>It is very economical and hard to compromise at a scale that has any effect.
Vote-by-mail creates unnecessary opportunities for cheating, irregularities, and all sorts of foolishness. If you can fill in the bubbles, you could theoretically fill them in for other people. People living with parents suffering from dementia could fill out their ballots without them knowing and vote multiple times. You don't even need a valid signature; states allow witnesses to vouch. Ballot boxes get vandalized. Ballot harvesting is rampant. There's so many problems. It's for the same reason universities don't allow take-home exams.
Vote-by-mail states are open targets for mockery (and rightfully so) as it routinely takes days or weeks to count all the ballots and declare a winner. Third-world backwaters can do it in the same night. This is a solved problem.
Whenever vote-by-mail is criticized, people get really upset. How do you think the other states do it? The argument about not being able to take off on election day doesn't hold water. Most states allow early voting for weeks. If you can find time to visit a post office or ballot box, you can certainly go to the library or a church basement for the 5 minutes it takes to fill in the bubbles, stick it in the machine and you absolutely know it's counted. And results will be available election night.
You'll probably want more detail. Ballot harvesting can't work because data analysis shows weird patterns like this ("huh this nursing home went 95% Biden whereas every other nursing home in the county went 55%"). Recounts do signature validation and lawyers from either party can challenge any ballot they want. Voters are contacted to cure their ballots. I've worked on the Democratic side and been heavily involved in doing all of this. We had armies of lawyers, software and data engineers, and organizers.
Most of the pointing out opportunities for fraud comes from a place of like, reasoning from first principles. But elections are huge undertakings involving tons of people. It's hard to successfully commit election fraud at a large enough scale to sway a federal election. It's why foreign adversaries prefer to swarm social media with bots: it has a chance of working.
Or more subtle: watching them vote, with the implicit threat of violence if they vote the "wrong" way.
> The argument about not being able to take off on election day doesn't hold water.
In my country it is mandatory to give time off to vote if necessary. But the booths are open from 07:30 to 21:00, are located in a bunch of convenient locations (schools, libraries, train stations, shopping malls), and have basically zero waiting time, so in practice rarely anyone needs to make use of it.
Can you elaborate?
Similarly, opposition of mail-in-voting typically ignores or supports closing down polling places (in strategically partisan areas), making it difficult for groups of people to vote.
These issues are always (by design) discussed in isolation, while ignoring the intrinsically related issues.
TL;DR: Voter ID laws are fine, only if, coupled with universal free IDs for citizens. And no mail-in-voting would be fine, if voting occured on a national holiday, and polling places were reachable by all eligible voters. This is not supported by any (elected) proponent of voter ID laws or opponent of mail-in-voting.
- Free FEC federal voter ID (requires proof of citizenship) to be used ONLY for voting
- Voter ID can be obtained early (age 16?) but DOB is connected to ID and you can’t vote before the legal age
- Funded FEC program to register students for voter IDs at schools and colleges and teach them about voting
- FEC to work with agencies like social security and IRS to determine if a voter is deceased (messy process). Likely deceased voters are communicated to the states ASAP. States must report confirmed deceased voters to FEC ASAP for recording.
- Federal 2 week minimum early voting period
- Federal funding and monitoring of elections requiring adequate polling site coverage of geographic areas, notification of residents, etc
- Federal program to provide free shuttle to and from nearest polling station for residents without transit. Operated federally, states have no involvement. Contract with private transit as FEMA does.
- Mail in ballots heavily restricted, must provide proof of absence or be military
- Voting day is a national holiday
- Federal ballots are separate and simplified to speed up counting/recounting (ballot complexity is often cited as a reason for slow counting)
It will never happen but this would solve so many issues.
But we do have a fair amount of evidence that there is suppression of in-person voting.
So neither of these systems is perfect, but we should go with the one that gives us the most accurate legitimate vote.
Someone else posted a list of ways that in-person voting would be more acceptable, e.g. having a large window to cast ballots. But instead, we see move the other way, trying to restrict the window in which we can cast ballots.
You put a free ID in the hands of every legitimate voter and give them enough time and opportunity to vote, and then I will consider in-person to be on par with mail-in.
The problem with this, like internet voting, is that you can be coerced.
e.g. a family member or your boss can tell you who to vote for and force you to submit that vote.
Whereas a polling both is utterly private; you are alone and free from coercion. Nobody else knows who you voted for and they have no way of telling.
In the UK, our voting is also done by paper and pencil. The votes are counted overnight by humans (with plenty of checks, independent oversight and rights of recounting) with the result typically declared the next day.
Its secure, and it just works.
Where i live, you can show up in-person on election day to override a mailed ballot, if you're in a situation like that.
