If you seriously feel paranoid about being watched then you'll want to own the hardware you're actually passing through. And I assume that any large organizations that demand this level of invisibility (cartels etc...) have essentially done this - likely locating some of those servers behind armed guards that will protect the physical device.
That said, I think it's unlikely that Tor has been majority compromised at this point, but as it fades from the minds of folks and becomes more and more niche the probability will escalate.
I mean. That’s what I uhh, would do if I was doing something dodgy on the internet…
Edit; with a second hand android bought from a pawn shop running nethunter as an ap ofc…
Send me your address and I uhhh
how do you keep the hardware physically secure? What prevents a gov actor replacing it with their own mitm proxy?
There is no safe when it comes to determined state actors.
This is going to be difficult: <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/the-n...>
Pretty sure that gets you on a list?
I "like" this explanation, but are you going with your gut on that or do you have any concrete signs that point in that direction?
Furthermore, using a zero-day on Ulbricht would be optimal as he is no security researcher. You are unlikely to “burn” a zero-day unless you are using it in a dragnet sort of fashion while a vigilant security researcher is watching.
By definition, it’s hard to find proof of parallel construction. However, former intelligence officials have confirmed its use as a “bedrock technique” for catching criminals [1].
> simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec
By this logic, could one get away with a "crime" indefinitely given good enough (perfect?) opsec?
People say that part of Ulbricht’s shitty opsec was that he left his laptop unlocked, but think of this - the FBI was already ready to grab his laptop the very moment he left it alone. Clearly, they knew he was the criminal well beforehand, and were just lying in wait for him to slip up just one single time.
All in all, this is really cool work. I wonder what it would be like to work for the FBI or NSA solving high profile cybercrime. I imagine it would definitely feel more impactful than my current FAANG position, even if the compensation would be lower.
Is there another laptop of his that they physically accessed somehow prior to distracting and arresting him? (I don't understand how someone could think from that story that the laptop seizure played any part in initially identifying him, since it was done by FBI agents in the course of arresting him pursuant to a warrant.)
It's unfortunately entirely possible that they didn't tell the judge about all of it, but it's still not as though seizing his laptop was the event that convinced the FBI that he was guilty, or even that they claimed to be particularly unsure about their suspicions before that.
What if you live 3 blocks away from a public library but a few floors higher? With direct line of sight and some wireless networking gear?
Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's go find him". You aren't triangulating the AP, you need to logically isolate the packets from the client, calculate their dB and somehow triangulate on just that.
This is smart, and a good idea. But it really just adds a step. Once they go to the library and don't find him, they'll start looking for something 'smart'. And doing 'smart' things like this really get the hackles of the feds up because they start thinking exciting things like 'state actor', and "I'll get a promotion out of this".
The best place to hide something is right out in the open. Preferably behind a SEP field.
Not hating on your idea, just exploring it further.
Maybe a bluetooth autolocking thing could have delayed the inevitable, but it would just be a delay.
Presumably they acted the way they did because they had reasonable belief that their plan would work. If Ross behaved differently i assume they would have a different plan of action
Tough to do encryptluks2-approved opsec if you have to use tools that don't exist.
Then there's another kind of tech (and tactics and practices) that could hope to keep you safe when you are targeted by state-level actors in both digital space and meat space.
Tor barely belongs in the former category.