He's not unique in this regard. Every national leader has to consider the interests and perceptions of their domestic power base when negotiating with international leaders. Very often a mismatch between their rhetoric and actual behavior indicates that they are trying to sell an unpopular but necessary international agreement to the people back home, or that they must accept an international reality that does not match their domestic political framework.

For example, Putin finds himself in a difficult position right now because he has convinced his people that the Russian military is invincible and the Ukrainians are dominated by a small number of Nazis who need to be removed from power. Meaning, his domestically acceptable "win set" only includes scenarios in which Ukraine cedes large swathes of territory and makes at least some notional concessions around governmental reform toward "de-nazification." Anything else admits the political framework he uses to justify his power is premised on falsehoods and risks destabilizing his regime.

These positions are of course not consistent with reality and therefore not within the Ukrainian win set, and so no agreement will be reached until something changes. I suspect that is why Russian journalists/propagandists have recently started recasting the war as a conflict against NATO, because that will make defeat more palatable to the Russian people. Getting beat by NATO doesn't mean the Russian military was horrifically incompetent and their government deeply corrupt, but rather that it was an unfair fight sprung upon them by evil westerners. It feeds their sense of grievance while excusing Putin and his lackeys from any personal responsibility for the widespread military failures.

There is a close enough express in English that it translates. "Do what I say, not what I do", is something parents tell kids when the parents want the kids to behave better than the parents do! For example, if a parent smokes, they may tell their kid "don't smoke, do what I say not what I do."

The question would of course be if EU/NATO want to do that. It's part of the usual political horse-trading game.

For sure, in the extreme scenario if US/EU/main partners really wanted Finland and Sweden to join and Hungary vetoed, it could be made to pay an unaffordable price.

But Sweden is already member of the Cuture Combat Air System (FCAS) initiative to create a 6th gen air war system of systems, alongside nato members. And this kind of colaboration will be even more natural when/if they join Nato.

Also the real question would be, would Hungary see it as a credible threat. Were they to go ahead with that, they'd find themselves with no airforce and unhappy allies. That sounds like a raise they couldn't afford to raise.

But even if not, in the most extreme case, everyone else could leave NATO and simultaneously join NATO++, which is just NATO without Hungary, but with Finland.

(And because that kind of process is possible in theory, I would suggest that any organisation with a voluntary exit clause might also want to have a clause that allows the unanimous vote by everyone else to expel one member. Maybe..)

This is all speculation about the most extreme consequences. Other commenters wrote more realistic things about trade in weapons being disrupted.

And, of course, you could set up 'NATO++' as an alliance between US, Finland and other willing nations, without shutting down old NATO. Just like Ukraine receives a lot of assistance from NATO countries these days without being in NATO.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220405-top-eu-body-laun...

In such a case, Nato could in principle invoke Article 60 of the Vienna convention, and if all other members agreed, they could expel Hungary from Nato. Similarly, if their conflicts with the EU continue to escalate, they may be expelled from the EU in a similar fashion.

This would be a catastrophe for Hungary.

Not that I believe that it would ever come to this. Just a hint of this from key Nato/EU countries should be enough to make Hungary back down.

More likely, if Hungary wants to buy some favour from the Kremlin, they would drag out the expansion process by a few months.

I don't think anyone wants that big hole on the alliance's border. Hungary might not be as critically positioned as Turkey, but it's still in a pretty awkward place.

But as you say, Orban could drag his feet a bit. Chances are his party enjoyed direct funding from Moscow, like others in their orbit all over Europe.

Without a shared border with Russia, Hungary's usefulness in a conflict would be relatively limited for Russia. On the other hand, for it would be highly dangerous for Hungary to willingly align with Russia, as that would make it likely that a future conflict would be fought on their territory.

As long as Sweden and Finland remain neutral, they are at risk. Putin has shown that he is willing to use military force to grab land. Should he grab Finland and Sweden, he would effectively control the Baltic sea and also have bases that can reach Western Europe much more easily than he can at the moment.

On the other hand, with Finland in the alliance, Nato has a highly defensible (for Nato) shared front with Russia, in the case of a conflict.

Also, keep in mind that Finland + Sweden together has a greater population than Hungary as well as maybe 5x the GDP, and that while Hungary is moving towards totalitarianism, Sweden and Finland both have long democratic traditions, low corruption, etc.

Very different ones.

Sweden has been independent forever and a democracy since 1921.

Finland was first a part of Sweden, later an autonomous part of Russia. In 1917 it became independent and a democracy. However, a bloody civil war followed. Although it did not last long, consequences in politics and society remained visble for generations. Between 1945 and 1990 there were limitations to the democracy. They would only do what was assumed not to annoy the Soviets too much. Party leaders and prime ministers were chosen according to that principle. Freedom of the press existed only as long it was not too negative about the Soviet Union.

While it changed with the end of the Soviet Union in 1990, they could join EU 1995, applying for NATO marks only the real end of that period that they could not freely determine the direction of their country.

But that is not what I mean when I say "democratic traditions". Especially for countries that introduce democracy gradually and (mostly) peacefully, I consider the whole transition period to be part of those traditions. A country like Sweden had more than 100 years (1809-1921) of public discussions and political manouvering to build up the institutions, culture and education that provide stability, legitimacy and public support to such a system.