This makes the attack you described impossible (short of having every official in the voting room being corrupt).
Given the ample attention recently, with no evidence of impactful fraud, it sounds like disenfranchising citizens for no reason other than unrealistic fears.
But now that one party sees their voters increasingly use mailin, I expect to see a shift in opinions quickly. (Recent evidence suggests democrats benefit from low turnout more)
Unfortunately, explaining them to Joe Q. Public in such a way that he's going to trust your election is a very tough sell, whereas counting paper is a much easier process to explain.
And that's before you begin worrying that the developer of your whizz-bang mathematically-provable voting system is a) going to win the bid to build it for the government, b) implements it correctly, and c) isn't subverted while doing so.
You can either couple every vote to a voter and risk oppressive monitoring of votes at scale or coercion at micro level, OR you can have decoupled voting proving that your vote was counted, but not have convincing proof that your vote or anyone else's are accurate.
Please prove me wrong because I would love it if it was possible.
Edit: Booth/paper-voting solves this by:
* linearly scaling cost of multi-party verification of identity at time of voting
* your vote being anonymous and being decoupled from you at time of deposit
* you trust the system at scale since each step in the chain-of-custody has many-eyes-verification
* vote amount is grouped by location so vote insertion can't happen at scale without coordinating with each involved polling place to fudge each of their numbers
* you can't insert into one area without having a random 100k population increase in a polling place overnight
It allows any voter to verify their vote was accurately recorded in the reported total. The usual argument against is you need a lot of people to verify, and most won't. That's probably true when everyone is confident in the outcome, but I'm not so sure it works be true if there was a wiff of fraud in the air.
> how can you prove that innumerable votes were added to the record, or that your vote is correct?
In Australia it's easy to prove no votes to the record because everyone on the rolls must vote, or they get fined. Ergo total votes must equal the number of people on the roll minus the number fined. As for "your vote was counted" - read the Wikipedia article. These systems do prove that, while keeping your ballot secret.
> It allows any voter to verify their vote was accurately recorded in the reported total. The usual argument against is you need a lot of people to verify, and most won't. That's probably true when everyone is confident in the outcome, but I'm not so sure it works be true if there was a wiff of fraud in the air.
There are a number of application details which wildly alters whether it's workable or not, where workable leans fairly close to current scalable cost, in which case the added benefit is minimal.
> In Australia it's easy to prove no votes to the record because everyone on the rolls must vote, or they get fined. Ergo total votes must equal the number of people on the roll minus the number fined. As for "your vote was counted" - read the Wikipedia article. These systems do prove that, while keeping your ballot secret.
Yes, but only by using as much verification as paper ballot casting, which is already provably robust and even more verifiable due to decentralization.
Skimmed these:
https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec05/tech/full_papers/k...
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277296393_Pret_a_vo...
I'm not sure what you are getting at here. A voter can not verify their vote in the current paper systems. Using these systems they can.
There are two kinds of attacks: typically classes as retail and wholesale. Retail attacks happen at the front end: stuffing ballot boxes, coercion, vote buying. As the effort involved roughly corresponds to the number of votes altered changing a large enough volume of votes to alter the outcome will be detectable using robust social systems, which boils down to teams of people watching each other.
Wholesale attacks happen when the vote is processed after they have been cast. An example is altering vote counting machine to lie about the votes counted. As they can systemically alter large numbers of votes they can be very difficult to detect even using statistical megtods. They are impossible to pull off when everything is done manually as teams watching teams still works, and you have to corrupt a lot of people. But when you introduce automation and machinery they voting system becomes vulnerable to this sort of manipulation.
Yes, "just continue to do everything manually using pencil and paper" does mostly eliminate wholesale attacks. But the reality is we are ditching pencil and paper for more automated processes. A famous example is a Diablo voting machine in some USA state, failed before regurgitating it's vote count (the "Volusia Error"). A man with a screw driver duely arrived, modified things, and handed over what he said was the correct vote count.
We are automating voting with voting machines and vote tabulators for good reasons. They are easier to use, particularly for the disabled, they are faster, they are cheaper than redundant teams of people, and they more accurate than manual methods. They are already arrived, and their use will only grow over time. Pleas like yours to "just use paper" are having little effect on their inceasing adoption.
The other option is to insist these machines and systems are end to end cryptographically verifable. That makes wholesale attacks these automated systems facilitate detectable. Currently we are deploying these systems without such safeguards. IMO this is insanity.
In the current paper systems you don't have to, as you know what you put on it before it got anonymized and counted as one vote by the teams watched by teams.
> Using these systems they can.
In theory, yes. In practice, barely. If it was easy/practical it would be intrinsically susceptible to coercion.
