Among possibilities:
- Individuals not closely associated with the IC will be increasingly utilised (knowingly or not) for intelligence work.
- Intel collection will shift from human intelligence to technical / signals intelligence (humint vs. sigint). This creates its own knock-on effects.
- Active development of countermeasures and practices, including creating and deploying cultivated identities and personas online, possibly with cooperation by online services, possibly through manipulation of them.
There's some existing coverage of this, e.g. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/27/the-spycraft-revolution... (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19970339) https://archive.is/vlJYo
Effectively, the NSA had excellent vision where Al Qaeda did not exist, and was blind where they did.
The quantity and low cost of sigint can often lead to a deprecation of humint. It's not sexy, it's slow, it's low-volume, it's expensive, it doesn't generate large support contracts with government suppliers.
But it can put precisely the right eyes and ears in precisely the right place in ways sigint often has difficulty in achieving.
Mind: this is based on open-sources discussion at the time. How much this reflected actuality vs. speculation or public campaigning / turf wars between intelligence camps (CIA tends to be more humint, NSA more sigint AFAIU) I'm not sure.
This is a much more recent article (I'm referring mostly to the 2000--2005 period), but makes similar points:
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-...
The actual on-the-ground investigation was done by an at least nominally-independent UN team (UNSCOM).
Scott Ritter specifically rejected WMD claims: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter
The investigation lead by Hans Blix found some violations but AFAIR no indications of a significant WMD capability. The Wikipedia article has more information (I've skimmed it): https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_des...
I don't think this maps well to the Humint/Sigint division. Inspectors relied somewhat on both, though non-covert on-site visits played a large role.
(Sigint and Humint are more typically covert.)
https://www.gawker.com/5861484/iran-and-hezbollah-caught-all...
It would have been hard to avoid ten years ago. Unless you use both phones very infrequently (which is of no use to most people) I think it's nearly impossible now.
Which phone is that these days?
It's compiling reports on what is happening, meeting with the other countries officials about bilateral relations, meeting your own citizen to know what they are doing. A lot of it is above board. I will hasard that most of the information which end up being classified is actually acquiried legally but becomes interesting through cross-referencing or exclusivity.
Admittedly, it's not a risk you want to take if you don't have to, but if you have no other option, it's workable.
This is straightforward to spoof. A single programmer could do it if they cared enough. It is possible to change the GPS (GNSS?) HAL to send any information you want [1].
[1] https://www.pathpartnertech.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-g...
Nothing about spying is ever going to be simple. Especially building those vital human relationships.
The country under your feet does the same. Every civilization has used spies throughout history. A greedy, hungry or desperate neighbor might get ideas that threaten your security.
sometimes I do wonder whether if i'll be going to US to steal some faang jobs, then TSA will mark me as a terrorist/spy internally cuz I don't have smartphone?
Now this sort of thing must make it almost impossible. You can't even leave your mobile at home accidentally - that would trip alarm bells, especially if your contact does it at the same lunch hour.
Spying seems to be a necessary part of how States understand one another. If human level intelligence work simply gets blown apart by technology then yeah we can keep track on what the other side is doing, but so very often we want to know why.