I call this "login gaslighting" and it's evil. Pioneered by the "do no evil" company.
In such a situation, I often think: isn't the fact that one makes "stupid mistakes" when attempting to solve a ReCaptcha rather a sign that the entity that is attempting to solve it is a human?
The smug gaslighting and intentional time wasting after an incorrect identification is the worst.
Just having a VPN + private mode is enough. That's how Google pushed me into becoming a happy DDG user.
Blocking people leads to them searching for ways around your block really quickly. Making them waste time not realizing they have been blocked, such as endless retries or shadow bans, is much more effective at making them stop bothering you for a while longer. Time spent doing this is time they can't spend being malicious on your platform.
It's unfortunate when a non-malicious user gets caught in one of these traps...
Sounds like something a film villain would say when asked about collateral damage.
it is better a thousand criminals/ spammers go free than a single innocent non-spammer be treated as if they are one
essentially the companies are shifting their own pain (with spammers) onto innocent users ("it's your problem now, suck it users, lol!!!")
Sounds like you never had to actually deal with such a spammer problem yourself
the equal and opposite response would be, "Sounds like you never had to actually deal with such a usability problem yourself", but I'm not interested in trying to devolve this discussion into one about you and me, instead of the topic
Got sent to the gulag - well now you have a major problem. Can't post meme on reddit - oh no!
Websites generally aren't obligated to accept all users, precisely because we as a society decided that it's not really a big deal if you can't.
Can't access facebook marketplace - legitimately annoying!
Can't access your mail archive going back a decade - could be a huge problem for some people
Sure, it's not as bad as getting sent to the gulag. But the problem with most of these tech companies is far bigger than not being able to post a meme.
For instance if your user happens to be an unwitting botnet member (or even if he has a newly assigned IP previously belonging to one) - his IP will be suspicious and you can "punish" him accordingly. Also Blackstone's ratio was 1/10, not 1/1000.
Lasted a few hours. I figure someone else on that vpn was doing something wrong and they just blocked anyone from there for a while.
Super frustrating that your left to just … to get frustrated.
Figure it was a mistake from some automated security framework type of deal.
But how many people do I know born in 88. Or on the 8th of August?
I understand that given the login is your public visible name on steam they just don't want clear neo-Nazi signifiers.
Edit: Typo
Also, steam should never even see the password, they should only ever see the hash.
Sites/apps will generally handle your plaintext password each time you login or set your password. They (hopefully) just don't store it.
In order for password security to work, you have to send Steam your actual password, which they then check against the hash themselves. So at some point, Steam will have your password in plaintext.
1. You produce an "authentication hash" X = hash(normalize(your_username) + your_password) and send X to the server.
2. The server computes Y = hash(X) and checks Y against the stored hash.
Now you're not sending the plaintext password to the service (e.g. steam), and steam is also not storing the "raw" authentication hash X on the server either. Yes, a manipulated client can send a stolen X instead of a stolen password (but in reality it's a reused password that's been stolen, not X). The advantage is that a compromised server will then not be able to log the plaintext password for credential stuffing.
In case anyone thinks about using the above scheme: Don't. It's merely an illustration for one specific property. Other than that it is PAINFULLY flawed in many ways.
----- edit, original post. feel free to answer if you still disagree :)
Now we're talking labelling. To me the password is what I, as a human, enter in some login form. What's sent to the server is derived from that. In once case the derivation function is just the identity, in the other case it's a trapdoor permutation (with a public salt). For the authentication flow it's quite similar, yes, and for many kinds of attack I wouldn't care what I have (e.g. PtH on Windows) - but for the user there is a huge difference if they memorize + enter "7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220" or "1234".
Let me pose a scenario and ask you a question: Assume I'm dumb and my login on HN as well as Steam is archi42 with password s3cr3t. Now the simple "sent password in the clear to the server" allows GabeN [president of Valve/Steam] to log my credentials and post spam on HN. With a trapdoor derivation function that's not possible anymore [this is where I realized my bad simplification]. So if the two are exactly the same thing, why does that attack work in once instance, but not the other?
(edit2: if you answer this, assume that there is a user-specific, public "salt" A that the client queries from the server prior to computing X = hash(A + password))
>Also, steam should never even see the password, they should only ever see the hash.
is, if you interpret it generously, trivially true. There are 101 authentication mechanisms where Steam doesn't "need" to see a password (i.e. some secret information that is remembered by the user.) As you point out, the password can be hashed and even salted before transmission.
Alternatively, Steam could authenticate with e.g. a public/private keypair, in a way that means that it would be immune to replays of the authenication protocol, while never seeing or storing any sensitive info.
But I find it hard to believe that the original commenter's objection to Steam seeing your password is based on any of these alternatives. The comment didn't say "Steam should be using a protocol where they don't see your password", and I don't think many hackers have such an opinion about any service, given how prolific just basic username+password authentication is on the web.
My original reply was based on the interpretation that the commenter had misunderstood how username+password authentication interacted with password hashing, both of which are technologies used in 99.99% of web services - rather than a more esoteric approach which somehow justifies the idea that "Steam shouldn't see your password".
But algorithmically even if you want passwords (you don't in most cases, get WebAuthn for example for web site authentication) you can use an asymmetric PAKE such as OPAQUE:
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-03.html
This is quite a bit more complicated than the one line PHP password stuff you pasted from Stack Overflow, but the user's password never leaves their machine, and so the Relying Party doesn't know the password, and yet they can verify that the user does know the password which they originally chose for the site.
However in cases like this what I wrote was just a fact about a world which they weren't aware of, I'm not sure what they hope to achieve by downvoting.
ivanbakel wrote "In order for password security to work, you have to send Steam your actual password" and that's not true. It's not going to become more true if you can just delete my comment explaining why it's not true, that's not how our universe works.
But you're probably not wrong about people not liking how I phrased my reply.
>Be kind. Don't be snarky. Have curious conversation; don't cross-examine. Please don't fulminate. Please don't sneer, including at the rest of the community.
- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_nam...
A lot of the crap real sites make people go through e.g. when they lose access to their account or login to a VPN or the site just "can't verify their identity" for some reason. Where you go through a bunch of hoops and captchas, only to have some step fail or reach a dead end. They really seem like they're just set up to intentionally waste people's time.
For example, Steam has a system where if you enter too many invalid passwords, it will present you with a captcha which you can never actually solve. It's a lot more annoying than just saying "you have been locked out of trying to log in for X hours".
But this, this is fine. It's pretty clear that the person you're targeting is a spammer, and it's pretty clear to the user after about 60 seconds that you're password system is a joke.