In general, I agree with everything you write except for this paragraph:
> We are automating voting with voting machines and vote tabulators for good reasons. They are easier to use, particularly for the disabled, they are faster, they are cheaper than redundant teams of people, and they more accurate than manual methods. They are already arrived, and their use will only grow over time. Pleas like yours to "just use paper" are having little effect on their inceasing adoption.
The only "good" reason would be cost, but I wouldn't agree that it's a worthy trade-off. They could be easier to use, but it seems generally to be prone to UI issues making it unclear who/what you're voting for.
I'm sure their use will grow over time, but it won't be for any reasons that are good for democracy.
True. But the "secret ballot in a polling booth using paper" systems are disappearing. 32% if Australian votes aren't done that way now.
> In theory, yes. In practice, barely. If it was easy/practical it would be intrinsically susceptible to coercion.
It can be reduced to scanning a QR code in an app. It is a bit of a mystery to me why you think that isn't easy, practical or is susceptible to coercion.
Because "scanning a QR code in an app" would lead to:
1) integrity loss, ie reduction of peers in the secret sharing concept.
and/or
2) privacy loss, ie vote coercion, "show me you voted for our dear leader or something bad happens".
You can either confirm your encrypted ballot is present, OR you can decrypt it before being cast, in which case it can't be cast anymore. Unless I'm missing something they're mutually exclusive. The entire premise of the mix net is not being able to verify what you voted for, only that your vote is there, right?
> 1) integrity loss, ie reduction of peers in the secret sharing concept.
> 2) privacy loss, ie vote coercion, "show me you voted for our dear leader or something bad happens".
Following your instincts instead of doing the work required to understand Prêt à Voter will lead you to that conclusion. Your instincts are wrong in this case. Neither of your claims are true. The first paragraph of the Wikipedia page makes that plain. It says in part:
> In particular, Prêt à Voter enables voters to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the count whilst avoiding dangers of coercion or vote buying.
In case you haven't thought about it, vote buying is the hardest problem to solve for secret ballots. It is hardest because both the voter and a malicious third party are working cooperatively to corrupt the system. If you come up with a system that prevents that, you've pretty much solved all retail voting attacks. Prêt à Voter makes a vote verifiable, while ensuring votes can't be sold.
While you can't sell your vote with the typical implementation of Prêt à Voter, you can do it with your favoured paper ballot system:
1. Mallory obtains an authentic, blank ballot, and fills it in way he wants. Perhaps he does that by voting, pocketing the ballot paper, and putting the dummy in the ballot box.
2. Mallory gives the pre-filled ballot to a voter willing to sell his vote for an agreed sum outside the voting booth, where the transaction can't be detected. The voter isn't given his payment yet.
3. The voter goes into the secure voting place and is given a blank ballot. In the privacy afforded to him to cast a secret ballot he pockets the blank ballot, replacing it with the pre-filled ballot given to him by Mallory.
4. The voter casts the paid for vote.
5. The voter meets with Mallory in their secret spot, hands over the blank ballot and gets paid.
Rinse, lather and repeat all the way to winning the election.
If you haven't seen that little caper described before you will find it surprising. I did. But it is nowhere near the surprise you will get from spending the time to learn how Prêt à Voter achieves what appears to be impossible.
This is from the actual paper, not wikipedia:
> C. Audit of ballot forms Voters may wish to check that the order of candidates claimed to be encrypted on the right-hand side does indeed correspond to the list printed on the left-hand side. If this were not the case then a vote cast for one candidate may be considered after decryption as a vote for a different candidate. To provide such reassurance, voters may elect to ‘audit’ a ballot form. This involves removing the left-hand side of the ballot form, and asking the system to decrypt the candidate list from the onion on the right-hand side. The voter can then check that the decrypted list matches the list of candidates printed on the left-hand side. In principle, this audit can be carried out as often as the voter wishes. This gives the voter confidence that the ballot forms have been correctly constructed.
> However, the voter is not allowed to cast a vote on a decrypted ballot form. Once the candidate list associated with a onion is known, vote privacy, and hence resistance to coercion and vote-selling, is lost. The audit process gives an individual voter confidence that the ballot forms are correctly constructed, but does not allow her to check the ballot form that she is using to cast the vote.
What I said in GP is that you can't verify WHAT you voted for AFTER the fact, because the concept of coercion hinges on being able to threaten or pay for something the victim can provide. It's a logical proof, you can't design that away. I'm not saying it's not a valid trade-off.
Agreed, you can't prove you voted in a particular way in any system that prevents vote buying. I'm struggling to see why that is relevant to this discussion.
