It only did run affected programs of course but it's so stupid to even talk about vscode in that case. if you used the affected nx versions you are affected no matter if you used vscode,webstorm, whatever ide of your liking. if you used a not affected nx version nothing happend no matter which vscode version you used.
I thought it was useful to include because:
* it can inform triage, if you use the extension you're more likely to be impacted * because it was VSCode, Workplace Trust actually partially mitigated this in at least 38 cases
I found the first submission on the story (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45034496), which used a github url, and merged the thread into it - more explanation at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45042727.
Create a blog post about a security issue. Post it on HN get upvotes. Find people who believe they might be affected. Let them run the affected program. Boom.
I'm not sure which is worse.
It seems a lot of general "wisdom" here is thrown by people who have not looked into this particular incident or are unfamiliar with js node dev in general.
Be weary of binary wasms though, harder to analyze. In the end, because it was published and npm allows you to see the history, we can all see.
Still, from a security standpoint, anything within a “package” that is compromised, compromises the package. Don’t install it. Wait for the fix.
Should the AI Assistant NOT reply to the request it was given? Why shouldn't it?
LLMs are not a dumb interpreter. At minimum, they are a client-server architecture that can be used as a control plane. But they are much more than that and can likely employ advanced detection and classification heuristics.
The vendors have the capability of (1) stopping this in its tracks, (2) understanding the extent of the attack and notifying customers, (3) studying the breadth of approaches used (4) for future, more ambitious attacks, monitoring them live as threat actors explore systems.
Google and Anthropic absolutely have responsibility here and must devote resources to this.
I am shocked that this is being met with such hostility. I cannot picture a world where LLM vendors are not responsible for making a best attempt at safeguarding their customers. Especially as they seek to have a greater role in business and financial automation.
I've worked at fintechs and we had to go out of our way to look out for our customers. We purchased compromised password and email lists and scanned for impacted customers. Our business didn't cause the data breaches, but we viewed it as our responsibility to protect customers.
Google and Anthropic have the greatest opportunity to make a difference here.
* THIS IS ABSOLUTELY A SEV0 FOR GOOGLE AND ANTHROPIC *:
While it's not a systems outage, it has incredible potential to shape future business and market sentiment. There are going to be major articles written about this in every publication you can think of. Publications that business decision makers read. Forbes, the New York Times, Business Insider. And Google and Anthropic are going to want to own their blurb and state that they acted fast and responsibly. If they're lucky, they can even spin this as an opportunity.
This is the difference between LLMs being allowed in the business workplace and being met with increasing scrutiny. (Not that they shouldn't be scrutinized, but that this incident will overwhelmingly shape the future of the decision envelope.)
I made the above, longer form post to hopefully grab the attention of Google and Anthropic folks. My top-level posts always fall to the very bottom of the page.
Google and Anthropic need to be tracking this.
YC startups: there's a business opportunity for you lurking in here.
Good callout. Evidence so far points to `nx --version` itself being safe because this was in a post-install script but we changed the rec in our post.
We took the versions in the Github security advisory and compiled it into a Semgrep rule which is MIT-licensed: https://semgrep.dev/c/r/oqUk5lJ/semgrep.ssc-mal-resp-2025-08.... Semgrep rules can be overkill for these use cases but it can be convenient to have a single command to check for all affected versions across multiple packages, especially for our users who already have Semgrep installed. That's basically what I did on all our internal repos.
We updated the blog post to note the Semgrep rule is MIT licensed. And you can run locally with Semgrep (which is LGPL: https://github.com/returntocorp/semgrep) if you curl it and run `semgrep --config=rule.yaml`
> Run semgrep --config [...]
> Alternatively, you can run nx –version [...]
Have we not learned, yet? The number of points this submission has already earned says we have not.
People, do not trust security advisors who tell you to do such things, especially ones who also remove the original instructions entirely and replace them with instructions to run their tools instead.
The original security advisory is at https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7... and at no point does it tell you to run the compromised programs in order to determine whether they are compromised versions. Or to run semgrep for that matter.