Why would that suddenly change in Netflix or some other company's favor at Apple's direct expense?
So you are now locked in to the apple ecosystem forever. You now need Apple to watch Netflix from your Samsung TV.
I'm trying to get a source on this but failing, do you have a link or some wwwdc sessions where Apple detail their stance ?
I see your angle, but would take their comments more at face value: their concern is really sync, anything privacy probably being the nice side effect.
Sync has been part of their strategy for a while now, from revamping the whole iMessage stack to allow for sync, to their work on eSim etc. so the move doesn't break with their recent trends either.
That comment reminded me too that Apple had briefly talked about supporting consumer attestation if they thought they could make it private enough and the compromise they ended up supporting and delivering were the uvi and uvm extensions, which is nothing like Attestation, are not attested claims (and can be "lied" about by passkeys), but are a much more privacy preserving alternative. Since uvi and uvm were accepted as standards I've not heard of Apple mentioning consumer attestation again.
(uvi and uvm are the CYA assertions that "this key was involved in a multi-factor process such as biometric unlock" which RPs like banks can use for "due diligence" and "regulatory compliance" to require keys be MFA in some way without requiring a full Attestation. Because they aren't attested they are "I solemnly swear a biometric unlock was used" claims, but in terms of regulatory compliance that should be enough in most jurisdictions especially if you can prosecute liars as in-breach-of-contract or felony misdemeanors, which a bank can in cases of banking fraud. So these extensions are huge and another big reason this article is wrong about the slippery slope here, because Apple already made huge progress in standing up bulwarks against it, uvi and uvm extensions being big bulwarks against attestation requirements for consumers.)
But man... I cannot tell you how many people don't even notice the walls of the garden. Besides Apple is in competition with some huge players, more than capable of offering "Done with Apple literally trapping you? Follow this link and we'll transfer your passkeys."
That's the whole point of the FIDO specs. This is now literally impossible to do. All the vendors are weirdly okay with this I believe it's because it cuts both ways.
https://rmondello.com/2026/09/07/switching-password-managers...
https://fidoalliance.org/download-credential-exchange-specif...
No, there is a working draft of a protocol. The "format" is only for use in the protocol, not a separate thing. Thus, giving the user a file is disallowed under the spec as per §5.1.1.1 which reads
> Explicitly state that the orchestrating party only transmits the credential exchange data between the exporting provider and importing provider.
And, in accordance with the spec, 1Password refuses to export passkeys directly to users for manual import on another platform or app. FIDO developers have complained about Keepassxc violating the spec and threatened to blacklist them as a result[1].Furthermore, 1Password (who is apparently leading the way on the FIDO exchange protocol design) has not implemented _any_ passkey export on _any_ desktop platform.
It is interesting that you listed Bitwarden, since I believe that FIDO developers have specifically disavowed Bitwarden's behavior of allowing users to access their passkeys.
[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407
[2] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...
That ship has sailed a long time ago.
Most people still hanging to that part have already built a whole way of life around the Apple ecosystem and the boundaries and how to work around them have become second nature to them.
The iPhone is now near 20y old, the world also changed, most got enshitificated, and looking at kids and elderlies dealing with their iPhones and macs none of it "just works".
Looking at Japan, it was the bastion of iPhone predominance, but I'm the latest numbers 30+ yo gradually got off the train to move to android as their phone is just becoming another tool to them.
I’m sorry you’ve had a bad time though.
I'm on Android and my kid got my old iPhone. Parental controls can't be set by me.
My Apple ID still tried to contact my old iPhone when logging in as a dev.
I don't need to expand on iMessage and where messages go, it's part of the lore at this point. My wife's airport auto-swirching was also a mess to the point she disabled it.
Google Maps' time line features get randomly shut off and you only know it way after the fact.
The list just goes on and on. I also have my frustrations on other platforms, I'm just pointing out Apple is far from being great. People just get used to the rough edges after a while and tout it as "good enough".
If passkeys are intended for platform lock-in then Big Tech is doing a really bad job...
I really wish WebAuthN critics could finally update on this point. There is so much else to complain about, but nobody will listen to somebody regurgitating points stale by several years.
From [0] (via [1]), we have the following statement from an unnamed Apple Systems Engineer:
Passkeys do not provide an attestation statement, as the attestation model currently defined in WebAuthn wasn't designed with syncing credentials in mind.
Attestation was designed to attest to a specific device, exclusively at the point of creation, with a specific set of security properties. It doesn't make sense for synced credentials for a number of reasons, including syncing to devices with different security properties, changes in security properties that happen after key creation, security properties of the sync fabric, sharing the passkey, or exporting to other passkey providers. We're working hard with W3C and FIDO to solve these problems.
