer requests so they can check whether they own both devices).

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by fc417fc802 on Monday October 12, 2026 @01:35PM (#50059866)
> My guess is, they want to be able to transfer some passkeys but not allow any copies,

Who are we taking about here?

For regular users it's no one's business if and when I copy my keys, for backups or any other purpose. Any scheme which attempts to prevent that must inherently infringe on my freedom.

For corporate I believe the goal is to know which registered (ie explicitly approved) device a login is coming from. Co-signing would accomplish that. The user key can be reused (not that you'd want to) and any session will still be tied to a known device. Plus you could bind a given user key to a given device on the server side so mission accomplished (assuming the hardware doesn't allow export of its key but then these are specifically approved devices so of course it won't if IT cares about that).

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Wednesday October 14, 2026 @03:24AM (#50083710)
> Who are we taking about here?

The corporate.

> I believe the goal is to know which registered (ie explicitly approved) device a login is coming from.

They can do that with non-transferrable passkeys already (assuming they hand out the devices, and trust the manufacturer to actually prevent transferring the keys out). No cosigning required here.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by fc417fc802 on Wednesday October 14, 2026 @12:09PM (#50089951)
Right but when it comes to that plus BYOD isn't that how we end up at attestation in the first place? I figure the alternative is to manually enroll each device as its own known entity, then require two "regular" signatures to authenticate. Basically it's just the observation that if you care about whitelisting the hardware then you must either have attestation or else accomplish the same thing manually. The former is less labor intensive but comes at the cost of enabling abuse.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:18AM (#50053607)
> if you require attestation you don’t require any specific provider. I.e. ban vendor lock-in: if I have a key, I should be able to use it, and move my passkey to another one if I need to.

Unfortunately this is fundamentally at odds attestation: If you trust anybody capable of providing a syntactically valid signature, it's not attestation anymore.

You can try and set up a neutral clearinghouse vetting attestation providers, but that itself will probably become a centralizing force itself, requiring expensive audits etc. – think web PKI certificate authorities, but even more complex (as you need keys in shipped end user devices, not just somebody's data center HSMs).

I think shunning attestation is largely the right move, with a very short list of exceptions (high trust e-signatures, high value bank transactions but not daily payment confirmation etc.)

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:11AM (#50054103)
> You can try and set up a neutral clearinghouse vetting attestation providers, but that itself will probably become a centralizing force itself, requiring expensive audits etc.

It is a problem, but isn’t FIDO acting as this body already wrt attestation in WebAuthn? I’m only building on top of this existing process.

Regardless, a sibling commenter has a good idea of how to sidestep this in corporate environment, and I think it should work for most of actually useful purposes.

> I think shunning attestation is largely the right move

I’m glad we’re on the same page :-) But as long as we have attestation for passkeys, I think we should at least make it as hard as humanly possible to (ab)use it as a general device attestation scheme.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by mschuster91 on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:29AM (#50053204)
Every iPhone, every supported macOS device, all Windows machines capable of running Windows 11 and all mainstream Android devices capable of running Netflix have a Secure Enclave of some sort capable of doing remote attestation, and for virtually all of them, Secure Boot providing the foundation for it is enabled and enforced.

It just took a decade worth of waiting after the first failed attempt by MS to push TPM support.

The only device categories where Secure Boot and Remote Attestation are either disabled, unsupported or not usable for the purpose of trusted attestation are many Linux systems and Android devices not sanctioned by Google.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:34AM (#50053249)
No, Apple used to support passkey attestation on iOS, but has since removed that feature. The same is true for macOS. Android still supports it, but not for synchronized passkeys as far as I know.

Not sure how DRM factors in here; it's a completely different problem space. Or is your stance something like "anything even theoretically capable of performing trusted computing is evil"?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:40AM (#50053306)
Okay, so it’s possible, but Google is not doing it correctly yet, so they won’t be doing it ever despite the fact they have all the incentives to do so?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @04:48AM (#50053373)
I think you got it the wrong way around. Apple has abandoned attestation, Google still supports it.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by notpushkin on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:02AM (#50053473)
Google still supports it, but only for some configurations (non-copyable, non-transferable). My point is, they could implement it for other variants as well.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by TeMPOraL on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:30AM (#50055466)
If they had it and then removed it, what's stopping them from adding it again?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by roenxi on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:43AM (#50054383)
Misplaced annoyance with the banks, they're responding to legislative pressures and incentives. Blame the regulators.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by goodpoint on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:25AM (#50055404)
There are no laws requiring remote attestation.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by roenxi on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:30AM (#50055458)
You've read all the laws? Regardless, there is likely a legal framework preventing competition and requiring the banks to standardise and coordinate. Otherwise people would go start their own bank that didn't require remote attestation; because the best way to pick up customers is to be flexible about letting them access their own money. In a free market there is a lot of pressure on financial service companies to butter their customers up (at least until the customer owes them cash).

If you're dealing with a legal oligopoly then it is expected that the quality won't be so great.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by mschuster91 on Monday October 12, 2026 @11:29AM (#50057858)
EU PSD2 is behind that push for "secure" banking. As if they couldn't be arsed to use the bank card we all carry for security...

