Leaves no choice but for this community to make the rest of the Arc community aware of it as they refuse the transparency
Browser security is more than finding the best PR strategy, it's a mindset that prioritizes the user's well being over the product's image. I've deleted my account and uninstalled Arc. Not because of the issue in itself, but because it's clear what the response has been aiming to protect (not my data).
The engineers already closed the hole, the blog post was already published, more work was (/is still?) going to be done to make a new site to hide them in. I wasn't asking for them to move engineers off patching to blog posting, I was asking for the already created blog posting to be made as visible in the blog the same as the posts were (which is now the case, so at least there is that).
In regards to whether or not they did analysis to show it wasn't exploited that was indeed nice to see but you still have to make the post visible anyways because you're not always right, even if you're one of the biggest companies in the world https://www.theregister.com/2024/09/17/microsoft_zero_day_sp... The measure to meet here is transparency, not perfection.
And no, I wasn't really sitting around waiting for a good opportunity to delete my account and uninstall my main browser. That would be... very odd? I'm free to change browser without a reason to blame haha. I didn't say what I was switching to either (it's quite irrelevant to the topic), which can certainly be more than one of 2 options you have quips for. Regardless which option, the measure to meet here is again not perfection but transparency and yes, others do meet that well and above how Arc did in this case.
More than anything, the reason for responding is less to argue about most of those points (I even debate just removing them now as they may detract from the point) and more to point out "real" transparency on security incidents (not just what a PR person would say gives the best image) is as big a factor in trusting a company with your data as their actual response to vulnerabilities. It doesn't matter that a company looks great 100% of the time they tell you about things if you know they are being intentionally stingy on showing you anything about it since you now have no way to trust they'd show you the bad anyways.
This is still responding to a different complaint. The operational performance of "optimally distributing" the message, or however you want to word it, on was/is both imperfect and perfectly fine at the same time. Where the ball was dropped was in responding to a complaint about how the posting was specially hidden where the communicated action was how it will be shown on a different site in the future in place of acknowledging it should be visible as a normal post currently.
When the alarms are going off you're going to be slow, you're going to make the wrong decision on something minor, you're going to wish you had done x by y point in time looking back, you're going to have been imperfect. All that kind of stuff was handled fine (from what I can tell) here. The disappointment in transparency was in deflecting a presented highlight in how to fix a visibility issue instead of outright acknowledging it was a miss.
My message was/is about how that's not cool. Not that their handling of the issue itself was bad or an expectation of apology or expectation more resources should have been put on doing x, y, or z. Just that deflecting callouts on security communication issues with deferrals and redirection is not a cool way to handle security communication. They've since changed it, which is cool of them, but the damage was done with me (and maybe some others) in the meantime. Maybe in the future they handle that differently, maybe they don't, but for now I lost the trust I had that they always will, even when nobody is looking, since they didn't even when they knew people were.
It falls a bit flat for me where you address the tracking of domains visited by users, I don't think this accurately addresses or identifies the core issues. When you say "this is against our privacy policy and should have never been in the product to begin with"--okay, so how did get there? This wasn't a data leak due to a bug it was an intentionally designed feature that made its way through any review process which might be in place to production without being challenged. What processes will you put in place to prevent future hidden violations of your stated policies?
Edit just to say, dubious as I am I sincerely hope Arc can overcome these issues and succeed. We desparately need more browsers, badly enough that I'll even settle for a Chromium-based one as long as it isn't made by Microsoft.
In case the parent can't fix it in time for the edit window: https://github.com/zen-browser/desktop
It's more a matter of saving precious vertical space.
I started moving to Zen about a week ago, hearing about this vulnerability yesterday and especially seeing their reaction to it I know I made the right choice in leaving Arc.
>We’ve fixed the issues with leaking your current website on navigation while you had the Boost editor open. We don’t log these requests anywhere, and if you didn’t have the Boosts editor open these requests were not made. Regardless this is against our privacy policy and should have never been in the product to begin with.
Given the context (boosts need to know the URL they apply to after all) this indeed was a "deliberate design choice" but not in the manner you appear to be suggesting. It's still very worrisome, I agree.
You've been handed a golden opportunity to set the right course.
The Browser Company raises $50mm at a $550mm post-money valuation in March [1]. They’ve raised $125mm altogether.