What Prêt à Voter does is allow you to confirm that your vote was counted accurately. Its magic is it does that without revealing how you voted. You've now read the paper and you didn't contest that, so I'm guessing you concede it's true.
My point above was the two claims you made, ie scanning a QR code in an app would somehow lead to integrity loss, and/or privacy loss in Prêt à Voter system are wrong. You don't seem to be contesting that either, so I guess you now concede they are indeed wrong.
You made those incorrect claims after I pointed out your earlier claim that checking your vote in a Prêt à Voter system is so difficult no-one would do it was also wrong, as it boils down to scanning a QR Code with an app. I guess you had to concede that is indeed pretty easy, so you invented those incorrect "facts" to prove scanning a QR Code couldn't work for other reasons. But it does work.
It's not a good track record, is it? One invented fact after another, all in an effort to prove end-to-end verifiable voting is somehow worse or less secure than our current paper systems.
That's also wrong of course, but worse than that many of our current systems aren't the "secret ballots cast in a secure polling place" system you are assuming we use. They are postal, or electronic, or worse the combination of the two we call internet voting. These electronic systems are particularly susceptible to wholesale attacks, and in my view they need something like Prêt à Voter to have a hope of being as secure as the old paper systems.
I will concede one thing. Personally I doubt in an election everyone thought was well run that many people would bother checking their vote was counted correctly, but that's not because it's hard, it's for the same reason we don't recount every paper ballot if it isn't close - why bother? But if there was a whiff of fraud in the air, it seems likely a lot of people would do the check, particularly if the Prêt à Voter receipt was recorded on their phone when they voted. That way they would not even have to scan a QR Code. They just feed the receipt to the checking app when the election results are published.
However, I would also suggest reading the guidelines, specifically these:
> Be kind. Don't be snarky. Converse curiously; don't cross-examine. Edit out swipes.
> When disagreeing, please reply to the argument instead of calling names. "That is idiotic; 1 + 1 is 2, not 3" can be shortened to "1 + 1 is 2, not 3."
> Please respond to the strongest plausible interpretation of what someone says, not a weaker one that's easier to criticize. Assume good faith.
> Please don't comment on whether someone read an article. "Did you even read the article? It mentions that" can be shortened to "The article mentions that".
In fact, the one isn't nearly as big of a privacy concern (if any at all). I wouldn't be surprised if someone told me the former could be done with some XOR scheme, but proving that both you voted and your vote counted for a specific candidate while keeping that a secret is a much more difficult task
Just have a code show the truth (for you to verify) and a second code to show a lie (in case of threats).
After your name is checked off, you then proceed to a booth where you mark a piece of paper before folding and placing that paper into a plastic collection box on the way out.
It's very analog and the electoral commission have no way to know if you actually voted or who you voted for. They only know that you turned up to the polling station and gave them your name.
I assume the number of people who turn up at the polling station, only to walk away without voting is so small that it's not seen as a problem to solve.
The receipt would id candidate
And the biggest problem of this all is that it's basically impossible to prove because there's no meaningful identifier at any given point in the process. The only real evidence you'd have is a bad signature, yet in 2020 some states ceased comparing signatures and signature comparison was, in general, bizarrely under attack by certain interest groups.
You cannot "fabricate" votes, because all mail-in ballots are associated with a voter. Or rather, you put your ballot in an envelope and the envelope is associated with you. When your ballot is received, you are marked as voted and other ballots are invalid. The envelope is stored as proof of who voted and the ballot is kept separately to be tallied.
Ballot counting is done in public (you can go watch!) and there are a lot of safeguards and crosschecks. It's intended to make any fraud very obvious and incredibly difficult to scale.
The government knows who is a citizen and who isn't lol, they literally have the records.
Voter rolls are very closely scrutinized. Dead people are, in fact, taken off the rolls. There is essentially ~no voter fraud and ~no instance of non-citizens voting in this country. Yes, it's audited and studied. Yes, they keep the data and you can audit it.
You're literally complaining about it being easier for people to participate in democracy, and you should stop.
Everything's a conspiracy when you don't know how anything works.
And this for elections which are increasingly decided (in terms of flipping the electoral college one way or the other) by votes in the tens of thousands to low hundreds of thousands. So the scale of fraud in US elections is likely greater than the minimum margin of electoral college victory in them.
--
You also are substantially overstating the degree of organization of voter rolls. Voting in the US is heavily decentralized by design, which is what enables various states to have completely different electoral systems. But more specifically voter rolls are maintained by the states themselves and that, in turn, is typically further decentralized down to counties themselves.
This leaves a significant degree of inconsistency. In general I do not think that double voting or completely ineligible voting is a significant factor - nowhere near as much as voting on the behalf of others, but it certainly happens. For instance thousands of mail in votes were rejected because they came from dead people, and it is highly unlikely that 100% of these attempts were caught.
