And do you always check for keylogger thumbdrives and such?
I haven't used a use usb stick in +10 years.
This was a corporate requirement where I used to work, unofficially reinforced by the local jokers who would rotate the screen and / or send prank messages if you didn't.
My colleagues edited my .bashrc to echo "lock your screen next time"
(Kidding obviously, at least for the latter).
I think at first the colleague might assume it's a bug in the terminal not someone had replaced the command with an alias
or just alias them to echo, so that it prints out the file name, not even the file content
Same here. The all time favorite is sending a resignation notice to the person's manager (the manager usually gets a fair warning first and plays along with it).
Or a message that says "I love you very much"
Check for keylogger thumbdrives: I use a laptop so it would be immediately obvious. But now that you say it I haven't checked the charger USB-outlet on the back of my cabled keyboard.
[1]: it has happened I have failed. Once a year or something.
[2]: I sometimes try to allow myself to go downstairs in my own house to fetch a cup coffe without locking when I am alone, but I find it so stressful in practice I always lock it. I don't need to know but it is a good habit. I'm otherwise normal :-)
For example IT enforces that your screen becomes locked after 15 minutes of inactivity and also ties in your local computer 's user login password to your SSO login to access everything. It's a contradiction around password best practices. If you force people to input their password multiple times a day then naturally people will gravitate towards easier to type passwords.
If the idea is "but what if you go AFK in a public place and forget to lock your screen?!?", that's not a valid reason. If you were working in a coffee shop and went to use the restroom for 4 minutes or turned your back for 2 minutes then your machine could be compromised.
It can really break morale to input your password and MFA half a dozen times a day.
Then they don't type most of the time and the length of 'memorable passwords' (like correct-horse4BATTERY!staple) isn't a problem.
> For example IT enforces that your screen becomes locked after 15 minutes of inactivity
If your OS is MS-Win, try playing an audio file when you don't want the auto-lock to go off. Provided IT's "checkbox security" parameters [1] did not include turning this off, MS-Win does not timeout lock the system if an audio file is playing, which makes playback of an audio file a way to prevent the timeout auto-lock from happening. Note that this won't help with any 'presence' indicators that go "idle" or "away" with no activity for some time.
If this works, then you can create an audio file of 'silence' with sox to use to play back when you don't want the auto-lock to trigger:
sox -n silence.wav trim 0 10:0.0
Creates a ten minute long wav of 'silence'. If you want it smaller, compress the wav with lame into an mp3 or fdkaac into an aac file. Then launch playback of the silence file, and set windows media player to "loop" when it reaches the end of the file.[1] Much corporate/govt. IT "security" is "checkbox security". It is the equivalent of IT having a "compliance form" with a long list of "configured settings" with check-boxes next to each, and so long as they can go down the form and "check all the boxes" they deem their setup "secure". Whether it is actually secure is not important, just that it "checks all the boxes" on the "compliance form".
This puts you into a grey area though no? You could make a case this is willingly trying to circumvent security protocols which could be grounds for being fired.
I dealt with this as a policy issue recently. Controls like aggressive screen lockouts are one of the few options available to allow some categories of workers to work outside of a company controlled premises.
The argument that you live alone etc is irrelevant as I have no idea (and don’t want to know) whether that’s true. I can tell you that people have done shockingly dumb things with remote work and the company has to try to control risk as best it can.
What does the policy really protect against?
If it's being locked out after 15 minutes of inactivity because of roommates or kids it doesn't protect you against anything in the grand scheme of things. For example if I leave my office for lunch and you step in 10 minutes later then you have a solid 40-50 minutes to do whatever damage you plan to do while I'm gone.
The only time it makes a difference is if it locks really fast, such as 30 seconds but then using the computer naturally would be ridiculous because you couldn't stop touching the keyboard or mouse without being locked out.
Also, what if your room mate planted cameras in your office that let them see exactly what keys you're pressing on what screens without ever compromising the machine itself? Now everything is compromised and they have full reign to do whatever they intend to do.
> The argument that you live alone etc is irrelevant as I have no idea (and don’t want to know) whether that’s true
This is the real problem. Everyone gets treated like an equal criminal when in reality none of the measures taken really do anything to provide the security they were designed to do. It reminds me a lot of "for the children" but applied to corporations for "compliance reasons".
Re: the “treat people like a criminal” take. A common approach organizations are taking is employee surveillance. I don’t want to know that your girlfriend has a conviction or that your kid sits next to you with sensitive data in your screen, etc. And I don’t want to force you into an office.
There’s a difference between “security” and risk management. If the discussion was pure security with low/no risk tolerance, you’d be working on a locked down terminal server in an office.
If you're on windows, there's a powertoy[1] called "Awake" that can keep your screen on indefinitely despite IT rules. I liberally use this on machines I'm remotely connected to because there's 0 reason why a remote session should lock if I'm active on the computer looking at a different window.
Ah, no mention of water proofing computer to protect against robotic dog innocently spilling moring coffee/tea on computer.
On Windows, Win-L to lock.
When home, I always have to lock or my cat would typeeeeeeeeawww
Mostly the same basics as you. The document you linked is a good starting point.
I'd add extensive use of virtualisation and sandboxing. I run less and less software as native, installed applications on any device I use personally or professionally. Instead it tends to run inside things like VMs or Docker containers or cloud-hosted platforms now.
