A snip from the post
The Analyst....
By this stage the Russians had lost most of their APC’s and tanks were standing well back acting more as artillery. The Russians then started the widespread use of what looks like golf carts and ATV’s to reinforce their infantry. Later they started using motorbikes.
With their armor gone the infantry were sent in meatwaves. *This lead the Ukrainians to mount their Octocopter heavy lift drones (which the Russians are generally very afraid of), with light machine guns to bring down the infantry attacks. While experimental these drones proved very effective, their only problem being recoil issues firing the gun. It’s planned to solve the recoil quite quickly, but using machine learning and thermal optical sights shows huge promise. This makes the drones less susceptible to having their control link severed - even if they do they can operate alone and return themselves to base. The day of the gun armed autonomous AI drone it seems, is here.*
The Russians continue infantry attacks but they have now stopped supporting them with any armor and have turned north instead, trying to find a weaker spot.
An outstanding and imaginative Ukrainian defense with limited resources yet again, blunts the relentless hammer blows of meatwave attacks backed by dwindling armor.
As far as drone defense, we already have KuRFS/Ku-720(mobile version)[0,1] radar to track drones/etc that works with a phalanx, 50-caliber guns, 30mm cannon, and coyote drones. We're also deploying a 50kw palletized laser (w/ KuRFS) with the DE MSHORAD program[2].
All of these programs predate the 2022 Ukraine invasion. The Coyote (designed at the start to take out small drones) first took flight in 2007[3].
0. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-m...
1. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/news/2021/10/11/rmd-proves-coun...
2. https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-m...
I don't think it's necessary true that the war devolves into a lot of loss of life and trench warfare. That's mostly the result of a stalemate. The Russians expected Ukraine to be a pushover. That didn't happen.
It is the other way around. Ukraine has a GDP per capita that is (prewar) 3 times that of Russia's.
Russia's oil does a lot. Using oil/gas fuels supports Russia's war economy by creating demand and raising their prices in the commodities markets, in addition to contributing to the climate disaster.
NATO armed forces have comparatively small amounts of armoured ground vehicles and artillery.
They need to and want to learn from the current war, but still keep in mind that their circumstances are different.
Vks has superiority at least along the front line since this spring maybe winter. What they dont have is supremacy
In fact a study came out in 2022 that made the Pentagon panic because it's estimated in a war with China, the US will deplete its entire anti-ship missile stockpile in only a week.
Western attack helicopters are just one prong in the meat grinder that would grind up enemy infantry formations and entrenchments far quicker than they can be replenished.
NATO vs Russia in a conventional war is basically the West hitting the delete button. Nuclear blackmail is about the only thing sparing Russian forces from that fate.
A war with China is more of a defensive situation. If large-scale infantry combat even had the opportunity to take place I'd be surprised.
That said it's always prudent to plan for the worst contingencies however remote.
What's the plan, btw, if the west does not have air superiority due to Russians, or Iranians, having drones, and the west running out of smart rockets before they run out of drones, and the denial of communications works about as well for the West as it worked for Russia? (meaning, drone communications can be disrupted at 5 meters, which means the drone explodes 10 cm from your ass as opposed to directly in your face)
NATO forces are very, very good at combined arms actions in conventional wars. Assets aren't used unless there's a fairly high assurance of surviving and accomplishing the mission.
>What's the plan, btw ...
Western military planners have been watching the Ukraine conflict closely and are aware of the threat that cheap commercial drones pose, seeing as they're partly responsible for the phenomenon.
>meaning, drone communications can be disrupted at 5 meters, which means the drone explodes 10 cm from your ass as opposed to directly in your face)
The US in particular excels at dominating the EM spectrum. I wouldn't be surprised if enemy drones wholesale fall out of the sky en masse or are otherwise rendered totally ineffective.
And how likely are NATO forces to run out of combined arms ammo after 2 weeks?
At least, if somebody doesn't take Putin out.