Sounds to me like Apple is working hard to enable attestation. It also sounds like attestation _might_ also require sharply restricting -if not preventing- freedom to sync the attested credential.[0] <https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/708982> (FYI: You'll need to click a button to see the second paragraph in my pull quote)
They already did that! That was the first round! It is only through community outcry that "Credential Exchange Format (CXF)" came to existence.
https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407
This one is specifically about 1Password: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37836783
There was a similar thing about what Google did with Android (basically making only the built-in manager viable, for a while), but I can't find a good link.
To suggest that people should stop using Passkeys over this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. All of these features of Passkeys are appropriate in a given context. The only concern is where a service that might not need/justify "high security" Passkeys starts demanding them anyway, and no-one is forcing you to use said service in that case.
The main problem in my mind is on the side of the vendors, attestation, secure hardware, etc is all an excuse to lock you in to their device/ecosystem.
Passkeys exist now and there's no taking them back. However, even if they did not, the government might well just develop its own authentication system and require that it be used under policies that require age verification for social media, for example. Hell, they might end up doing that anyway, and that would be no different. If the government wants to force tracking/verification on certain websites, it won't simply be something they walk away from if Passkeys don't exist. You can only fight this with your vote and by not using those services once they implement such controls.
I mean, we can take them back. Everybody refuse to use them and cause as much trouble as possible for anyone who tries to make you. Use TOTP or similar instead.
> If the government wants to force tracking/verification on certain websites, it won't simply be something they walk away from if Passkeys don't exist.
The way you fight things like this is by making it so the current technology is incapable of doing it and then if they try to legislate it, you have more time to roll back the policy before the technology to support it can be developed and imposed on everyone.
Implementing support for the dystopian technology before the law even requires it is the opposite of that.
Like how everyone stopped using Google/Gmail, Facebook/Instagram and Windows/Office365 and flocked to alternatives?
Let's flip your suggestion. What if someone says if you need "high security" build a competing service that enforces it, no one is forcing you to use a "low security" service ?
My point was not about getting critical mass, it's that the service can already do anything they like to lock people into whatever they want and gatekeep their service. They can do it with Passkeys, or they can do it with a proprietary alternative and if they're big enough, they'll get away with it. Neither of us can sway them at all - I wasn't saying they should do this, only that they can.
Blaming Passkeys is aiming at the wrong target. Passkeys rightly offer features that have valid use-cases, even the attestation in the right context. Can they be abused? Probably, but so can just about anything. Passkeys do, on the other hand, offer some real tangible benefits that other mainstream solutions do not.
Let the usecases that need passkeys use it.
Why can't there be a parallel standard with similar features that doesn't have the parts that can potentially be abused. If the difference between abuse and non-abuse is a vague promise and the good graces of corporate structures, it is better to err on the side of caution and demand solutions that make it impossible.
> The people don't care enough to bother, and that's fine - it's not your (or my) place to force other people to do anything.
Yeah it wasn't your place or anyone else's. How can you or I force anyone. Not sure why that even came up.
Debate is how we evolve new and alternate solutions. Handwaving by saying not your place or mine is not how we affect change if needed.
The advantage of passkeys is that no one can trick you into giving your passkeys to the wrong person. Every time this comes up, people say "I don't need that! I've got a password manager. I'm too smart to get tricked." But they are wrong.
The possibility that sites will require attested keys does seem pretty remote at the moment, but if passkeys take off and >95% of people use keys tied to their phone, I could totally see sites starting to prevent you using a key from Bitwarden. I don't think there's a conspiracy trying to achieve this, but the incentives of security & lock-in could push us there.
You won't be able to use your google account passkey to log into the perfect clone of "gmail.com" where the 'a' is actually a greek or cyrillic letter or something, and neither will your ageing parents. You could still paste your password into the fake site from your password manager, or the spyware on your computer could still sniff it from your clipboard.
Hopefully after thoroughly checking the URL but you only have two minutes before the Uber gets here and just need to get this one last thing done ASAP...
I'm somewhat desensitized to this myself for non-bank use cases. It's unfortunately necessary with corporate merges and rebrands. After all, how is my password manager supposed to know that it's safe to fill my hulu.com password on disneyplus.com? The same applies to mobile apps providing some-outsourcing-vendor.com instead of my-actual-service-provider.com etc.
For passkeys, there's native support for that type of thing using "related origin requests": https://web.dev/articles/webauthn-related-origin-requests
Yes. That is a feature, not a bug.
Transferability and delegation of authority are features. Calling them "phishing vectors" only makes them seem like a bug.
Being able to give your Hulu or Bank of America password to your spouse is a feature, but giving it to a scammer is a bug.
Can't have one without the other, but I disagree making credentials non-transferrable is the right choice.
You're spreading nothing more than FUD. This is a completely imaginary threat vector that doesn't exist. And even threats that do exist don't always justfity security at every cost. The optimum amount of security is never 100%.
