Can anyone with FAA / CAA (the UK civil aviation authority) or EU airspace rules knowledge clarify what protocols exist for these situations?
In the US and most everywhere else, when you willfully ignore ATC they scramble fighter jets. Every pilot is trained in what this looks like and how to respond, but the safe next step is always to respond in the affirmative and land. https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/regulations/inflight...
In reality it is highly unlikely for a commercial airline to ignore a direct ATC command (unless the pilot believes the plane is in distress) - and in a case like this where ATC reports a hazard onboard and divert it wouldn’t be unexpected to see an escort (even if just so that there is a witness if the plane were to actually explode).
After 9-11 the chance that the interceptors are armed is probably 100%.
Fun fact: the max speed of a normal GA plane (think Cessna) is below the stall speed of many interceptors which can result in amusement.
I was answering in the context of flying from one country to another while crossing over a third. You'll need a flight plan and overflight permits, which generally require ATC contact at least on entry.
Belarus specifically requires a fixed flight path using defined entry and exit points for any aircraft, a Sunday afternoon VFR wander-about is just as likely in Yemen or Iran. :)
Somehow I get the inkling that terrorist groups probably aren't going to start trying to crash into office buildings with a Cessna.
He speaks of the farmer's community though as a tight nit community. Used planes are sold and bought within the community, farmers themselves would be very suspicious selling to someone "shady", and the FBI knows about this threat vector as well and is monitoring it closely (iirc).
So there's an example of a small plane and its potential use case in terrorism. Not sure how easily a Cessna could be rigged up to do something of that kind.
Another attack vector in the future might be small drones. Due to them not holding tons of gasoline, some form of biochemical weapon or radioactive material could be distributed.
Muller argues that the mass panic of an incident involving biochemical materials or radioactivity would most likely be a greater danger than the "material threat" itself. Many people would be scared of "radioactivity" without much understanding. People are not particularly well educated how radioactive decline works, what half life times really mean (long half life meaning slow release, less imminent danger), why various types of radioactivity can be quite different from another etc.
So don't underestimate terrorists. Luckily, don't underestimate smart people in three letter agencies thinking about this either.
Sounds prudent of them. If a small plane spreads radioactive material over an area they are in as an act of terrorism, even a nuclear expert with 5 PhDs will first panic and try to get the fuck away and only much later care to go into the minituae of the situation.
The imminent reaction of "let's get out of here" in the face of danger was not what I was referring to here.
Authorities and experts want to reduce panic to make their jobs (coordination, damage assessment, policing, rescue, etc.) easier and reduce the results of masses reacting panickly.
But authorities also lie time and again and downplay threats to keep panic low (or to make themselves look better, and also because they don't know shit yet, but must still pretend that they are in control).
The sole individual might be more beneficial to panic and get the hell out (not just directly after immediate blow).
The problem is that everybody else panicking will make things difficult, cause mayhem, stampedes, block the highways, limit petrol availability, etc. But that doesn't mean it's not a good strategy at the individual level.
So there's a friction on what might be best survival strategy for each individual, leading to crappy outcomes when adopted by millions.
What I'm getting at is two subtle additions to your comment:
(a) mass panic/exodus might be a crappy response, but it can still be great at the individual level (if only if it could be kept to that). But even if not, the few succeeding in pursuing it, will probably have an advantage over others that meekisly listen to the experts/gov and "stay calm".
(b) experts often don't know whats going on for a long time, have limited input, give contradicting expert advice, and often just flat out corroborate some story to assist the government political decision about handling a crisis.
I mean, this was true of a similar incident that didn't involve those factors. The United States' overreaction to 9/11 has cost several orders of magnitude more lives than were actually taken on that day.
Although I suppose things get murkier if you include copycat crimes - not too easy to copy "hijack a commercial airliner", but a whole heap of people could very easily strap a biochemical threat to a drone.
The gasoline attack (liquid fuel in general) vector in relation to agricultural planes (planes used to spray crops) is real though and the relevant part to your comment. Fly it into a full football stadium with 100k people, so small planes are not to be underestimated.
You can easily kill more people with a sewage pipe pipe mortar, or ramming a truck.
You don't see many those "smart people" even trying.
The "intelligence community" are a nest of inscrutable incompetence, and idiocy. That's the bottom line.
And the Apache is way more intimidating than the jet.
1994 - Cessna 150 vs. White House South Lawn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Eugene_Corder
2002 - Cessna 172 vs. Bank of America Tower https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Tampa_Cessna_172_crash
2010 - Piper Dakota vs. IRS office in Austin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Austin_suicide_attack
>on September 11, 1994
Wow.
The Tamil Tigers did run a campaign of dropping small bombs from planes that were too slow for the Sri Lankan air force to intercept at one point.
Why wouldn't they be? What else can they even do? Especially in the case that the radio is inoperable. Other than seeing what's happening, and reporting back.
International air travel was possible with paper tickets.