Now France and others are claiming they must stop Russia, implicitly even if means World War 3, because the idea of Russia being able to set military and missiles within rapid striking range (on the territory of Ukraine) would be a tremendous threat to their national security. That is reasonable and true, and it is literally the exact same thing that Russia was saying when calling Ukraine in NATO a redline.
A (more or less) neutral Ukraine worked as a tremendous buffer between NATO and Russia. If Ukraine falls under either side's control, it does indeed pose a tremendous security threat to the other side. The obvious solution to this problem is obvious. And it's not WW3, which will just immediately turn into global nuclear war, billions of deaths and, if humanity somehow survives, a likely failure to resolve these issues anyhow.
I just want to add a bit to France's threats to deploy troops to Ukraine for direct conflict. There's a serious case to be made that this is France playing a game of chicken, essentially trying to get the Russians to have to consider that as a possibility and plan for the contingency, thus occupying their time and forcing them to hedge resources they would otherwise employ.
Certainly nobody knows for sure - unless they have penetrated French intelligence - but this seems to be the majority take of US foreign policy analysts I've read.
Whether such a game of chicken is responsible or not is its own discussion. Although one could also point to escalatory rhetoric from the other side.
I'd argue giving in to nuclear blackmail is irresponsible. Personally I'd like to see the US version, with the Russians having to pause and think about what the eventual, complete loss of all their conventional forces in Ukraine looks like should they advance too far.
Then again, that's probably what the US has already communicated to them in private regarding use of tactical nukes.
It was widely reported that the US privately communicated the consequences of tactical nuclear weapon use to Russia, while maintaining an element of strategic ambiguity. Most reports suggested these consequences involved a full-scale conventional military response within Ukraine’s borders, thereby disincentivizing use.
In terms of subsequent escalation: As you pointed out, Russia of course knows using nukes against the US is literal suicide.
It's also possible the opening salvo of such a response might see tactical nuclear deployments neutralized via conventional means.
[0] https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterring-nuclear-weapons-use-...
The bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to several times larger, would generally be considered "tactical" in modern times. These are massive weapons. Then there's ADM/'nuclear landmines' [1], and more. In the absolute worst case scenario, there's even the possibility of transitioning to strategic weapons. Approaching this sort of battlefield with conventional forces is not a viable idea.
So I have no idea what the US will do if Russia resorts to nuclear usage in Ukraine, but I think this scenario can logically be discarded as one of the possible options. It plays well in the media, but it simply does not make any strategic nor logical sense.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_demolition_munition
It's almost certainly unstated US foreign policy on the matter, and not just a media bluff.
They might have thousands but they don't have thousands deployed. Moreover, use with any kind of frequency would just trigger a strategic US response, which would defeat the entire purpose—assuming there was purpose in the first place, which there isn't given conventional cost imposition.
Despite chill messaging, I suspect the US's strategic trigger finger is far itchier when things get real, and Russia knows this. Their triad has two arms which very possibly are entirely negated, and their C&C infra is garbage. There's a very real risk they'd just straight up die and accomplish nothing.
All that said I do agree that this would result in mutual mass strikes with strategic weapons, and whatever tactical weapons may be appropriate for such a strike. This is why I think direct conflict with Russia, or Russia using nuclear weapons of any sort in Ukraine, is likely to escalate rapidly to what would be the defacto end of the world.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_des...
>There is no concept of deployment for these - it's simple and normal usage.
They are absolutely deployed and accounted for.
>...and thousands of tactical nukes of all shapes and sizes.
Most sit in storage, not deployed.
>But speaking of a deployed tactical nuke is somewhat nonsensical.
The people whose job it is to track deployments of tactical nuclear weapons would probably disagree.
But strategic nukes are a different beast those simply because of their size and requirement for specialized launchers, as well as their relative incongruence with conventional weapons delivery devices. You're not launching a strategic nuke out of a conventional rocket system (as could be the case for a tactical nuke) for sure! So this makes them, more or less, able to be reasonably estimated. It's still a pretty big guessing game, but it's generally going to be at least roughly in the right ballpark.
