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Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by dgrin91 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @09:46AM (#35802330)
How is this more secure? They say "with a fingerprint, a face scan or a screen lock PIN", but basically all phones let you fall back to PINs if you dont want to do face or fingerprints. Pins are flat out not secure - typically just 4 digits.

Yeah its probably better than 80% of people having "password123", but it seems strictly worse than a password + password manager? Or at least just having proper 2FA.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by VoodooJuJu on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @09:59AM (#35802487)
>with a fingerprint, a face scan or a screen lock PIN

I agree - not secure.

And just a daily reminder that biometrics are usernames, they are not passwords. You can change a password, a lock, a key, you cannot change biometrics, and thus they should not be used for guarding sensitive info.

The only use-case for biometrics is deanonymization, sold to you under the auspices of security, primarily used for corporate surveillance.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by wepple on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:21AM (#35802729)
> The only use-case for biometrics is deanonymization, sold to you under the auspices of security, primarily used for corporate surveillance.

Please provide evidence that biometric data has ever been extracted from a major platform (IE Apple/enclave). Absence of evidence != evidence of absence, I know, but you’re selling it as the only use case so surely you have proof.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by johndough on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:54AM (#35803135)
> Please provide evidence that biometric data has ever been extracted from a major platform

Why extract it from a platform when it can be extracted easily from the person? Imagine your password was written on every surface you touched (fingerprint) or is prominently displayed on your social media accounts (face).

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by fireflash38 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:13AM (#35803369)
And then extrapolate to how those biometric factors could be changed outside of your control -- car accident requires facial reconstruction. Or a fire burns your fingerprints.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by jeroenhd on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @04:32PM (#35807381)
I cut myself on a cheese slicer once and had to use PIN for unlocking my phone for a week or two while the cut healed. Annoying, but that's what the fallback PIN was for I guess.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by dwaite on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:16PM (#35810823)
Actually, the PIN isn't a fallback - the biometric is just a more convenient option once the PIN is "cached".

The biometric doesn't exist until you enter your PIN on restart, which is what unlocks the filesystem (including the biometric profile).

You'll also see that you can change your biometric with just your PIN, but you cannot use your biometric to change your PIN.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by startupsfail on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:50AM (#35803850)
I don’t understand how this could work actually. From a couple of photos on the social media you can likely recover the 3d geometry of the face. From that, if the signing algorithm is known, you should be able to replicate these passkeys.

If the algorithm is not known, it’s only a matter of time it’d be leaked or reverse engineered. And then suddenly there’d be a massive, difficult to fix security breach. Just like the breaches that we have now, with voice based authentication.

Can someone explain, how this can be mitigated?

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by Scion9066 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:08PM (#35804094)
The biometrics like your face or fingerprints aren't used directly with the site you're trying to log into and would never leave your device. It's just used to unlock your phone/tablet/computer/whatever's stored secrets to sign a message verifying it's you. If you don't trust the biometric systems on your device or are worried about someone stealing them and trying to fool your device's hardware, you can always just not use them and just use a passcode/password to protect your device instead.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by startupsfail on Thursday May 04, 2023 @02:14PM (#35819775)
The problem is not that biometrics are leaking from my device. The problem is that faces are already on the social media. And that the biometrics of the face can be reconstructed extremely easily and at scale.

But if this is used only to unlock the trust zone/secrets, I guess that works. It seem to be extremely dependent on the device not getting locked up accidentally, lost or damaged. If a damage would lock you out from all of the accounts, this seems rather drastic.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by wepple on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:00PM (#35803997)
That’s not my understanding of how it works.

Your face geometry is used to allow access to a secure processor (trustzone/Secure Enclave/etc) which then signs the web token.

Which is why the phone is the “something you have” piece of the puzzle here.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by wepple on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:51AM (#35803857)
How does my use of faceID on my iPhone promote de-anonymization if it doesn’t leave my phone?

Everything you’ve described can be done whether or not I use biometric to sign into a device, or even own a device?

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by oli-g on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:24AM (#35802773)
> biometrics are usernames, they are not passwords

While I see where you're coming from, they really aren't just usernames. It's not like I can log into your e-mail account by typing VoodooJuJu and pressing Enter.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by JohnFen on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @04:05PM (#35807042)
But most biometrics (at least faces and fingerprints) make terrible passwords. They can be copied and they're very hard to change if you need to.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by somedudetbh on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:50AM (#35803088)
> And just a daily reminder that biometrics are usernames, they are not passwords.