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26487418
The article quotes one Mr Richard Mawrey QC:
> "Postal voting on demand, however many safeguards you build into it, is wide open to fraud… on a scale that will make election rigging a possibility and indeed in some areas a probability."
> "Now I know that there is a very strong political desire to keep the present system. What I'm saying is that if you keep the present system, then however many safeguards you create, fraud and serious fraud is inevitably going to continue because that is built into the system."
Personally, my concern is that with mail in ballots some nutjob that believes there's ballot stuffing can set fire to the ballotbox and even though they're caught it's a major inconvenience to get a replacement ballot and the websites that show your ballot is received take days to update.
But I still love mail in voting. My state sends a candidate brochure with it and I can take my time to actually look up all those random candidates' policies. It takes me hours to actually fill out my ballot but that's a feature, not a bug (there's nothing preventing you from along party lines but frankly I'd be happier without parties)
[1] - https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voti...
If thousands of people were told "you already voted" when they showed up, then that would be very very obvious.
They also really do look at signatures and contact voters to cure ballots if they're unsure.
Hell, the fact that so many people have been looking for massive voter fraud for about a decade now and haven't is pretty telling. People aren't good at keeping secrets and if it's being done at scale it would be uncovered or leaked. Accidents and stupid people happen, but that works both ways
[1] - https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2024:_Analysis_of_...
This is why many of the election fraud claims focused on lax signature verification of ballots as well as the lax mail in ballot address locations. I feel that IL elections are probably more secure, but only because the state is solidly one party and comically gerrymandered anyways.
But technically, yes, a ballot harvester could send ballots on your behalf if they have enough information about you.
But you can already do that, regardless of mail in voting or not?
Not to mention the peer pressure. What asshole is going to stand in the booth for hours voting? I got to get to work!
Sure, you can do all this at home but there's a clear convenience when having both in hand
You never can be too careful!
Also, maybe someone inside will take their ballot from them.
IMHO this voting thing is too risky. We should just go back to having a ruling family /s
Guy with sledgehammer is at least a block waylay, and everyone knows that everyone votes, by law.
People do, in fact, threaten or coerce their spouse and that extends to voting.
Being able to audit from a secure counting room and being able to produce an always-available-online permanent record is different.
Even if you ignore the pencil they give you and use a pen, you can simply tear or damage the paper, take it back to the elections officer, ask for a new ballot, and fill that out instead. We make it as hard as possible to coerce a vote while maintaining secret voting (noting that it is definitely still possible, just hard).
- collect blank ballots (usually 2 pieces of paper, one for the House, one for the Senate) at the entry,
- walk over to the booth,
- fill out your ballot in secret at the booth (taking as long as you like),
- fold the ballots,
- walk over to the ballot boxes,
- drop the folded ballots into the corresponding box (House ballot in the House box and Senate ballot in the Senate box),
- then leave.
As no-one sees what you write at the booth, you can vote legally, draw pictures on your ballot, write obscenities, write nothing, or a combination.
At this point, if the voter has not checked in yet, we can refuse to do so. Either way, if the phone/camera is still out after the judge has asked and shown them the law, judge is to immediately call the constable's office (police), who have been positioned nearby (but never directly at any vote center, due to possible intimidation). The constable can and will remove the man from the vote center. (It's never escalated that far!) (arresting that voter for any length of time might be problematic on election day for obvious reasons).
The most common complaint is "but I wrote up all my selections on there!" and for these voters we can provide a paper "sample ballot" and even a pen and they are free to mark their selections outside of the room and then come back to vote on the machine. One location was a church that was even gracious enough to allow a gentleman to AirPrint his notes.
Also of note, we do not have any kind of a "booth", however, the machines are typically placed rather far apart, and no one is allowed to queue at or near the machines, or linger there after voting, so I believe that privacy is effectively maintained. (Workers including judges are not even allowed to linger there unless assisting a voter who has specifically asked for help, and even then, there's more rules - if the voter needs help actually making the selections for candidates, now you need at least one judge and one clerk, one of whom must observe and ensure that the voter's selections were made correctly.)
We also got rid of the problematic "digital only" machines several years ago, but this post is too long already.
I encourage everyone to look up the relevant sources, easy to find.
As far as I know, these votes have gone mostly unchecked before electronic voting, but after that, they’ve started voting straight from the workplace computers. There were, of course, a lot of straight-up falsifications as well.
That said, our pen-on-paper voting isn’t too legit either :’)
The closest I can think of is rare cases like this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bushel%27s_Case
You can try to google-translate [this, for example](https://holod.media/2024/03/08/soprotivlenie-putinu/#h-3-%D0...)