Moreover, it wouldn't be in our interest to let another state invade another state for the express purpose of annexation and regime change. Our answer at minimum, must be the sanction of said state. If necessary, we will strangle their growth until they become like North Korea. Otherwise, our toleration will leads to further wars down the line and would be contrary to our democratic values and to the rule based international order.
I wouldn't also be too worried about WW3. It is unlikely that France would be involved, but it is clear that nukes is something that states are weary of, with good reason. I would call that nuclear blackmail which hobbled supporting Ukraine.
Recall the difficulty of getting Germany to send tanks or the controversy on the use of missiles like Storm Shadows. Now the British allowed the Ukrainian to use those missiles in attack on Russian territory. This is known as the escalation ladder and Russia seems to have a weaker hand since they backed down every time.
1. https://afsa.org/did-nato-expansion-really-cause-putins-inva...
The Ukraine war isn't about NATO, of course, any more than it was about Nazis.
It also wasn't a mistake. They aren't in it to win. I believe that Putin is deliberately trying to turn his country into a failed state that the rest of the world will have no choice but to prop up.
When you realize that it is Putin who looks at Kim with envy, and not the other way around, a lot of seemingly-nonsensical things abruptly begin to make sense.
I can't think of such a question, and apparently neither can anyone else. The only admissible conclusion is that Putin wants to turn Russia into North Korea.
That aside, why would Russia need a 'buffer' from NATO? Russia is a nuclear power. They can never be attacked or conquered again... except from within.
That is not what happened. Ukraine and Georgia applied for NATO membership in 2008, but at Russian pressure, got denied. This left them without allies and allowed Russia to invade both without triggering mutual defense clauses. Burns got played. He has changed his mind since then and now argues for military aid for Ukraine, and warns about even wider war should Ukraine fall.
> Now France and others are claiming they must stop Russia, implicitly even if means World War 3, because the idea of Russia being able to set military and missiles within rapid striking range (on the territory of Ukraine) would be a tremendous threat to their national security. That is reasonable and true, and it is literally the exact same thing that Russia was saying when calling Ukraine in NATO a redline.
The threat is not "missiles within rapid striking range", because Russia already has nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad in the middle of the EU, closer to France than any point in Ukraine. The threat is Russia rolling over Ukraine and conscripting millions of Ukrainians into invading Poland, like they have conscripted Ukrainians from territories occupied in 2014 into fighting against Ukraine. It is better to stop Russians in Ukraine in already established battlefield than to see the war spread into the EU.
You might notice that a lot of things happened in Russia internally since 2008 that indicate it's not a healthy society. While Putin is definitely the animus behind much of that and is fabulously, perhaps singularly evil, fundamentally the problem is people believing this "sphere of influence" crap instead of accepting countries' right to free association, territorial integrity and self-determination.
Russia doesn't have nearly the amount of nukes they used to. Apart from the dismantling, all signs point to many of them being unusable due to lack of maintenance (due to corruption). What they have left are smaller bombs.
The fear is overblown.
The reason strategic weapons are generally tracked is largely because these are the massive weapons, both literally and in terms of capacity. For instance a modern strategic nuke on the smaller end would generally be around 500kt of yield. The largest bomb ever detonated, Czar Bomba, was 50,000kt of yield. For contrast, the nuke dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 15kt. Even if our estimate is wrong by 90% in the happy direction, that's enough power to effectively destroy any country countless times over, including the US. Furthermore, those 4000 'rando' warheads are indeed going to be small relative to strategic nukes - but "small" in this case again means sizes of up to ~100kt, once again several times the power of Hiroshima.