Nah, it's fair to regard anything that supports remote attestation as toxic and aggressively thrust it into the biohazard waste incinerator. Any whiff of remote attestation, even being adjacent to it, and an angry mob should appear to burn your entire castle to the ground. Deters companies from wanting to be associated with it.
Also impedes the motte and bailey where they claim you can opt out of it until it's entrenched enough that you can't.
> no-one is forcing you to use said service in that case.
Until something with a monopoly or both halves of a duopoly or a strong network effect starts demanding it.
What remotely attested passkeys will really start being adopted for -- blocking consumer AI agent use.
Think about how many billable products are essentially convenience automation on top of a user's existing access in a platform?
What if consumers start using AI agents to interact with platforms in ways that skip those billing toll gates (because their agents are remixing actions / data on the user side)?
Both the intended (I'm skipping a premium charge) and unintended (I used a hacked agent and/or my agent went awry) are going to become major issues for companies in the next 5 years.
And the question will be asked "Can't we just ban user AI from using our app?"
Attested passkeys are going to be an awfully tempting option to reach for as an answer. Especially for banks. (Fuck banks' technology stacks)
More context: I've been saying this a lot about this in the scan and go at sams club and how there are fanatics that act like it's a good thing and to be the only way to pay.
They could start doing it tomorrow. They just have to flip the switch.
What’s your point?
Attestation is already putting the screws onto open computing, and the frog is already on the boil.
They could also start requiring you to mail a DNA sample to create an account tomorrow.
> It's going to be the banks first.
The same banks that (in the US) largely don’t even systematically use 2FA for online banking logins and completely ignore 3DS for card payments? Attestation usually requires customers to buy and carry extra hardware, so I highly doubt it.
The only place I’ve seen mandatory attestation is in enterprise IT, where admins can supply and enforce usage of e.g. Yubikeys.
Fuck banks with a cactus for forcing us to relinquish our freedoms as a precondition of interacting with them, which is a precondition to exist in most societies.
Arguably, even passkeys with attestation would be a step forward compared to that, as banks could require an external authenticator tap on a rooted device, or signature of some sandboxed secure element that runs independently from the application OS.
It’s dead so far. Again, X.com could ask you to re-enroll your passkey next time you sign in, but this time requiring attestation. It’ll be phrased like “we’re upgrading your account security, please click ‘Accept’ to proceed”.
> banks could require [...a] signature of some sandboxed secure element that runs independently from the application OS
They can. Why don’t they?
How? Almost none of their users own an authenticator capable of attestation (i.e., a Yubikey or similar).
> They can. Why don’t they?
They can't, because open/neutral access secure elements do not exist yet, and nobody really wants to carry an external one.
I haven’t checked, but I suppose both Google and Apple have passkeys implementations capable of attestation? (If not, it should be fairly easy to add, and considering Google has been pushing for various “integrity” bullshit, this would be a no-brainer for them.)
> They can't, because open/neutral access secure elements do not exist yet, and nobody really wants to carry an external one.
I’m not 100% sure if this would work: https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-...
Presumably, banks trust Google, so if Android doesn’t erase attestation information from the HSM when unlocking the bootloader, they could use this process to verify that the key they’ve generated is stored there, regardless of whatever other software the user is running. (If Android does erase attestation info then eh, it’s just as bad as relying on Play Integrity APIs.)
> I’m not 100% sure if this would work: [...]
I believe it might, but like you I'm not sure if they really don't measure some secure boot properties into that keystore these days.
It's also usually implemented in TEEs and attested by the device manufacturer, which means there's a high chance of getting either insecure implementations in the mix or ending up with a heterogeneous mess of supported and non-supported manufacturers varying from bank to bank.
FIDO at least has their manufacturer directory; not sure if Google has something similar for Android (and if it does, whether non Google certified Android OEMs may apply).
> Apple used to support attestation but removed it. That alone makes it non-viable for sites to enforce attestation.
Again, for now. Apple might have less incentives to bring it back than Google, sure, but their products are not really known for being open platforms either.
So I set up my own self hosted provider, and transfer the keys to it, and ... how is this any different from not being attested? The entire point of attestation is to whitelist providers so a requirement for universal transfer would seem to defeat the purpose.
I appreciate an enterprise wanting attestation for certain things, but I don't think consumer oriented protocols should support it. I also think it would make more sense for protocols to support some sort of arbitrarily extensible co-signing scheme instead of device attestation. So corporate keeps a registry of secure elements they own and which users are associated with each one. So there's no way for a vendor to lock authentication (or whatever else) to a specific OEM but corporate IT (or an end user or etc) would still be capable of binding credentials to some subset of physical devices.
...get it certified, then transfer the keys to it. Or more likely you get an HSM and use its certification.
> I don't think consumer oriented protocols should support it.
Ideally yeah, that’s my point of view as well. In the corporate land however...