Vote for me and I'll increase your pensions, the other guy wants to decrease your pensions.
Vote for me and I'll increase wages of gov workers and civil servants, the other guy wants to fire gov workers.
VOte for me and I'll increase your welfare and give you free* housing.
etc... etc.The gov has masses of people that depend on the gov's generosity that they can leverage with a carrot on a stick to swing the majority in their favor. You don't need to put a gun to their head. The gun to their head is the threat of losing those government provided perks.
That's how elections are won in Europe, just promise the boomers(largest voter base) higher pensions. That's why nobody who campaigns on reforming the pension system will ever win an election.
Party A) Keep the 80% discount in the electricity and gas bills
Party B) Reduce inflation from 200% y.o.y. to 50% y.o.y.
Party C) [I don't remember]
Party D) "A normal country"
---
PS: D was a slogan, they got less than 5% of the votes.
It sounds like their Election Commission takes their job very seriously.
A key part of India's system is the Elector's Photo Identity Card (EPIC), required to cast ballots. Similar obligations are present wherever election integrity is taken seriously.
We have an independent electoral commission. I'm not saying its incapable of being reproachable, nothing is "beyond reproach" but I have yet to hear a serious, non-cooker accusation any political party has tried to stuff the electoral commission.
What we don't have, (and I think should have) is capped party donations. I'm tired of the money aspect of who gets the most billboards.
We also have silly bad behaviour emerging: People doing their billboards in the same style and colours as the electoral commission. Often in foreign language support roles, using words like (not a quote) YOU MUST VOTE FOR PARTY A LIKE THIS which I think is really trolling the voter badly.
We do get occasional issues with individuals trying stuff, but the AEC is very good at calling it out or prosecuting it.
It's strong enough that the parties don't try anything risky.
Asserted without evidence, and apparently quite likely to be an attempt to cast aspersions on "election integrity" in the USA and elsewhere.
The flip side is even more true. If someone is claiming they care about election integrity and isn't willing to pair that with funding of an equivalent ID system that is both free and easy for voters to acquire, they don't actually care about election integrity.
If your voter ID system isn’t 100% free and absolutely effortless for voters to obtain, it’s a badly disguised vote suppression scheme.
It’s pretty much always a vote suppression scheme.
Some people probably are so badly organized and/or ignorant that they can’t manage making and keeping one single DMV appointment even once every 15 years so that they could get an ID (I think we can all agree that an “expired” ID would do fine, as long as the picture isn’t so out of date it can’t be verified).
Anyway, it’s only those people who would be “disenfranchised” under a voter ID system and I’m not convinced our government would benefit from incorporating the opinions of someone so unserious. It’s ok that some things in life are reserved for people that have invested a tiny amount of effort once in their lives. There’s also not a free and effortless way to feed or bathe yourself.
By the way, a state ID costs $15 in Mississippi and $9 for “eligible people” in California.
If it costs a penny and is a requirement to vote, it is an unconstitutional poll tax.
I hate calling something a slippery slope, but I don't know how else to describe an argument that is fundamentally "Sure, it will disenfranchise people, but who cares about those people anyway?" Once you accept that people's rights can be taken away simply because protecting those rights is an inconvenience, then none of us actually have any protected rights.
Beyond this point: voting isn't just a freedom, it's a duty in a civilized democracy. We don't enforce it like Australia does, but anyone who not only doesn't care if it's performed, but is sanguine about it, isn't fully on board with government by the people.
There are already a bunch of arbitrary de facto restrictions:
- If you can't read, you won't be able to use your ballot.
- If you don't have transportation or any time off to vote, you can't vote in person. (Also the main objection given to requirements to get an ID card).
- If you don't know where you'll be living consistently, mail-in voting is problematic.
We accept that there will be people whose lives are so chaotic and messed up that voting probably won't be easy for them. So why is the requirement of identity proof, which is not more difficult to overcome than the above existing barriers, such a trigger to some?
> anyone who not only doesn't care if it's performed, but is sanguine about it...
My response is, anyone who cares so little about casting a vote that they wouldn't set aside time once in a decade to get an ID for the purpose of voting isn't fully on board with participating in government by the people -- and I'm totally fine with that.
I also don't see the point in the Australian idea, especially since paying $20-50 is trivial for anyone who's not homeless, and uncollectible (moot point) if you are actually destitute. You're still getting basically the same set of people in the voting booth anyway -- only the ones who give a shit about voting.
A state ID is not required to register to vote in CA[1]. (The requirement is CA ID number or last-four-of-SSN or a third complicated way, but I'm assuming ID or SSN is attainable for nigh everyone eligible.)