Unless they’re absolute asshats, they’ll increase the bug payout. But people act truly when they don’t think they’re being watched—a vulnerability of this magnitude was worth $2k to this company. That’s…eyebrow raising.
[1] https://techcrunch.com/2024/03/21/the-browser-company-raises...
So…how? Are you claiming they have oodles of logs and a perfect dork* to find suspicious JavaScript? If they had the latter wouldn’t they already be using it for security?
If you have some method that works do tell.
With that said, I think you're probably right. I doubt Firebase audit logs contain update contents, and based on the bug report, your "in and out" proposal is as simple as:
firebase.collection("boosts").where("creatorID", "==", "attackers_user_id").update({"creatorId": "victims_user_id" });
sleep(time);
firebase.collection("boosts").where("creatorID", "==", "victims_user_id").update({"creatorId": "attackers_user_id" });
(okay, not exactly, because this would also set the ownership of the victim's legitimate Boosts, but the actual code isn't much more difficult).
> As of July 2023, The Browser Company has 100,000+ users
https://www.boringbusinessnerd.com/startups/the-browser-comp....
Low bounties might mean that somebody doesn't bother to look at a product or doesn't bother to disclose beyond firing off an email or maybe even just publishes details on their blog on their own.
Bounties aren't really meant to compete with black markets. This is true even for the major tech companies that have large bounties.
I think this should be a resigning matter for the CTO.
I'm looking at all of the Arc Max features which probably need to be architected correctly to be secure/privacy-preserving.
They could take a lot of inspiration from iCloud Private Relay and iOS security architectures in addition to really understanding the Chrome security model.
They are owning up to their mistakes and making sure such things don't happen again (and increasing the amount from 2K :-)) seems like the right approach to me
But it's also likely part of the startup mentally of "move fast and break things", which is not entirely compatible with the goal of the browser.
Pro tip: if stuff like this violently upsets you, never be an early adopter of anything. Wait 5-10 years and then make your move.
Personally, I expect stuff like this from challenger alternatives, this is the way it should be. There is no such thing as a new, bug-free software product. Software gets good by gaining adoption and going through battle testing, it’s never the other way around like some big company worker would imagine.
On the other hand, we’re talking about a 2 year old browser leaking what websites you visit. Do you also think Firefox in 2006 was bulletproof? The entire internet and every single OS & browser was a leaky bucket back then.
The current safety-ism, paranoia and risk-aversion around consumer software on this forum is hilarious to me. Maybe they shouldn’t have called this place “Hacker” news, because it’s now full of people LARPing as international intelligence agency targets from a 90s movie. If the prying Five Eyes are such a concern for you, maybe use a fake email when signing up for stuff and your browser history is instantly anonymized.
Yes, startups involve lots of risk (to everyone involved, users/employees/founders/investors). But risk is the only way we get new things. If you those risks are too scary for you, stay far away startups.
Is there a reason why you don’t have any security-specific positions open on your careers site?
Also, there's the whole notion of every URL you visit being sent to Firebase -- were these logged? Awful for a browser.
That’s corporate speak for “no, we won’t pay the researcher any more money.”
While people might nitpick on how things were handled, the fact that you checked if anyone was affected and fixed it promptly is a good thing.
Being prompt on a vulnerability of this magnitude should be considered "meeting the standard" at best.
Maybe not. If the browser is that buggy, there may be plenty of these lying around. The company itself is pricing the vulnerability at $2k. That should speak volumes to their internal view of their product.
Do we have adoption statistics?
It would seem prudent for the browser to be banned in professional environments. (I use Kagi's Orion browser as a personal browser on MacOS. My work is done in Firefox.)
> browser bug of this severity is extremely valuable, even for a niche browser like Arc
Absolutely. (Even if it were in beta.)
What I'm trying to say is the $2k payout sends a message. One, that The Browser Company doesn't take security seriously. And/or two, that they don't think they could pay out a larger number given the state of their codebase.
Side note: my favourite content on crisis management is this 2-minute video by Scott Galloway [1]. (Ignore the political colour.)
Bringing the chaos back like it's 1999.
To be honest, I'm a bit disappointed. For future reference, this doesn't seem like a good strategy to contain reputational damage.
By the way, I don't know for sure, but given the severity I suspect on the black market this bug would have gone for a _lot_ more than $2k.
