So, if you can call "metadata exchanging app" an app that simply has a list of numbers registered to the service, without any metadata assigned to them except their last access, the same label could be assigned to a much larger number of services.
It may not be anonymous, but it can hardly be disregarded as private.
[1] https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/
[2] https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
[3] https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/
Assuming you trust them (notice all your links point to signal.org own publications). Most of the privacy people are cautious/paranoid and assume that everything that can be collected is collected. Even assuming a lack of malicious intent, what's stopping NSA from hacking into Signal's infrastructure and logging who's talking to who along with timestamps? That's not to say I don't trust signal (it's the best mainstream solution right now), but it could do better to hide metadata from the protocol.
Sealed Sender, the second link in the comment you've replied to. The indicator is off by default, but you can enable it under Settings → Privacy → Advanced. If I remember correctly, it doesn't work for the very first message you exchange with someone, but then it turns on and remains on.
In layman terms, it turns "from A; to B; content: <encrypted>" into "to B; content: <encrypted>". Their infrastructure doesn't need to know the "from" part to serve its purpose, so they strip it away.
If it was the other way around, they'd have to give that info to the (US) court. Same as any other US-based business, it's not optional, they can't ignore such requests, they can't lie, otherwise they'd be placing themselves in legal troubles for a random nobody that happens to be using their product. So, when I see this page, I fully believe them: https://signal.org/bigbrother/. If I didn't, my first step would be to look up those court cases from alternate sources.
NSA can hack into Signal's infrastructure, and what they will be able to gather are the same information provided by Signal in reply to subpoenas (the whole list here https://signal.org/bigbrother/), because everything else is end-to-end encrypted.
I think Telegram is very wide-spread for running large group chats and communities, a use case that Signal is not interested in. Personally, I want my chats end to end encrypted and I'm grateful to Signal for pioneering this and inspiring Whatsapp, facebook messenger and others to adopt the same.
You will still need a phone number to sign up for Signal. Signal still knows your phone number, you just hide it from your contacts. To me this only makes it even more suspicious.
And you can correlate username to phone number not that hard in most standard setting cases.
Sorry, but that's not privacy. I don't care what they do to encrypt your messages, they are still tied to me, which makes the super duper encryption pointless.
Yes oranges umm phone numbers is a problem. They have that both. Only one can additionally read the contents.
Thats for now the price for a normie interface.
First goalposts first.
But in this thread, GP was just talking about metadata. The goalpost here is metadata. GP particularly mentioned that Signal "fixed" the phone number issue and I just want to note that currently Signal isn't any better than Telegram in this aspect.
And then you moved orange back.
This is incorrect. Telegram has E2EE.
So, not on by default (unlike Signal), no group chats (unlike Signal), no support at all in desktop apps (you've guessed it: unlike Signal).
It's not as simple as Signal inspiring Facebook and Whatsapp, the sequence of events happened in reverse order.
Whatsapp started encrypting messages after significant security issues in ~2012
It was purchased by Facebook under initially some administration separation terms in ~2014?
In 2016 it added e2e encryption. If I recall this was controversial because it limits fb ad potential on users.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that the timeline seems to me to still be pointing towards <<e2e came from Whatsapp not FB as an initiative, even if FB owned Whatsapp at the time.>>
Again you're not factually wrong, but I hope my restating of the timeline makes it more clear why i I think your reverse order point doesn't tell the same story.
The success of such tactics can more easily be understood by even looking through the many, many comments right in this thread telling us Signal protects metadata because usernames are now a feature - guys, Signal has the metadata as the *services* are what is the topic of discussion here, not other users.
Wow, really? ICQ had that in 1996 ...
I'm sure reactionists will immediately drop Signal because Elon the great said they should without considering that it still might be their best solution to communicate privately with their friends and family. But X makes *all* of it's money from collecting a lot more than metadata from their users, Tesla collects driving data and metadata from all of its customers, Grok trains it's AI on all of the data collected from X, Tesla and other sources without asking if users want to opt out of those training datasets. So I'm not sure Elon has a leg to stand on in this conversation.
Signal got a massive boost in popularity because "Elon the great" literally told people to "Use Signal".
I have little trust in an entity that "leverages the social graph" though...
Your encryption may be great, but if you act like Farmville I'm going to trust you as much as I trust those facebook games that spam your friend list.
So all it can tell authorities is that a person with x phone number uses Signal and still uses it.
You can block number discovery.
You can't resolve username to number.
Your main account ID internally is not your number anymore.
If 2 users add you using 2 different links or usernames. Its now harder to confirm its the same account.
"[...] You can have a Telegram account without a SIM card and log in using blockchain-powered anonymous numbers available on the Fragment platform."
> To me Telegram is going after WhatsApp, not Signal.
They mention Signal by name in the referenced post.
That makes sense only in the context of e2ee to avoid MITM attacks, unless I'm mistaken.
Metadata are more important than the content of the messages and yet Signal has always been about knowing your phone number, with handwaving when the subject is mentioned.
Sessions, a Signal fork, had its tagline right: "Share encrypted messages, not metadata".
Signal is a metadata exchanging app and it's about collecting your phone number and everybody else' phone number.
Now I don't think Telegram needs to "attack" Telegram: Telegram is immensely more successful and has reached take-off velocity.
To me Telegram is going after WhatsApp, not Signal.