This is not clear at all. Phishing websites always say (C) Bank of America. That doesn't make it legit.
Curious why they'd use a totally different domain in the first place–how much access do you think you could get to private repos just by cloning that page onto githubfuture.com (available) and spearphishing interesting targets?
Because it uses GitHub's oauth flow, all applications who use this flow show the same stuff.
I assume the problem is that GitHub doesn't have sufficiently granular permissions (OAuth scopes), or that the requesting app doesn't use the correct scopes.
But I totally agree that this isn’t a great/clear message about where this is from.
"Techies" often lament about how silly users are about falling for phishing tricks, but then they also routinely make it so difficult to determine what's legit from what's fake.
Like the amount of times on my phone where I get prompted for a username and password different from the app im in (to make some kind of connection) but then suppress the url from visibility. An astoundingly poor design choice that has proliferated into every single variant of that user design flow.
Thanks for the feedback.
So true. I still think the DNS was one of the only chances to grant, and teach, the ability to confidently make trust decisions in the general population. IDN attacks notwithstanding, it's hard to beat an inspectable string that contains its own trust chain, compared to "app names" that can often be set to the hacker's own choice. Sadly, antipatterns seem more common than useful patterns.
(Antipatterns like using a domain like "talktotacobell . com" (don't visit that) as the site to complete a receipt survey. Or every public school district or even school having a random .com or .org.)
People decided that end users would find an address like xhs.xsd.ed.ca.gov too complicated, yet people found 10-digit completely meaningless telephone numbers perfectly fine for decades.
I wouldn't have hesitated at all if it were at next.github.com.
I’ve passed feedback on to the team so (hopefully) the CLI app will be be clearly from GitHub soon (we need to transfer it to the regular GitHub org and then there hopefully won’t be any confusion). GitHub Next exists in a different org from GitHub proper for lots of reasons, but we should definitely make it more clear that those experiments are still from GitHub.
Can't wait for Voice Copilot :)
Maybe it's just copy and pasted from somewhere, but it looks wrong to me regardless.
Just the other day I had to verify with a Norwegian bank that the KYC (nonsense as usual) that they linked to was actually them and not someone who had gained access to sneak in a link. Because the domain was something completely different.
https://github.blog/changelog/2021-01-29-github-pages-will-s...
I'm reminded of this incident [1] from a few months ago. Allegedly, a malicious actor abused GitHub's poorly designed OAuth permissions to obtain up to 500 stars from developers without their consent, all thanks to a "sign in with GitHub" button and a flawed consent screen that did not communicate what the victims were consenting to. Even worse, GitHub allegedly decided to suspend at least one victim's account.
We're left with a number of questions:
1. Why does GitHub give third-party apps permission to star repos when it is apparently against the terms of service to automate such an action?
2. Why does GitHub lump this permission in with public_repo, a scope that grants read and write access to all public repositories? [2]
3. Why does the consent UI for this scope display simply as
Repositories
Public repositories
and not even mention that this grants write access unless the user clicks on it? [3] (it also doesn't mention that it gives permission to star repos)4. Why does GitHub punish victims with account suspension for being tricked into giving consent to malicious apps?
It is good that GitHub is taking some steps to improve account security, such as fine-grained personal access tokens and mandatory 2FA. But these improvements do not seem to be extending to the OAuth system. The GitHub App system, while better in that it has granular permissions, is also flawed with its mysterious "act on your behalf" consent UI. [4] [5]
[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33917962
[2]: https://docs.github.com/en/developers/apps/building-oauth-ap...
[3]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33919481
[4]: https://github.com/community/community/discussions/37117
[5]: https://github.com/cirruslabs/cirrus-ci-docs/issues/751
ffmpeg -i input.mp4 -i watermark.png -filter_complex "overlay=10:10" output.mp4
Bunch of descriptive words too.
"Next Waitlist by GitHub Next would like permission to: Act on your behalf
Not owned or operated by GitHub"
Why does signing up for a waitlist require me to give permissions to an app to act in my account? An app that isn't even officially from GitHub?
This sets a bad example for permission requests, getting people to just click through the dialog, which requests too much access, and from the wrong domain.