Accusing the author of blaming individuals is rather silly when you're rushing to blame training/procedures/the system.
I didn't say he did. (I was referring to comments here on HN.)
I see your point. I am not ruling out individual culpability.
Still, by the time a person is in a cockpit or a control tower, they have a history, a record of performance. It is part of the system's responsibility to evaluate this record.
So I am less likely to blame an individual only, because to do so would require the individual to act in a way that no system could predict, mitigate, or compensate for.
(And they do have GPS, They also have ADSB, and ground based position detection, and, and, and..)
They don't know if Southwest was moving?
This is nothing one can solve by throwing even more sensors and technology in, and have that run by ChatGPT or something. Highly trained people with the right amount and kind of technology are the solution.
Edit: Sensors and stuff tell you were aircraft is, not what the human pilots are going to do when within the aloted period of time they have to do whatever they are cleared to do. Hence, you do the logical thing and ask them.
Poor visibility should not ever be a factor when we can have sensors that show exactly where the plane is on the ground. And yes we are definitely at a point where machine learning can predict the likely actions based on the human communication and warn if the predicted path could lead to a collision. The point is to have multiple safty systems (inclduing the human operators) so that one mistake doesn't kill hundreds of people because there are secondary systems to catch it.
The controller had at least one screen displaying their positionx probably several. It may fuse multiple data sources. They may also have been able to see the Southwest aircraft, although maybe not clearly or only as lights.
Despite this it can be difficult to judge the speed of an object at long distances under less than ideal circumstances and at night without a long observation period.
So yeah they knew where they were but not the acceleration.
It's also worth pointing out that the controller may have been in sudden stress due to realising the aircraft were too close, and so may have made a call that they already knew the answer to.
The FAA says that, specifically the 7110.65 which governs ATC rules and procedures. In a radar environment it allows for departures when the arriving aircraft is 2+ miles from the runway, and there will be at least 3 miles of separation within 1 min of takeoff. A separate rule requires that the departing aircraft is at least 6000ft down the runway and airborne before the arrival crosses the runway threshold.
If there is a departing plane rolling up to the hold short line and confirmed ready for immediate takeoff, there is possibly time to get them out and maintain separation. If it's low visibility, the departing plane is rolling slowly and not confirmed ready, then it's a bad bad idea.
Juan Brown [1] made an interesting point also. For a Cat II or III approach, and this one was definitely Cat III, there is an ILS critical area that Southwest would have impinged on as it was taking off.
The controller very clearly made a huge mistake.
Just to keep stating this: I'm not at all defending the AUS controller here. A squeeze play like this in low visibility is needlessly reckless.
[1] https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atc_html...
This will be the job of the investigators but it sounds like obvious tower control human operator error.
FedEx deserves all the credit for avoiding a disaster. As soon as they got their clearance to land, they called back to clarify and verify it. So, they knew that this was going to be a close one, and you can bet that they were ready to go around and abort the landing before they every broke out below minimums and saw the Southwest on the roll.
FedEx knew it was going to be ugly, and they were already ready for the go around.
> ‘As bad as it gets without body bags.’
> Why the Austin airport situation was so dangerous.
Because the planes almost collided. But the author wants to say more than that. The article covers the “how” things went wrong by analyzing the transcript. The write-up doesn’t answer the key ”why” question —- why are existing procedures and training not suitable?
Safety-critical systems (including procedures and protocols) must be designed to account for wide human variation, including mistakes and miscommunications. Let’s not waste our time pointing fingers at one person.