To me it looks like SSL cert infra is completely compromised and unreliable.
Google has CAA records set (https://www.entrust.com/resources/certificate-solutions/tool...) and I guess CAs will have denylists of "popular" domains, so no.
> And any large national ISP can use MitM to issue fake certificates for any site hosted within that country?
Yes. You can fix this by CAA and ACME-CAA.
I can't think of a way to validate DV certificates in a better way that will resist this kind of attack.
I think some of the researchers who wrote about BGP spoofing attacks against Let's Encrypt may have suggested something about logging BGP changes and delaying DV issuance if a network's BGP announcements are too recent, or something? I don't think Let's Encrypt currently checks that, but it could be an interesting data source in the future.
This doesn't help much if the attacker is sufficiently close on the network to the target, or if the attacker can perform a successful wide-scale BGP spoofing attack.
I'm not sure if that will reassure you, since it's not a complete mitigation in all cases, but the multiperspective validation was explicitly created in response to exactly this kind of concern about attacks on, or by, ISPs!