Therac-25 was a safety event, not a cybersecurity event.
Even with "defense in depth", there's clear separation between parts that do the important stuff, and parts that protect the parts that do the important stuff from being used against the rules.
I'd go as far as dividing cybersecurity into two major areas of concern:
1) The part that constrains software systems to conform to some make-believe reality with rules stricter than natural -- this is trying to make the abstract world function more like physical reality we're used to;
2) The rules and policies - who can access what, when, why, and what for.
Area 1) should very much be a bolt-on third-party thing everyone should ideally take for granted. Area 2) is a responsibility of each organization/project individually, but it also small and mostly limited to issues specific to that organization/project.
It maps to physical reality like this:
Area 1) are the reinforced walls, floor and ceiling, and blast doors that can only be opened via a key card[0];
Area 2) are the policies and procedures of giving and revoking keycards to specific people in the company.
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[0] - Or by crossing some wires deep in the reader, because accidents happen and cutting through blast doors cost money. I.e. real-life security and safety systems often feature overrides.
Like, if the code can handle all input correctly, then there is no exploit path. Regardless of whether the input comes from an attacker or not.
Compromising it would simply be a matter of changing a few bytes in the executable, or replacing the executable with another one.
This seems so obvious to me that I think you may have non-standard definitions of either safety or security.
The executable is part of the system that's supposed to be safe. That you have no means to modify it is an aspect of safety.
With your example, imagine that program would be running on an AVR with boot fuses burnt.
\|/ \|/
\ /
You're wrong!
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^^^ ^^^
Sorry, couldn't help myself. There's an obscure Polish joke it made me think of (punchline being, thankfully you didn't ask for it to "hold its shit together").If that's the standard, then no wonder "software safety is near non-existent".
Is that true? The safest train is the one which is stationary. Cut off the wheels, and drop the rail cars on secure foundations (carefully) and you just protected yourself from 90% of possible accidents. If you remove everything flamable and weld the doors shut you got rid of 9% more.
Do you see why this is silly? Because the main business of rails is to transport people and stuff. You won’t be railroad engineering long if you don’t keep that in mind.
You're confusing a statement of the way the world *Is* as an endorsement of the way it *Ought* to be. Ask yourself this: WHY do you get your licenses and certificates revoked in railroads and aviation? Because without that threat of punishment, the railroad and aviation companies would choose to spend their money on other things that are their actual business and not on the distractions that safety and security are otherwise. It takes the force of law to mandate that the companies do something that is contrary to their actual interests and goals. See also Boeing.
I'm pissed this is accepted as normal for the IT sector, while in railroad engineering and aviation (where human lives are at stake) you'd get your licenses and certificates revoked. Therac-25 something.