> binding credentials to some subset of physical devices
I don’t think that’s the goal. My guess is, they want to be able to transfer some passkeys but not allow any copies, and this only works if one device trusts another. It could work still with your scheme (store a private key on each device; when transferring a secret, make one device encrypt it to the other and immediately destroy its own copy, and make IT department sign any transfer requests so they can check whether they own both devices).
Who are we taking about here?
For regular users it's no one's business if and when I copy my keys, for backups or any other purpose. Any scheme which attempts to prevent that must inherently infringe on my freedom.
For corporate I believe the goal is to know which registered (ie explicitly approved) device a login is coming from. Co-signing would accomplish that. The user key can be reused (not that you'd want to) and any session will still be tied to a known device. Plus you could bind a given user key to a given device on the server side so mission accomplished (assuming the hardware doesn't allow export of its key but then these are specifically approved devices so of course it won't if IT cares about that).
The corporate.
> I believe the goal is to know which registered (ie explicitly approved) device a login is coming from.
They can do that with non-transferrable passkeys already (assuming they hand out the devices, and trust the manufacturer to actually prevent transferring the keys out). No cosigning required here.
Unfortunately this is fundamentally at odds attestation: If you trust anybody capable of providing a syntactically valid signature, it's not attestation anymore.
You can try and set up a neutral clearinghouse vetting attestation providers, but that itself will probably become a centralizing force itself, requiring expensive audits etc. – think web PKI certificate authorities, but even more complex (as you need keys in shipped end user devices, not just somebody's data center HSMs).
I think shunning attestation is largely the right move, with a very short list of exceptions (high trust e-signatures, high value bank transactions but not daily payment confirmation etc.)
It is a problem, but isn’t FIDO acting as this body already wrt attestation in WebAuthn? I’m only building on top of this existing process.
Regardless, a sibling commenter has a good idea of how to sidestep this in corporate environment, and I think it should work for most of actually useful purposes.
> I think shunning attestation is largely the right move
I’m glad we’re on the same page :-) But as long as we have attestation for passkeys, I think we should at least make it as hard as humanly possible to (ab)use it as a general device attestation scheme.
It just took a decade worth of waiting after the first failed attempt by MS to push TPM support.
The only device categories where Secure Boot and Remote Attestation are either disabled, unsupported or not usable for the purpose of trusted attestation are many Linux systems and Android devices not sanctioned by Google.
Not sure how DRM factors in here; it's a completely different problem space. Or is your stance something like "anything even theoretically capable of performing trusted computing is evil"?
If you're dealing with a legal oligopoly then it is expected that the quality won't be so great.
(The thing that banks are afraid is malware spoofing the bank app's UI and the user then approves a fraudulent transaction... not sure how to prevent that tbh)
There is an alternative* of which I haven't heard in a while.
Are merchants obligated to accept swipe transactions?
This is a great point as banks already did exactly this and to me this seems like a very strong proof that we can't rely on "vigorously calling out"
In Japan, this is already the reality. The FSA required brokerages to implement passkey authentication, and the effect is that it's no longer possible to have a brokerage account without a passkey. (Some brokerages, like Nomura Securities, will offer two separate client portals. The portal with money and trading-related functionality requires a passkey).
The thing that sucks a lot is that brokerages seem to also restrict the allowed software/hardware. Don't know the details, but none of my FIDO2 hardware keys were able to be used. I consistently use these hardware keys through WebAuthn, so I was surprised when my brokerage explicitly told me my hardware key is unsupported and I must use either Windows Hello or the iOS Passwords app.
The FSA's official explanation for mandating passkey implementation is that people kept falling for phishing attacks, and the attacks were getting too sophisticated thanks to "AI" or something.
Of course not, you still have some control over those FIDO2 hardware keys and they don't lock you to a limited set of devices. That's what the attestation is for, to allow banning the use of sign-in with anything but a couple megacorp providers. The few small time hangers on will be expelled in time. They're useful idiots for the adoption phase.
Notice that after lots of complaining about there being no way to transfer keys in the spec they developed some planned working group that will in the end only allow transferring from Google/Microsoft/Apple and maybe a few other dumpster companies. They aren't going to give that control up.
Ah, yet another case of people being forced to use technology instead of being left alone doing things the old way where they understood all the risks.
Of course it is, the site will reject the passkey and require you to create one that is attested.
> Are Netflix and Twitter currently requesting attestation when people register passkeys, and rejecting the registration if the user declines the permission prompt?
They could start tomorrow.
> a hypothetical and unlikely scenario.
You have not been paying attention, that scenario is where this whole thing is building towards.
> If consumer-facing sites start requesting attestation when registering passkeys, they deserve to be vigorously called out
It's going to be the banks first.
Why called out, it's all for your safety, to make sure you are not using an insecure client that might leak your data.