My basic policy is to try and make every device and installed application expendable/replaceable in case anything breaks or gets compromised and then focus on the data. I apply the principle of least privilege for access to any sensitive data, try to keep all important data in standardised formats and avoid lock-in effects as much as reasonably possible, and keep good back-ups under my own control with the ability to redeploy/restore anything quickly and as automatically as possible.
I generally use a device as an access mechanism; a configured window into the data. This configuration is the only thing lost when a device is lost. No data, no function, no service. Configure the replacement device and continue as you were.
Virtualisation and Docker-isation makes backups and restores almost enjoyable.
If, however, there's a backdoor I don't know about, then I'm pwned.
Given the most common network activity is web browsing, it seems like enabling protections in the browser is becoming mandatory for the security-conscious.
For me this amounts to enabling NoScript and UBlock plugins in Firefox, desktop and mobile versions, and disabling or locking down various "features".
An additional step I take is to use several browser profiles for different purposes (mail, banking, shopping, default, to name four) so that Firefox always asks me to pick a profile on startup. As well as reducing the possibility of XSS, this lets me relax the settings for some profiles where I restrict myself to a small number of trusted sites. (This may well be overkill!)
I also made an app and extensions to help me use multiple browsers, one per site. (Browsr Router)
0: https://www.simpleanalytics.com/en/blog/google-changed-googl...
You're solution is more bullet proof. For similar reasons I am hoping to add better profile support to Browser Routr.
> or me this amounts to enabling NoScript and uBlock
Hard to see how installing third-party extensions that can view and change data for every site makes the browser more protected.
It's about who/what you trust.
What I am looking for is an easy way to run something like a LiveCD OS in a VM for browsing. The problem is that I have never found a decent LiveCD that has Firefox with all of the mandatory extensions (uBlock Origin, etc...). I guess I could customize my own LiveCD, but last I looked into it, doing so seemed complex and too time consuming to figure out.
Posting this in the hopes of being steered towards a simple solution or to inspire someone to create one.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-...
Here's a 5m solution whose starting point might be acceptable:
- install Nix
- Follow first two steps at https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Creating_a_NixOS_live_CD to generate iso
1. Install Nix in a VM or on a clean HD
2. Customize Firefox to my liking
3. follow the two steps you highlight
4. Load my created iso in a VM
Right?
You should be safe to avoid this unless your threat model includes a trusting trust type exploit on Nix generating the ISO.
Also, just realized it'll be a little more complex because you'll want to use home-manager to install Firefox plugins and do about:config configuration.
Here are some examples of that in various contexts:
https://github.com/search?q=language%3Anix+programs.firefox+...
Since Ubiquity started fown the cloud-first path I’ve switched to Mikrotik. While they do seem to have regular CVEs (which is good, I think?), they also don’t seem to have a public bug bounty program.
Is it really true that you can't access the router's dashboard and configure things without associating an online account to your router?
I was in the market for more hardware and I had to decide whether to increase my investment in Ubiquity or make a change, and I chose the latter.
The day after I set my UDM Pro up as non-cloud, it corrupted the login somehow and I had to factory reset it and redo all settings (as it hadn't been running long enough to run any automatic backups first). I capitulated and just set it up again as a cloud login to avoid having the same fiasco at some random point in the future again.
I immediately regretted going with the UDM to save (quite) a few bucks over a OPNsense/pfSense appliance to fit my requirement of handling a full 10G of WAN.
I will admit having the app to monitor usage remotely is a somewhat neat trick. I find the firewall configuration in GUI obtuse enough to be next to unusable.
As someone who bit the bullet and sold all their UniFi gear on eBay and switched to OPNsense and Ruckus, I'll tell you that it's been absolutely worth it.
That might be true for their UniFi line, but EdgeMAX devices work fine without an online account. EdgeRouters run a fork of Vyatta, with configuration files and command line operations that are fairly easy to work with. They also have a web UI for common configurations, though I have little experience with it.
A bit of warning: EdgeMAX support has been declining in recent years. Security updates are still published, but bugs don't seem to be addressed as quickly or consistently as they were in the past, and some forum users have expressed doubts about what kind of support will exist in the future. That said, my equipment is still doing fine.
I think OpenWRT has been ported to at least one Ubiquiti router, so that might be a good fallback if EdgeOS support ever ends. I wonder if anyone here has tried it.
* Windows
* storing data on other people's computers (cloud apps)
(Yes, they're all safe under the right circumstances. But the right circumstances are far from universal.)
And loosing access to important stuff can be worse than other people seeing the stuff - anything behind a google (etc) account can be lost in a moment, due their mechanised decision making and inability to meaningfully contact humans.
If you can't always easily contact a helpful and authorised human, the continuing existence of your stuff is a gamble. And no, setting off a twitter storm and hoping that the company will be embarrassed into restoring your data is not a suitable contact method!
We have a pretty standard setup at work: screen times out after 15 minutes, and co-workers teach you pretty fast to lock your machine.
At home, where I use a MacBook Air, I work in a physically unstable situation...in a rocking chair, on my lap. Whenever I stand up, I close the machine, which locks it immediately. If not, I risk the machine sliding to the floor.
My even shorter (and incomplete) summary of the document would be: configure your router and firewall; remove default passwords and crapware from your devices; use a lock screen; don't run as root; use a password manager and decent passwords; enable 2FA everywhere you can; enable anti-malware if your OS has it built it; don't run software from untrusted sources; patch regularly.
There are also other controls that you can choose to impose on yourself. For example, I require full-disk encryption, and I will only use mobile devices which get regular updates. Would be interested in hearing other things that HN'ers do to limit risk.