When a switch has learned a mac address all traffic destined to that traffic would be immediately switched to that port. If the switch has no record for that specific mac address it floods all ports except the ingress port. This is expensive and means other devices receive traffic that isn't intended for them so they waste time dropping it.
So in networks that have no protections against those attacks then this could very well be a problem if there are multiple access points and the two nodes are on different access points.
I once bought a cheap Bluetooth dongle from China. Its MAC address was 11:11:11:11:11:11 Obviously there are now a lot of bluetooth dongles in the wild with the same MAC address.
at least they bothered to type something!
> As a general rule, reset (RST) is sent whenever a segment arrives that apparently is not intended for the current connection. A reset must not be sent if it is not clear that this is the case. There are three groups of states:
> 1. If the connection does not exist (CLOSED), then a reset is sent in response to any incoming segment except another reset. A SYN segment that does not match an existing connection is rejected by this means.
It's possible for a node to be configured not to do this, but this is the default behavior.
[1] https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc9293.html#name-reset-generation
Worst case scenario, the router/service endpoint sees your connection responses and the other party's strange NACK responses, but I honestly don't know enough about how it works to say "everything works fine"
I'd guess that connectionless protocols will work fine and connected protocols will also work fine. The truth is probably YMMV by protocol, but there is truly no way for the wifi router to detect this is happening or isolate the redundant stations - it's an unencrypted broadcast. The only way this goes sideways is if a connection protocol is engineered to make it go sideways when you try to do that.
I'm pretty sure that any such protocol which succumbs to any unencrypted (or incorrectly keyed) traffic that isn't from the designated counterparty is insecure to begin with. It should be resilient against DoS, so most protocols aren't going to have that vulnerability. Again, I'm guessing, but I'd hope.
Still boggles my mind that WiFi clients don't establish an encryption key with the AP and encrypted their traffic even without a shared secret. Yes, that means you can't authenticate the AP, but it would still protect against passive snooping.
That makes me really reconsider my past struggles with this form of Internet access.
A multicast packet might vary based on physical distance to the imposter?
Because if that's a crime we're screwed because then it's illegal to read, or listen.
https://www.theverge.com/2021/12/31/22861188/missouri-govern...
https://github.com/aselvan/scripts/blob/master/macos/free_wi...
Granted, being a NOC engineer at Wayport (now AT&T WiFi) certainly helped me understand how it all works.