I think you should stop giving out this daily reminder. This meme has outlived its usefulness.

Using face id to unlock a local key store to enable my device to sign a signed challenge from a site I want to log into with the private key stored on my device is not a 'username' in any meaningful sense.

The problem is, the metaphor about passwords and usernames is not a good, structure-preserving simplification of the actual problem of authentication.

The biometric data and/or pin code are not being used to prove that you are you to Gmail, it's being used to unlock the set of private keys you have on your device. This doesn't fit into the metaphor at all.

If my non-technical parents said they were migrating all their accounts to passkeys, I would be very pleased. I wouldn't be worried about their inability to change their biometrics and that causing a problem following some sort of breach in the future. I am highly worried about their extreme susceptibility to phishing, especially in their inability to distinguish phishing sites from real sites, or real account maintence contacts via email and SMS from phishing contacts, their reuse of very simple passwords that are probably circulating in combolists already, and their general inability to retain username/password pairs. I have a lot of sympathy for them when I try to talk them through something like logging in to an Apple device with their apple id, when their appleid username is their email, which ends with @gmail.com. "But...why would i log in to apple with my gmail?" nevermind how confused they are about 'log in with google', 'log in with facebook', etc.

Moving to a model where their devices store webauthn credentials and guard them with a pin or faceid-style biometric shortcut is a _massive_ improvement in practical resistance to account takeover for my parents, and I don't think continuing to say 'biometrics are usernames in authn' is accurate or helpful.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by latchkey on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:07AM (#35803298)
> If my non-technical parents said they were migrating all their accounts to passkeys, I would be very pleased. I wouldn't be worried about their inability to change their biometrics

My 76 yr old dad can't do it. His phone is some shitty android trash that when he's setting up his biometrics, he shakes a bit, and it never stores the finger data correctly. I have to hold his finger and his phone at the same time to even scan it. Then, unlocking is also super unreliable because of the shaking. He refuses to get a better phone cause this one "works well enough."

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by sam345 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:35AM (#35803664)
This is so true - most older people I've worked with have major problems with touch devices. No one has come up with a satisfactory solution. This is not a new problem - I remember working with my grandfather in his 80's on a 286 equipped with a mouse - his arthritis prevented him from accurately positioning the mouse. Today's touch interfaces are far worse. And fingerprint scans are very difficult to get right and use with older people. Maybe face scans are fine but I've never trusted them. Regardless of security logins, there are a host of other issues - complex navigation, complex and confusing layouts (especially desktop), and hard to manipulate controls. One example, a simple zoom or skype call - why hasn't anyone ever developed a simple device to allow for same without having to use intricate controls. I've always imagined something similar to the video enabled nest or alexa devices but with physical knobs and push buttons. There's a very large market being ignored for some reason.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by ryandrake on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:29PM (#35804357)
> There's a very large market being ignored for some reason.

It's no surprise that the tech industry, which largely employs urban, educated 20-somethings and 30-somethings, tends to produce products aimed at urban, educated 20-somethings and 30-somethings.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by anonymouskimmer on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:39PM (#35804485)
> No one has come up with a satisfactory solution.

Stick your finger inside of dynamically sizing aperture, or clip a finger reader onto your finger? If both the finger and the reader shake the same there shouldn't be a problem.

That doesn't solve the general touch issue, but it solves this particular case.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by latchkey on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:46PM (#35805399)
Forcing my dad to carry around and stick something on his finger just to get into his device, seems rather overkill, don't you think?
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by anonymouskimmer on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:55PM (#35805504)
People carry around earpods, keychains, wallets. What's one more little dongle on a keychain?

But sure, I agree (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35790638 ). I'm just trying to come up with some workable solution. Not trying to make the best of all possible worlds.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by latchkey on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:16PM (#35805749)
Let me guess, you're not a 76 year old man.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by anonymouskimmer on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:36PM (#35806015)
It doesn't fucking matter who I am if I don't have the power to direct product development.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by nitwit005 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @08:14PM (#35809634)
It might not be that the android is crappy. Some people's fingerprints stop being readable as they age, and there are various injuries and diseases that have that result.

Essentially every biometric has a population they won't function well with.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by jrm4 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:50PM (#35804632)
It's 100% accurate. And I get why it may not seem helpful, but I think this is simply due to this industry trying too hard to cater to people who want things to be 6-year-old level easy.

Security is HARD. There's no getting around that. Your data is valuable and protecting it is not an easy task. At some level, security and convenience is a zero-sum game.

