I'd say these are security issues
so does Telegram
> requires a primary Android or iOS devices
so does Telegram
To be honest, Telegram using homemade crypto instead of relying on standard approaches like CA certs turned out to be good solution in the end. Apps should stop trusting CA and should hardcode public certificates instead.
Regardless, using open and verified cryptographic primitives is a best practice for a reason. As are audits. The likelihood any company can start from scratch and produce a flawless solution is a number approaching zero.
I'd feel much more comfortable with something using Signal protocol. Ideally built from audited source.
https://techcrunch.com/2023/10/19/telegram-is-still-leaking-...
Peer-to-peer communication reveals people's IP addresses to each other, what a sensational revelation! By the way, water is wet.
All voice can be E2E thru servers, like Signal does.
Since this thread is about XMPP, Telegram's security is effectively the same as XMPP over TLS, maybe a bit better because there isn't a trusted third party (the CA).
> All voice can be E2E thru servers, like Signal does.
I know that. In fact, I built the first VoIP implementation for Telegram, libtgvoip, myself from scratch. Relay servers add delay, can run out of capacity, and cost money in bandwidth. Of course relays are still used if a P2P connection can not be established (libtgvoip always started the call through the relays and only switched to P2P if pings went through and RTT was lower, that took at least several seconds before enough statistics was gathered).
If you’re using it to communicate to a hostile party who would love to unmask you, then very not so much. Personally I’m not in the second category but I’m sure some are.
Your IP address is public. Stop treating it like a secret.
And no, your IP should not be made public in any modern chat app, that's ridiculous. The fact that Discord protects your IP from leaks is at least half of the reason it's so successful.
To anyone who wants to complain about Telegram not encrypting chats by default and using "homebrew crypto" I'd like to say that it's XMPP we're discussing here. Telegram offers marginally better security than XMPP over TLS. The "homebrew crypto" is still not broken in 10 years and not for the lack of trying.
I think you should compare apples to apples, that is, end-to-end encrypted XMPP using OTR/OMEMO/PGP. However, I agree that many XMPP clients were UX disaster when using E2E.
Yeah, and the private keys are shared with Roskompozor.
It requires phone number.
UPD: it seems that this is not Let's Encrypt's problem, but the large vulnerability of SSL infrastructure in general: many other CAs would also issue a valid certificate to an attacker capable of doing MitM.
the information available right now are too vague to come to a conclusion this bold.
Instead, I find it something like the following more plausible:
jabber.ru and xmpp.ru seem to use "exotic" DNS servers (at least as I checked right now).
https://uk.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx?itc=dlp_domain_who...
All it then takes is an exploit there in the DNS server, or a badly set-up ACME DNS-01 there, in order for Let's Encrypt to grant an SSL certificate.
https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/#dns-01-challen...
The moment you're able to write a (TXT) record for some domain name, you have proven to be eligible for getting an SSL certificate for that domain name.
To me it looks like SSL cert infra is completely compromised and unreliable.
Google has CAA records set (https://www.entrust.com/resources/certificate-solutions/tool...) and I guess CAs will have denylists of "popular" domains, so no.
> And any large national ISP can use MitM to issue fake certificates for any site hosted within that country?
Yes. You can fix this by CAA and ACME-CAA.
I can't think of a way to validate DV certificates in a better way that will resist this kind of attack.
I think some of the researchers who wrote about BGP spoofing attacks against Let's Encrypt may have suggested something about logging BGP changes and delaying DV issuance if a network's BGP announcements are too recent, or something? I don't think Let's Encrypt currently checks that, but it could be an interesting data source in the future.
This doesn't help much if the attacker is sufficiently close on the network to the target, or if the attacker can perform a successful wide-scale BGP spoofing attack.
I'm not sure if that will reassure you, since it's not a complete mitigation in all cases, but the multiperspective validation was explicitly created in response to exactly this kind of concern about attacks on, or by, ISPs!
DV represents a security trade-off, and Let's Encrypt took this and ran with it, with the net effect of much much much much less web traffic interception overall, albeit with known non-Let's-Encrypt-specific vulnerabilities to attackers who can manipulate infrastructure sufficiently.
As other people in this thread have noted, there are also other mechanisms that can help mitigate those vulnerabilities. Maybe we can come up with more over time!
https://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2021/03/exposing-currently-act...
https://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2019/07/profiling-currently-ac...
https://blog.talosintelligence.com/picking-apart-remcos/
https://flashpoint.io/wp-content/uploads/Plea-Agreement-USA-...
Really interesting writeup though. I guess it's a practical example of why everyone should get a CT monitoring service!