Effectively, the NSA had excellent vision where Al Qaeda did not exist, and was blind where they did.
The quantity and low cost of sigint can often lead to a deprecation of humint. It's not sexy, it's slow, it's low-volume, it's expensive, it doesn't generate large support contracts with government suppliers.
But it can put precisely the right eyes and ears in precisely the right place in ways sigint often has difficulty in achieving.
Mind: this is based on open-sources discussion at the time. How much this reflected actuality vs. speculation or public campaigning / turf wars between intelligence camps (CIA tends to be more humint, NSA more sigint AFAIU) I'm not sure.
This is a much more recent article (I'm referring mostly to the 2000--2005 period), but makes similar points:
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/enhanced-human-...
The actual on-the-ground investigation was done by an at least nominally-independent UN team (UNSCOM).
Scott Ritter specifically rejected WMD claims: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Ritter
The investigation lead by Hans Blix found some violations but AFAIR no indications of a significant WMD capability. The Wikipedia article has more information (I've skimmed it): https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_des...
I don't think this maps well to the Humint/Sigint division. Inspectors relied somewhat on both, though non-covert on-site visits played a large role.
(Sigint and Humint are more typically covert.)