As for old people, my dad writes down his passwords on a text file in his laptop and has a printed backup in the house.

And, yes, he does have to bug me sometimes to re-login or change a password, but we've never had a security problem, which is way more than can be said for a lot of people who tried the INHERENTLY unsafe "3rd party manager" thing.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by bb88 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:32PM (#35805224)
> It's 100% accurate.

No it's not.

The security triad is "something you are", "something you know", and "something you have". Fingerprints are something you are. Usernames are something you claim to be.

The username is the "claim" you are this person. The password is the "proof" you are.

If I'm fingerprinted by any federal agency today (and my fingerprints have been on file with the government since the 90's for a security clearance), then my fingerprints can serve as absolute proof of my identity. This is helpful to me should my identity ever be stolen and I need to show absolute proof of who I am.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by lcnPylGDnU4H9OF on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:49PM (#35805429)
Those are all factors in multi-factor authentication. If a service does not require the "something you are" there's still good security if they require the other two factors. If the only required factor is "something you are" that's bad security.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by newaccount74 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:24PM (#35805875)
They all require the "something you have" as well. Pretty much all the face recognition / finger print tech on mobiles is locked to a single device.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by jrm4 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:36PM (#35806018)
Good point, you're right. And with e.g. federal agencies, this fine.

But given the relatively high level of laziness, capriciousness, and general failure all around that is "IT security by means of companies who are rarely held accountable," it's good to point out that this is what makes biometrics worse than usernames and should probably mostly be avoided, or at least optional.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by bb88 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @03:59PM (#35806978)
Your points are taken, but I do believe that the "something you are" is better than the "something you know" and "something you have" pieces -- as the knowledge or the thing you have can be stolen.

Sure fingerprints, face scans, and iris scans can be stolen as well. But certain things are really hard to fake, including potentially, scans of faces and an iris scan at the same time -- unless you can somehow graft a new iris and grow a new face.

Put it like this: a dead victim is found naked along the side of the road. Which leg(s) of the security triad can the police use to prove the identity of the victim?

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by jrm4 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @07:50PM (#35809445)
If convenience plus precision are your only goals, sure. But this requires probably too much trust in the systems. I'm fine with the FBI having that power and information.

Google, who I don't pay and doesn't owe me much, not so much.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by withinboredom on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @04:01PM (#35807004)
Your fingerprints change over time (mine are different from just five years ago -- as I learned when recently renewing a visa a few weeks ago).
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by pcthrowaway on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:35PM (#35805261)
Biometrics are shitty usernames too. They might change, it's just outside of your control.

My apple touchID never works because I rock climb and I guess that abrades the skin too much

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by nilsbunger on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:49PM (#35805437)
i rowed on a crew team for many years. The pads of my fingers were all worn down. I was rejected three times for "bad fingerprints" when applying for US citizenship.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by JohnFen on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @04:02PM (#35807008)
It's not as rare as people think for fingerprints to be messed up either permanently or temporarily. Which amazes me, actually, because I'll be willing to be pretty near 100% of adults have, at least once in their lives, burned or otherwise injured their fingers in a way that alters their prints.

Relying on fingerprints to gain access to things on a regular basis never seemed like a great idea to me.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by akira2501 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @04:10PM (#35807114)
> you cannot change biometrics

Bodies are not invulnerable to damage. You can absolutely change your "biometrics", you just probably wouldn't _want_ to.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by surteen on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @09:55AM (#35802443)
Because it's a PIN protecting a certificate stored on the device. Even if you know the PIN but don't have access to the device, you can't use it.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by toomuchtodo on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @09:56AM (#35802456)
And the pin is the same functionality as activating a hardware authenticator like a Yubikey.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by stouset on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:24PM (#35805876)
… which have historically yielded credentials at any touch, without a need for a PIN, fingerprint, or face scan.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by segmondy on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:22AM (#35802747)
This is more secure, passwords can't be stolen from the site. Sure, let's go with the assumption that your phone can be stolen. It would be only your phone. If a site has 100 million users, an attacker could steal 100 million passwords. With this approach, the attacker would have to steal 100 million phones. No matter what password manager you use, with a password length of 100 characters. The entire password list (encrypted) can be stolen.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by aidenn0 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:38PM (#35806036)
This keeps you from ever sending the password to the site (similar to e.g. SRP).