Finland underwent a similar development from the end of the Civil War to 1990, which mean that in 1990 the democratic institutions and traditions had already been built.

Other Warzaw pact countries had varying amounts of democratic traditions at that point. Some (like Hungary) had seen little democracy. Others, such as Czechoslovakia had been mostly democratic in the interwar period, while most had seen some democracy and some authoritarian rule in that period.

I would argue that those traditions from 100 years ago play a part, even today. And in the case of Sweden vs Finland vs Hungary, Sweden and Finland both have very strong traditions for democracy (even if the age of those traditions are different), while for countries like Hungary and Ukraine, those traditions are still shaky.

More realistically, they could just spin up an alternative alliance between US, Finland and any other willing current NATO member (but excluding Hungary). And over time move more and more importance to this new NATO++, and perhaps even eventually drop out of old NATO.

There's no provisions for kicking countries out of NATO. But everyone else leaving the club is equivalent to kicking one country out.

Orban’s party won reëlection. Orban is popular [1]. We can crib about disinformation and this or that, but holding Hungary accountable for his decisions is perfectly acceptable.

[1] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-viktor-orban-europ...

I love the use of the diaeresis.

1. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-curse-of-...

Co-operate is much more common than na-ive (which I've never seen). But both cooperate and naive seem reasonably well accepted.

Nobody is Putin's friend. When you join his club he send the military in to make sure it goes his way.

It's not a coincidence that von der leyen wants to change the voting system from hunanimity to majority. They don't like to lose, and the rules are fine only as long as they can do what they want.

So vetoes have more power than you would let us think.

I can imagine Finland/Sweden being very different. Who benefits/loses from Finland/Sweden joining? These countries are very well-armed, with large, well-trained armies, so they are a welcome addition for most. Baltic states must be delighted. Germany must be realising that hugging Russia for decades hasn't paid off, but it is in a clinch; its army has had decades of peacetime budgets, while they find themselves on the gas/oil hook. Hungary's own immediate neighbours, Romania and Slovakia at least, are quite wary of Russian threat and will welcome at least a diffusion of Russian targets in the area.

Would there be consequences to ruining the plans of US, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia and Romania, and many other countries? No doubt, and beyond what Hungary is prepared to pay.

But then what do I know? I'm an armchair strategist.

You can add Norway and probably Denmark to that list. With Finland and Sweden in Nato, all of Scandinavia becomes significantly more defendable. This would enable all Scandinavian countries to combine their defensive efforts, and would it make it extremely hard for Russia to attack any individual country.

And keep in mind that Stoltenberg is Norwegian....

But only one is blocking.

This may be true or not. Doesn’t matter. Those others waited. Hungary didn’t.

Erm... huh? You cannot, not in a million years, compare the democratic processes of US or EU states with what's going on in Russia. I'm not even sure where to start. How about this then: Russia's premier opposition leader, Alexey Navalny, got poisoned with deadly poison known to be used only by Russian secret services, and almost died. Did Biden or Trump or any other US politician try to kill their opponent?

I suspect given that comment, we won't find common ground, but for others' benefit:

> It paid off incredibly well actually. Why do you think Germany is the first industrial power in Europe? Who's selling them all the cheap gas that keeps the industries going?

Germany decided to wean itself off atom and onto gas/renewables. That was a political decision, which drove energy prices up. France instead doubled-down on nuclear and is doing just fine. Affordable energy is achievable without Russian gas, just not overnight. For sure the going was good for Germany for a while, but now they find they are held by the balls.

But if Navalny isn't okay, let's talk instead about Russia poisoning Yushchenko in 2004 with dioxin...

The most important mark of a democracy is the ability to get rid of unpopular leaders at the end of their term, as the US did in 2020 and may be doing in 2024.

The mark of a dictatorship, on the other hand, is that they subdue any opposition by any and all means available. When the totalitarianism is total, the leader will get 99% of the votes in elections and a similar reported approval rating. Those who do not support the regime and not already eliminated, are too scared to say so.

After all independent media got closed down, put to prison or killed. The vast majority of those 80% watch only TV, a brain washing machine telling the world is full of Nazis and NATO threatening the existence of Russia.

Everybody in Russia knows that for being against Putin you can be beaten up by the police, put to prison and whatnot. So how many dare to answer what they really think when they suddenly get a phone call from an unknown person?

I am sure both exist. The brainwashed ones who believe all the lies and those who don't dare to admit that they don't believe it. How the percentages are proably nobody has too good guesses.

Source?

> The vast majority of those 80% watch only TV, a brain washing machine telling the world is full of Nazis and NATO threatening the existence of Russia.

Source?

> Everybody in Russia knows that for being against Putin you can be beaten up by the police, put to prison and whatnot

Source?

> I am sure both exist. The brainwashed ones who believe all the lies and those who don't dare to admit that they don't believe it. How the percentages are proably nobody has too good guesses.

Source?

Btw. the ruling party - practically means Orbán himself - is more like protecting personal interest than the contry's, likely (very likely) financial interests of self while the country's interest is completely elsewhere concerning both financial and the big picture.