Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by stavros on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:01AM
(#41346353)
Ah, there's the non-standard definition. Safety means that the system performs as designed while the design invariants hold. Security means someone malicious can't change the invariants.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by blueflow on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:06AM
(#41346374)
Cite your standard.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:07AM
(#41346383)
How could it be any other way? There are probably some definitions out there, but what 'stavros said is pretty much what the words mean.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by blueflow on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:13AM
(#41346403)
That's not what it is about. If someone calls you "non-standard", you challenge them to identify these standards. If you call me wrong, at least give it hands and feets.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by TeMPOraL on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:16AM
(#41346420)
> If you call me wrong, at least give it hands and feets.
\|/ \|/
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You're wrong!
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^^^ ^^^
Sorry, couldn't help myself. There's an obscure Polish joke it made me think of (punchline being, thankfully you didn't ask for it to "hold its shit together").
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by stavros on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:07AM
(#41346380)
Nah, I'm OK.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by blueflow on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:41AM
(#41346555)
If you know it better, enlighten us.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by stavros on Sunday August 25, 2024 @07:43AM
(#41346565)
I comment for fun, and this thread has stopped being fun.
Re:Defenders think in lists, attackers think in graphs (2015)
by Dylan16807 on Sunday August 25, 2024 @10:28AM
(#41347542)
That AVR can still be manipulated. If your definition of safety includes preventing in-person attacks on the data storage, then you pretty much need armed guards.
If that's the standard, then no wonder "software safety is near non-existent".
The executable is part of the system that's supposed to be safe. That you have no means to modify it is an aspect of safety.
With your example, imagine that program would be running on an AVR with boot fuses burnt.