Most sites already don't store the password. If you have a sufficiently strong password (i.e. very long, randomly generated, stored in a password manager), it is likely not computationally easier to recover the password from a hash than it is from a public-key. The only improvement here is that you don't have to trust that the site is following best-practices for storing passwords, as you never send them the password.

[edit]

It also prevents phishing attacks for those using some form of entering a password other than autofill from the password-manager.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by neilalexander on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:05AM (#35802550)
> How is this more secure?

The three factors of authentication are:

1. Something you have

2. Something you know

3. Something you are

Passkeys are typically 1+2 or 1+3 — you'd need to have physical access to the device either way.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by ferminaut on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @09:51AM (#35802398)
it's more secure on the back end. The DB will store a hashed unique pass phrase that isnt shared with anyone else.

You enter a pin, the web server sees a public key that only your side has the private key to.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by wepple on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @10:19AM (#35802702)
Password + password manager can be trivially phished. PIN can’t, because even if you somehow phished a user you can’t use it.

I don’t know what “proper 2FA” means but the gold standard today is U2F, and it has failed to be mass adopted due to requirement to purchase and maintain another device.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by aidenn0 on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:40PM (#35806073)
FWIW, my password manager has prevented me from being phished because it wouldn't auto-fill the password.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by bkettle on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:34AM (#35803659)
A PIN entered onto a physical device like a smartphone can be rate limited (see iPhone progressively increasing PIN timeouts). If you try to rate limit password entry to an online service, you make it trivially easy for an attacker to lock out a real user.

Thus, even short PINs can provide strong security since the attacker gets, e.g., at most 10 tries to guess it out of 100k possibilities for a 6-digit PIN.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by petedoyle on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:13PM (#35804148)
This has been bothering me, a lot. Google talks [1] about how Passkey replication is e2e encrypted between devices, but AFAICT they're just using a pin + key derivation. A six digit pin is like 20 bits of entropy before a KDF. [2]

Has anyone seen any docs that might help characterize how much entropy the keys have for e2e encryption (Android/iOS)?

I must be missing something, because I can't see how Google would call something e2e encrypted if the keys only have like 30-35 bits of "effective" entropy after a KDF. But that seems like it's the case??

    [1] "From the user's point of view, this means that when using 
    a passkey for the first time on the new device, they will 
    be asked for an existing device's screen lock in order to 
    restore the end-to-end encryption keys"
[1] https://security.googleblog.com/2022/10/SecurityofPasskeysin...

[2] https://www.omnicalculator.com/other/password-entropy?c=SGD&...

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by sebk on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:33PM (#35804413)
Talking about Apple here because it's what I'm more familiar with, and their security whitepapers are more widely available.

The PIN and key derivation wraps the actual encryption key that's stored locally in the device or secure enclave, not the actual secrets that are stored in the provider's cloud. The actual wrapping keys are random 256 bit AES-GCM keys. This approach works because the secure enclave provides measures against bruteforcing and tampering.

There is some controversy that I can't find an explanation for in any whitepaper, specifically here: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 where it reads "(...) this data remains secure even in the case of a data breach in the cloud. If you lose access to your account, only you can recover this data, using your device passcode or password, recovery contact, or recovery key." because that implies off-device use of the PIN, so those measures are lost. There's no further explanation that I could find about that. Some previous discussion about that particular point here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33897793&p=2#33900540

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by petedoyle on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:13PM (#35804955)
Thank you! I'm trying to understand more deeply, so I appreciate it. :)

> This approach works because the secure enclave provides measures against bruteforcing and tampering.

That's interesting!

> because that implies off-device use of the PIN, so those measures are lost

This link from your previous thread is interesting: https://support.apple.com/en-sg/guide/security/sec3e341e75d/...

Uses SRP to let the device prove to iCloud HSMs that the user entered the correct pin, without ever sending it over the wire. The HSMs have similar protections for brute forcing, etc.

From the docs I have a fairly high confidence entropy is 256 bits for iCloud Keychain. I have much less confidence on Android, but I'm still researching... :)

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by 015a on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:48PM (#35804607)
Sure, but if that key derivation function is protected by a "you get 10 attempts then we wipe the keys" safeguard, the effective entropy is much higher. The question shouldn't really surround the effective entropy of the PIN, but rather the systems in-place to protect bypassing safeguards in the key derivation function which render the actual entropy of the PIN irrelevant. There probably isn't no way around that safeguard, but as more of this gets moved into trusted compute silicon the level of sophistication required to breach it goes up; and is one hardware revision or operating system update away from being made moot again.