This can be fixed, but you will notice the people who champion voter ID never bother trying. Naturally, the only reasonable conclusion is they like it that way. They're not stupid, after all.
Also https://www.reuters.com/world/india/family-remote-himalayas-...
There was really no good reason for that, unless they were really against a certain segment of the population voting (a lot of people in the apartments didn't have cars, or were too busy to go so far to vote).
Then both parties think that if their party’s guy isn’t in charge of the election itself, that the vote counting itself is being faked. Of course, these concerns only ever come out when their preferred party loses.
Mix internet voting into this, and the average person’s utter cluelessness about computers, and no amount of fancy crypto, blockchain, etc. would ever convince any American that their party lost fair and square. “The new online voting system was rigged!”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_suppression_in_the_Unite...
What evidence do you need that making it more difficult to vote will result in fewer people voting? Isn't it common sense?
I would feel much better if they required ink.
There are scrutineers that watch counting happen at the booth once polls close, and who also see and hear the numbers get phoned into HQ. HQ has more scrutineers from all parties checking both postal votes and recounts.
If anything doesn't match up it gets flagged. I think that the ability of every party to watch votes themselves means that trust is increased, and they have skin in the game (if they didn't object at the booth why not!?).
Pen markings are perfectly valid however, so you can bring a pen to the booth to vote with if you'd like to do so.
It's also true of course that erasers don't quite erase pencil. It would be fairly obvious that the paper was tampered with.
I mean the same is true in the United States. One of the key issues with the 2020 election was footage from several jurisdictions where the public was physically blocked from viewing the counting by election officials literally holding up giant white boards. The optics of that were extremely bad.
Scrutineers are also not members of the public. They are declared and appointed by candidates and parties for polling oversight and have complete access to the counting and polling area. They're not allowed to touch ballots but they can challenge and bring them up to all the scrutineers in the location (and EC staff) and finally they can take it to the court afterwards
Election officials are also not local council\elected people they're people working for the AEC\State Electoral commission. which is as mentioned above a non partisan organisation (which is highly different from bipartisan framing)
You also have a large number of counting staff. who do the sorting and then counting with machine assistance (how many sheets are here in this stack do they match the tally the 2 people already made on that pile)
Though the senate elections have a more complex voting software stack due to STV fun.
Like... what do you think American elections are actually like? Do you think some democrat/republican counts them in secret somewhere?
Given the number of people involved in watching ballots the entire time it is happening this would require a lot of compromised people and a lot of compromised scrutineers.
On the other hand, disappearing ink has been around for a long time.
The mark of vote being indelible or not is irrelevant. The monitoring and protection of the ballots is far more important. For example, representatives of all political parties are involved in the count, oversight by an agency, etc. If you had time to erase and re-mark ballots, you could swap out paper ballets too.
Erasing is indeed a possibility with pencil markings, but this can only happen during the counting process - which should be open to anyone to audit, and anyone messing around with an eraser during the counting process would stand out like a sore thumb.
You must press the stamp on the stamp pad at the official who gives you the stamp.
Stamping is fast and convenient. While corrupted officials could apply additional stamps during the counting, to make the vote invalid, that should be prevented by witnesses belonging to the parties that compete in the election.
Then my refusal to vote should be counted. If enough people refuse to vote then the entire election should be cancelled and new candidates found. Otherwise this is a ridiculous catch 22 of state bullying to no actual purpose. Who would even think to create such a law?
The USA. We have districts where turnout is as low as 25% of eligible voters.
> anyone can start a political party of their own and participate in the election.
You don't get federal funding and the FCC doesn't force networks to cover your party or include you in debates until you win 5% on a national platform. Have fun actually doing this. Which was the only reason I voted for Nader. I wanted the greens to have a standing in the US. It's never even come close to happening since.
> "cancel the election and find new candidates"
Then your political parties will engage in a race to the bottom with you. You don't sense this already happening?
As it is though, people tend to vote for one of the parties on offer, of which there are many. And as it's also preference voting, Australia is not stuck in the trap of "better vote for A or B will get in" either. You can vote for C, with a fallback to D, E and F before putting in A as a back-stop.
Does this manifest as any real political outcome?
We also have a lot of choice of parties here which helps. Shame the same 2 majors keep getting in but the smaller parties and independents do take some seats.
Then spoil your paper.
Spoiling your paper shows that you got off your arse and voted to say "I don't want any of these people". (See the number of spoilt votes in the UK Police and Crime Commissioner elections for a prime example of this; many in the UK disagreed with politicising the police and spoilt their papers in protest)
By simply not voting, the assumption is you are either lazy or simply don't care...... And as a result, the politicians will not care either.
Is that the point of democracy?