(The thing that banks are afraid is malware spoofing the bank app's UI and the user then approves a fraudulent transaction... not sure how to prevent that tbh)

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:33PM (#50064015)
Easily fixed kick banks that wont reverse transactions out of payment networks. Kick banks that won't follow through with criminal investigations out of payment networks.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by brnt on Monday October 12, 2026 @07:29AM (#50054814)
Fuck Play Integrity, which is what Google implements, with these drawbacks very much intentionally in place, and 'recommended' banks implement for security. Fuck Google for doing everything they can to make custom roms fail these API's ever more.

There is an alternative* of which I haven't heard in a while.

* https://uattest.net

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:10AM (#50055242)
How is that alternative supposed to work without OEM support?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by throwawayffffas on Monday October 12, 2026 @06:22PM (#50063895)
Fuck all of that. We don't need attestation. We have been handling money online without attestation for over 30 years. Sandboxes and operating system isolation is only getting better. Pwned devices is not the main problem, people getting phissed is the main problem. You don't need attestation to defend against that.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by tiagod on Monday October 12, 2026 @08:36AM (#50055532)
On my GrapheneOS phone, the only things that I came across that require (and thus fail) maximum level attestation are Google Pay and the app for McDonald's for some reason.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by Melatonic on Monday October 12, 2026 @02:52PM (#50061058)
Hamburglar is running infosec now and he's taking it reaaaaal serious
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by fc417fc802 on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:13AM (#50053567)
Yes, the same banks that simultaneously don't support 2FA, or only support it via SMS, while insisting that mobile devices pass attestation. Also the same banks that still accept swiped credit card transactions but god forbid you want to register a custom non-attested device for wireless payment transactions. Those banks. Lets not pretend that the policies of US banks are by and large either internally consistent or in the customer's best interests.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by jasomill on Tuesday October 13, 2026 @02:13AM (#50067490)
Don't they support swiped credit card transactions because they can pass the increased cost of fraud onto merchants in the form of increased transaction and chargeback fees?

Are merchants obligated to accept swipe transactions?

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by didntcheck on Monday October 12, 2026 @07:55AM (#50055058)
You answered your own question in parenthesis. US banks are an outlier and the US is not the entire world
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by lxgr on Monday October 12, 2026 @12:43PM (#50059034)
Do you know a market in which banks widely use attestation for WebAuthN hardware authenticators?
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by wraptile on Monday October 12, 2026 @05:26AM (#50053663)
> It's going to be the banks first

This is a great point as banks already did exactly this and to me this seems like a very strong proof that we can't rely on "vigorously calling out"

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by koito17 on Monday October 12, 2026 @07:02AM (#50054554)
> It's going to be the banks first.

In Japan, this is already the reality. The FSA required brokerages to implement passkey authentication, and the effect is that it's no longer possible to have a brokerage account without a passkey. (Some brokerages, like Nomura Securities, will offer two separate client portals. The portal with money and trading-related functionality requires a passkey).

The thing that sucks a lot is that brokerages seem to also restrict the allowed software/hardware. Don't know the details, but none of my FIDO2 hardware keys were able to be used. I consistently use these hardware keys through WebAuthn, so I was surprised when my brokerage explicitly told me my hardware key is unsupported and I must use either Windows Hello or the iOS Passwords app.

The FSA's official explanation for mandating passkey implementation is that people kept falling for phishing attacks, and the attacks were getting too sophisticated thanks to "AI" or something.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by deltoidmaximus on Monday October 12, 2026 @09:19AM (#50056057)
> The thing that sucks a lot is that brokerages seem to also restrict the allowed software/hardware. Don't know the details, but none of my FIDO2 hardware keys were able to be used. I consistently use these hardware keys through WebAuthn, so I was surprised when my brokerage explicitly told me my hardware key is unsupported and I must use either Windows Hello or the iOS Passwords app.

Of course not, you still have some control over those FIDO2 hardware keys and they don't lock you to a limited set of devices. That's what the attestation is for, to allow banning the use of sign-in with anything but a couple megacorp providers. The few small time hangers on will be expelled in time. They're useful idiots for the adoption phase.

Notice that after lots of complaining about there being no way to transfer keys in the spec they developed some planned working group that will in the end only allow transferring from Google/Microsoft/Apple and maybe a few other dumpster companies. They aren't going to give that control up.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by grishka on Monday October 12, 2026 @10:09AM (#50056718)
> The FSA's official explanation for mandating passkey implementation is that people kept falling for phishing attacks, and the attacks were getting too sophisticated thanks to "AI" or something.

Ah, yet another case of people being forced to use technology instead of being left alone doing things the old way where they understood all the risks.

Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by floorsthelimit on Monday October 12, 2026 @11:32AM (#50057900)
I think OP was referring to “initial attestation”. Without that you cannot attest again.
Re:Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them by jasomill on Tuesday October 13, 2026 @02:19AM (#50067531)
While not directly related to passkeys, CAs require private keys for code signing certificates to be generated on FIPS-certified hardware security devices, and use attestation to verify this.