This thread really smells like https://xkcd.com/538/. Three things you have to remember, that are far more important than any of the concerns you have:

1) The effective entropy of the current system (passwords) is "shrugs shoulders fuck it not our problem". Services can enforce password entropy requirements. They cannot effectually require users to use a unique password. They also cannot forbid users from writing the password they use in a .txt file on their desktop or post-it note or throwing it in Apple Notes (EVERYONE does this outside of our bubble. Apple Notes and Excel are the #1 and #2 password managers on the planet). A six digit pin + hardware TPM key derivation is, at best, the same thing that was guarding how most people store their passwords anyway, and in many cases far better than the current state (if a user's device has no E2EE, or if they're syncing their passwords.xlsx file with Dropbox, etc).

2) Passkeys do not and are not designed to protect against nation-state level attackers. Passwords weren't either. They also don't protect well against the "grab a hammer and beat it out of him" threat vector; you're going to give up your password, and tomorrow they'll probably have your iPhone and your passkeys will be disclosed as well. Passkeys are designed to protect against unsophisticated (and even moderately sophisticated) attackers; phishing, data breaches, etc.

3) If you want higher tiers of entropy guarding your passkeys, you can do that. 1Password, as an example, already has this [1]. They store passkeys, and encrypt those passkeys with their two-level account & master password keys. Done! If you don't like 1Password, you can roll your own, and I'm sure OSS password managers like gopass/keepass/etc will eventually add this. Passkeys/WebAuthn don't prescribe to anyone how you store the private keys; Apple will do their thing, Google will do their thing, you don't have to use them, many people will, and they'll be better off (see point 1).

[1] https://future.1password.com

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by petedoyle on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @01:26PM (#35805125)
> Sure, but if that key derivation function is protected by a "you get 10 attempts then we wipe the keys" safeguard, the effective entropy is much higher.

Thank you. 100% agree.

> Passkeys do not and are not designed to protect against nation-state level attackers

I've been mulling over some use-cases where this is important, hence the deep consideration over entropy. 100% not a huge deal for the passkeys case for many 9's of people.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by NoMoreNicksLeft on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @12:44PM (#35804558)
You're forgetting Oyler's Law of Passwords: Humanity will be forced to try each wrong approach to passwords, one at a time and trial-and-error, for all eternity.

Slightly off-topic: If a website will not let me register and complains that my password is too long, they're still storing that in the underlying database as a properly-salted (modern algo) hash, right?

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by bhk on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:14PM (#35805732)
Being tied to a device, it defeats the most serious threats of phishing and weak passwords, for which attacks can be mounted on a global scale.

2FA via SMS is still vulnerable. 2FA with an app like Google Authenticator or VIPAccess is more secure because it is tied to a device.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by ilyt on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @02:18PM (#35805790)
The devices are far from being security bastion.
Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by jjav on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @05:12PM (#35807875)
> more secure because it is tied to a device

Tied to a phone (as opposed to some security-specific device like a Yubikey) is a terrible idea.

It ties your authentication to something that is often lost or damages, but more importantly, something that is controlled by a third party (apple or google) and requires an expensive monthly subscription to yet another third party (your cellphone company).

TOTP is not tied to a device which is why it's a beautiful solution. You can store it where you wish under the controls you wish and back it up as you wish. You are fully in control, dependent on nobody.

Re:Passkeys: The Beginning of the End of the Password by dwaite on Wednesday May 03, 2023 @11:13PM (#35810806)
> it seems strictly worse than a password + password manager

Your password manager is likely the exact same thing. The underlying implementation of this is typically a system or third party password manager which added a public key-based credential type for sites. For an Android phone, this is Google Password Manager by default. For iOS, it is iCloud Keychain. Third parties like Dashlane and 1Password have indicated support for passkeys.

I would have thought your interpretation would be that this was strictly better. Even if the credential database leaks for a site, the attacker can't do anything with it - all they have is a public key, specific to that one site.

> Or at least just having proper 2FA.

If I use my android phone to log into a website, I have done 2FA. I have physical possession of my phone, and have used a gesture, PIN or biometric to confirm who I am.

The difference is in the password case, the website has no idea that I did that - all they saw is the password. With a passkey, it is possible that a site would recognize that I did a stronger, multi-factor authentication.

This may have varying strengths as a physical factor - say, provisioned database of credentials onto a device using MFA vs a FIPS-certified security key fob, but I would still argue it is "proper" 2FA.