If your app is paying out $2K and a competing app pays out $100K, why would anyone bother searching for bugs in your app? Every minute spent researching your app pay 1/50th of what you'd get searching in the competing app (unless your app has 50x more bugs I suppose, but perhaps then you have bigger problems...).
I'm always so confused by the negative responses to people asking for higher bug bounties. It feels like it still comes from this weird entitlement that researchers owe you the bug report. Perhaps they do. But you know what they definitely don't owe you? Looking for new bugs! Ultimately this attitude always leads to the same place: the places that pay more protect their users better. It is thus completely reasonable to decide not to use a product as a user if the company that makes the product isn't paying high bug bounties. It's the same as discovering that a restaurant is cheeping out on health inspections and deciding to no longer eat there.
It's not about viewing security researchers as sociopaths who will always sell to the highest bidder, the fact is there will always be criminals going for exploits and bug bounties can help not just by paying off someone that would have otherwise abused a bug but also by attracting an equally motivated team who would otherwise be entirely uninvolved to play defense.
If you and a couple friends released an app that had 50k users and you’d not even broken even, can I claim my 100k by finding a critical RCE?
Long story short, there are ways to creatively solve this problem, or avoid it, but simply exclaiming “well it would be too hard to do the necessary thing” is probably not a good solution.
you cannot demand more than someone is willing to or able to pay, either a researcher out there will spend some time on it because it’s a relatively new contender to the market and they’re hoping for low hanging fruit, or they won’t.
obviously the bounty was enough for someone to look at it and get paid out for a find, otherwise we wouldn’t be having this conversation. trying to argue that they should set a bounty high enough to make it worth your time is pointless and a funny stance to take. feel free to ignore it or be upset that they aren’t offering enough to make you feel secure, it’s not going to make 100k appear out of thin air.
Secondly, in a true demonstration of confusion, if you read my posts they demand nothing. They simply state what are likely outcomes of certain choices. I’m not sure how to possibly make the stance of “if you pay smaller bug bounties in a market that has other offerings, you will get less research focused on your product” any simpler. It seems fairly straightforward… and the existence of one bug report does not somehow “disprove” this. Why not make the bug bounty $1 otherwise? Oh, is that a ridiculous suggestion? Because that might not be a worthwhile enough incentive perhaps? But who are you to dictate what is and isn’t a worthwhile incentive. “That’s not how this works. That’s not how any of this works…”
> “either a researcher out there will spend some time on it […] or they won’t.”
Yes, I agree with this truism that they either will spend time on it or they won’t. Interestingly, this is true in all scenarios. My point is how to optimize researchers spending time on your product (which in theory you are inclined to do if your are offering a bounty), and I then separately even make suggestions for how to possibly require less attention by making safer choices and being able to “ride” on another project’s bug bounties.
But again, the simplest point here is that the position of “we offer low bug bounties because that is what we can afford” is fine, it’s just also absolutely defensible to be completely turned off by it as a potential user of that product, for the likely security implications of that position.
The case is redeemable. It may still be an opportunity if handled deftly. But it would require an almost theatrical display of generosity to the white hat (together, likely, with a re-constituting of the engineering team).
Firebase is not to blame here. It's a solid technology which just has to be used properly. Google highlights the fact that setting up ACLs is critical and provides examples on how to set them up correctly.
If none of the developers who were integrating the product into Arc bothered about dealing with the ACLs, then they are either noobs or simply didn't care about security.
Firebase ACLs are a constant source of vulnerabilities largely because they are confusing and don't have enough documentation around them.
What is also unacceptable is to pay 2000 dollars for something like this AND have to create user accounts to use your browser. Will definitely stay away from it.
To explore a constructive angle both for the industry generally and the Browser Company specifically: hire this clever hacker who pwned your shit in a well-remunerated and high-profile way.
The Browser Company is trying to break tradition with a lot of obsolete Web norms, how about paying bullshit bounties under pressure rather than posting the underground experts to guard the henhouse.
If the Browser Company started a small but aggressive internal red team on the biohazard that is the modern web?
I’ll learn some new keyboard shortcuts and I bet a lot of people will.
I'm really sorry about this, both the vuln itself and the delayed comms around it, and really appreciate all the feedback here – everything from disappointment to outrage to encouragement. It holds us accountable to do better, and makes sure we prioritize this moving forward. Thank you so much.