Heck, you could've travel, immigrate, and settle all around Europe without papers prior to a certain mentally challenged emperor deciding to ruin it all.
You might have to be more specific there have been more than a few of those in European history
I would really like to know when exactly was that.
And even less the part "prior to a certain mentally challenged emperor deciding to ruin it all" where I really dont know who the original person means.
And most countries will probably just refuse overflight privileges if they don't get that information.
for some reason non Americans always seem to think that SE Asian people won't help the Feds. But as anyone American who has visited the region could tell them, SE Asia is about the last place you should try hiding from the Feds.
edit : Vietnam and the region is very friendly to Americans and even Brits who avoid alcohol (apologies I'm British born with family in both countries and actually casual drinking alcohol is probably the number one error made by British business people when travelling) but the logic behind cooperation with the USA is simply keeping the USA off their regional collective backs. Just consider how much drug trade is at risk if you upset American interests in SE Asia...
edit the 2nd : actually trying to hide anywhere where life itself is cheap is fundamentally the worst error possible to make if you are hiding from existential danger of really motivated people.
2. Vietnamese people drink like fish. What are you talking about?
3. Vietnam does not assist or extradite to the US AFAIK.
It's not that you should hide where life is cheap. You should hide in countries that are sworn enemies of those you are wanted in.
But (as a fellow from another region where Brits and alcohol mix) he might be talking about asshole drunk tourists behaving badly. That's a common pest everywhere young British tourists come in masses to "have a good time", and the locals don't like them much (even if some locals working in tourism make a buck off them).
Then again, the parent writes about "the number one error made by British business people when travelling" -- and business people don't fit this profile.
This is absolutely true. No mater what, there WILL be abuse.
It's also what worries me most about the normalization of "COVID passports". What's to stop me from putting a bounty on the owner of COVIDpass abcxyz? All you'll have to do is use an alternate scanning app and upload a video of you suckerpunching the owner of COVIDpass abcxyz to receive a 5k prize.
Edit: for improved discourse as pointed out
Information is not power, information is a power multiplier. It enables actions (including attacks and defences) to be specifically focused and targeted.
In the case of Kim Jung-nam, two women (by all accounts innocent accomplices) managed to kill a significant political target in what they thought wasn an entertainment prank by splashing him with liquid, on the ground, at an airport.
Critical to the success of that attack was not access to supersonic military jet fighter aircraft, but simply knowing where and when the target would be in a specified location.
Information that's now broadcast to accuracy of centimetres and seconds on many hundreds of millions if not billions of people worldwide right now.
To give another example I've noted previously, what rights to privacy should a rhinocerous have?
https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/25ll1v/does_a_...
That’s deep and insightful, and now that you’ve written it, perfectly obvious in hindsight.
Various forms of camouflage come to mind. Though the thought occurs that those can also be used by the more- and less-empowered, perhaps asymmetrically.
these are very different capabilities. the former is limited to state actors the latter can be found out by any Amadeus employee without any security clearance. the only way to avoid this is not to fly or use a passport that isn't in your name.
if one were to speculate it is likely not even Belarus that made this happen.
it is pretty standard practice in case of a bomb threat around the world as no one knows where the bomber(s) would force the plane to fly to :
https://abcnews.go.com/US/16s-scrambled-escort-jets-bomb-thr...
"An apparent bomb threat against two passenger flights that was tweeted today resulted in two F-16 fighter jets being scrambled to escort the two airliners.
The two flights were both enroute to Hartsfeld-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, where they landed safely NORAD said."
"The new court filings contend that since HSBC was made aware that Huawei and Skycom were operating in Iran...".
The slides proving that were however removed from the US submission to Canada.
Further to that: "In October 2020, a judge blocked an attempt by Canada's attorney general to dismiss parts of the extradition case,[121] allowing arguments for the misrepresentation of Meng's case to move forward.[122]"
So it appears that earlier ruling in regards to fraud does not hold much water.
The Belarus plane hijack is a small reminder why it's generally not a good idea to let governments know who is going to where. I'm not sure why governments that like to think of themselves as democratic don't see the risks.
-- Alexander Bochmann https://mastodon.infra.de/@galaxis/106285985254850170
I'd made a similar point following the assassination of Kim Jung-nam in 2017:
Travel and hospitality databases are widely accessible and shared amongst a tremendous number of organisations. State intelligence organisations might readily have access through their own state-run airline, or through private operations or plants within same. Similarly for terrorist, narco-criminal, money-laundering, or other organisations. Financial, banking, and payment-processing systems, only slightly less so. A P.I. license or position on a fraud or abuse desk at a major online retailer, or any skip-tracing agency, can have access to such information.
https://old.reddit.com/r/dredmorbius/comments/5ud243/data_ar...
What is your threat model?
Note that your own threat model may not include possibilities which put others at risk.
(In fairness, it appear that Protasevich was followed onto the plane itself, suggesting that in-flight availability of manifests played little role. The question of what pre-flight intelligence methods were employed remains open.)