> See the number of spoilt votes in the UK Police and Crime Commissioner elections
The candidate was still elected with a turnout of 15.3%. This is farcical to give this person a mandate where they clearly earned none. Shouldn't the parties get off their arse and pick better people for office? I'm busy and I pay taxes. What are you hassling me for?
> the assumption is
Assume whatever you like.
> the politicians will not care either.
I hate to be flip, but your entire tenor has brought it out of me, and this is the hardest to take. Then why would else would they run for office? They need my approval by engaging in a national cargo cult ritual to function properly? You accept this from your "leadership?"
How has that actually worked out in practice?
It'd be a pity to get heated up over a misunderstanding of the Australian election system.
OP said (somewhat confusingly I admit):
>[Australia has] compulsory attendance at voting booths for eligible citizens, you can spoil your paper or walk away but we enforce with a fine,
and I think you understood that to mean:
>Australian citizens must choose: drop a valid ballot in the box or be fined
but I think what OP intended was (and this is consistent with the Australia Electoral Commission website [0]):
>Australian citizens must choose: drop a ballot (spoiled is fine) in the box or be fined
(As an aside - one WILL get fined if one appears the polling place but refuses to drop a ballot in the box - see [1].)
Then, believing (incorrectly) that casting a spoiled ballot incurs the fine, you said "Then my refusal to vote should be counted [for the system to be anywhere near reasonable, given that I went to the polling place and exercised my civic duty to the extent permitted by my moral fiber, fully expecting to be fined for it]" (emphasis and context added).
And Australia does keep track of how many "informal votes" (their term for what we're calling spoiled ballots here) are cast. See [2] for an official results page breaking out informal votes by count and percent. But informal votes have no bearing on the election results; they are thrown out and only the valid votes contribute to the result.
So I think you're fundamentally asking for the "informal votes" to have a first-class mechanism for contributing to the election result (specifics TBD, maybe a threshold to meet, maybe an disqualification of the candidates for a period of time, maybe a re-do, whatever).
And that's a valid ask and an interesting discussion to have!
But given that the reason you asked for that was based on a misunderstanding, do you even still want that? Do you still think the AUS system is unreasonable as-is?
----
0. https://aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/voting/index.htm#c...
>Under the Electoral Act, the actual duty of the elector is to attend a polling place, have their name marked off the certified list, receive a ballot paper and take it to an individual voting booth, mark it, fold the ballot paper and place it in the ballot box.
>Because of the secrecy of the ballot, it is not possible to determine whether a person has completed their ballot paper prior to placing it in the ballot box. It is therefore not possible to determine whether all electors have met their legislated duty to vote. It is, however, possible to determine that an elector has attended a polling place or mobile polling team (or applied for a postal vote, pre-poll vote or absent vote) and been issued with a ballot paper.
1. https://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/publications/backgrounders/...
in Krosch v Springell, at the polling place, Mr Springell handed the presiding officer a note saying, paraphrased, "none of these candidates deserve my vote". He was fined, because it could be proven that he didn't uphold the "duty of the elector" as defined in [0].
2. https://results.aec.gov.au/31496/Website/HouseInformalByStat...
The biggest reason "it just works" is that the Australian Electoral Commission, the organisation that sets electoral boundaries and runs the election, is independent of the government. Other reasons are compulsory voting and preferential voting. In my mind, it is these three things that keep Australia's democracy relatively healthy.
"The laws of mathematics are very commendable, but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia" said a politician asked about his policy of making encryption illegal.
And the pieces of paper with votes for the wrong candidates are easy to dispose of. See, for example, russia.
(this is Australia. we have compulsory attendance at voting booths for eligible citizens, you can spoil your paper or walk away but we enforce with a fine, participation in the one obligation of citizenship)
-I have been offered voting remotely in elections for my home economy of the UK and I would have welcomed some kind of homomorphic encrypted, secured voting method, given I have done KYC with the UK government to get my pension paid, I don't see there is a problem with them knowing who I am online.
I therefore do not totally agree with the headline, but I'm willing to be convinced by the article, because comparing the land of hanging chad to my own, I think paper and pencil is just fine. BTW we have a senate election which demands ballot papers cut from A0 paper in long strips. Hundreds of boxes to be filled in. What we don't have is the vote for every judge, official, proposition on the table, we just elect representatives and senators, but we have a complex vote method. It just works. We do machine reading, but every single paper is reviewed by people, and parties have rights to monitor the vote, in secured spaces. We do not have a serious concern with the integrity of our vote, and the question is regularly asked and tested. (it's not just because we believe its secure and don't check)
Its a great list of signatories, includes people I respect. I would think that the prime question for americans is "how much worse or better than the current approach could this be?"