I find the propaganda gradually trending towards 'nuclear war wouldn't be so bad' to be quite disconcerting. Let's at least wait until we're a multiplanetary species before we decide to start offing ourselves on a massive scale. Or even better, never do it in the first place. The Fermi Paradox is a real thing, and could be easily explained by people's inability to escape their own self delusions.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_des...
It costs a king's ransom to maintain a nuclear arsenal, as Ukraine well understood when they made the decision to give their own weapons up. The people charged with maintaining Russia's nuclear weapons since the fall of the USSR had absolutely no incentive to do anything but divert the funds for their own purposes. That's just how the Russians roll.
Meanwhile, ours will most likely work as intended. The question is, does Putin feel lucky? Well, does he? (Don't answer that, please -- I don't actually want to know.)
You tell me: what should I think of Russia, given the evidence at hand? They are still powerful enough to cause immense pain and suffering outside their borders as well as inside. If they were content with the latter, that would be one thing, but we have Putin's word that they are not.
That's too strong an assumption. The USAF 's bread and butter is supersonic stealth jets that can enter a territory, fire RF missiles to take out anti-aircraft radar, and leave faster than anything can catch it. Repeated hit and run attacks that wear down ground defenses until they can fly unchallenged. That's on top of the massive arsenal of precision guided missiles that will take out any static installation identified by constant global satellite surveillance.
NATO doctrine has always been geared towards countering the Sovet Union/Russia, despite the counter-terrorism detour the US took.
Even MANPADs, which are extremely cheap (relative to an aircraft) pose a major threat. For instance the now somewhat dated FIM-92 [2] can hit mach 2.2. This is why even though Ukraine's air defenses are overall somewhat limited, Russian aircraft rarely if ever go for deep missions. Air superiority is probably just impossible in modern times against a peer adversary.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_SR-71_Blackbird
MANPADs like the FIM-92 have an effective firing range that is a small fraction of the flight ceiling of jets, regardless of the missile's max velocity. They're not a threat unless a jet is flying very low for close air support or when lacking precision munitions, and the operator gets very lucky.
As for the numbers stuff, all modern air defense systems have independent integrated radar of at least their engagement range, and do not rely on external radar systems, though of course everything works much better with layering and cooperation. An F35 at max speed (which it is only capable of reach at high altitude for very brief periods of time) is hitting about 1975 km/h. An S-400's engagement and radar range is about 400km. That's an engagement radius of more than 12 minutes at max speed. The engagement window would be smaller with a low & slow approach, but then you start running into various other risks, even going back to MANPADs.
One could try a long-range stand-off but that's unlikely to prove effective without getting into the primary way to disable anti-air defenses - overwhelm them. But that's extremely non-trivial even if the systems are in relative isolation, let alone if they're part of a comprehensive anti-air system. And all of this for one system. Again I would appeal to Ukraine. Their anti-air defenses are relatively limited yet it's been more than enough to greatly limit the engagement capabilities of Russia's Su-57s.
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Actually I also completely failed to mention another major factor. If this sort of war breaks out, satellites are going boom shortly thereafter, the global internet would follow in short order. This will further reduce the chances of any sort of effective elimination of anti-air.
The Swedish air force could routinely (16% of the time) get a fighter jet based missile lock on a frigging SR-71 in the 80s! 40 years later, altitude and speed do not help as much as you think. And radars are networked.
It is unclear if the US will prevail against a peer adversary in an air war, but if anybody is able to achieve air supremacy, it would be the US and their allies.
F-35 can't super-sonic cruise. The choice was to be slow but stealthy.
And that's not counting the rest of NATO.
I would not say that they will succeed in a peer to peer war, but NATO have the greatest chance to achieve air supremacy against any peer opponent.
But it doesn't really matter: collective defense is the whole point of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I am not certain US will enter war with Russia in case of some escalation with European countries, especially if Trump will be elected.
Superior air force and air superiority are different concepts. The latter refers to a conflict-time status in a particular theatre.
The drones are too small, cheap and numerous to use a modern fighter jet's weapons against.