Neither did linking his dark web identity to his real life identity via multiple forum posts or his other 1,000 opsec failures.

I suspect those “opsec failures” are just parallel construction. The FBI almost certainly used a zero day on him and then waited to see how they could construct a feasible explanation for having identified him from there.

> almost certainly used a zero day on him

I "like" this explanation, but are you going with your gut on that or do you have any concrete signs that point in that direction?

Parallel construction is not new for US intelligence when it comes to solving high-profile crime. We know US intelligence both hoards and uses zero days, especially on users of Tor. As such, we can be reasonably certain that parallel construction is used to capture cybercriminals in high-profile cases, since it immensely simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec.

Furthermore, using a zero-day on Ulbricht would be optimal as he is no security researcher. You are unlikely to “burn” a zero-day unless you are using it in a dragnet sort of fashion while a vigilant security researcher is watching.

By definition, it’s hard to find proof of parallel construction. However, former intelligence officials have confirmed its use as a “bedrock technique” for catching criminals [1].

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction

This is really interesting, and sad. Thanks.

> simplifies solving the crime to a matter of using the exploit and merely observing for gaps in opsec

By this logic, could one get away with a "crime" indefinitely given good enough (perfect?) opsec?

Perhaps, but no one is perfect. Keep in mind that perfect opsec also encompasses physical security+surveillance, where intelligence agencies are much better than this than criminals.

People say that part of Ulbricht’s shitty opsec was that he left his laptop unlocked, but think of this - the FBI was already ready to grab his laptop the very moment he left it alone. Clearly, they knew he was the criminal well beforehand, and were just lying in wait for him to slip up just one single time.

All in all, this is really cool work. I wonder what it would be like to work for the FBI or NSA solving high profile cybercrime. I imagine it would definitely feel more impactful than my current FAANG position, even if the compensation would be lower.

> People say that part of Ulbricht’s shitty opsec was that he left his laptop unlocked, but think of this - the FBI was already ready to grab his laptop the very moment he left it alone. Clearly, they knew he was the criminal well beforehand, and were just lying in wait for him to slip up just one single time.

Is there another laptop of his that they physically accessed somehow prior to distracting and arresting him? (I don't understand how someone could think from that story that the laptop seizure played any part in initially identifying him, since it was done by FBI agents in the course of arresting him pursuant to a warrant.)

No, the theory is that a zero day was used on Ulbricht and they knew he was guilty for a long time. Things like seizing the laptop was just theater to construct a parallel trail of evidence for the courts.

I understand that theory, but I don't understand what leaving his laptop unlocked has to do with it. As the FBI already had a warrant to arrest him when they encountered him in the library, they had already made a probable cause showing to a judge by that point. The probable cause showing isn't the same standard as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" needed for a criminal conviction, but clearly the FBI already believed he was guilty before they seized his laptop, whether or not they accurately told the judge about all of the evidence and evidence-gathering methods that led them to that conclusion.

It's unfortunately entirely possible that they didn't tell the judge about all of it, but it's still not as though seizing his laptop was the event that convinced the FBI that he was guilty, or even that they claimed to be particularly unsure about their suspicions before that.

I agree with this. They just wait to find a small breadcrumb trail and then use that construct a case. The identifying the suspect is done through hidden means.

Even if that's true, Ross certainly made it easy for them

Try public WiFi + spoofed MAC + directional antenna.

What if you live 3 blocks away from a public library but a few floors higher? With direct line of sight and some wireless networking gear?

Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's go find him". You aren't triangulating the AP, you need to logically isolate the packets from the client, calculate their dB and somehow triangulate on just that.

>Would they really try to triangulate the client packets? It is a large leap past "oh he is in the library, let's go find him".

This is smart, and a good idea. But it really just adds a step. Once they go to the library and don't find him, they'll start looking for something 'smart'. And doing 'smart' things like this really get the hackles of the feds up because they start thinking exciting things like 'state actor', and "I'll get a promotion out of this".

The best place to hide something is right out in the open. Preferably behind a SEP field.

Not hating on your idea, just exploring it further.

Arguably it did protect him, but Ulbricht compromised himself by making several major opsec blunders including linking his personal Gmail address to his pseudonyms.

Because he walked away from his computer and left it unlocked. Wear a hidden bluetooth device or something to lock your computer and use USBGuard if you're that worried.

I feel that, at the point where the fbi is trying to distract you by making out so they could steal your laptop, its already too late and you are very screwed.

Maybe a bluetooth autolocking thing could have delayed the inevitable, but it would just be a delay.

Not really. Wish proper encryption and a USB safe list, once the computer is locked there isn't much they can do.

They can watch you for the rest of your life, interrogate you, etc.

Presumably they acted the way they did because they had reasonable belief that their plan would work. If Ross behaved differently i assume they would have a different plan of action

IIRC he was still sitting at the computer. They just distracted him to turn around and then they swiped it.

They literally snuck up behind him and swiped it out of his hands. He was seated with his back to the door, one of his many opsec failures.

Regardless, USBGuard and a hidden bluetooth device to automatically lock when it leaves a certain radius would have likely prevented any issues.

Ulbricht was arrested in 2013. USBGuard and usbkill were released in 2015.

Tough to do encryptluks2-approved opsec if you have to use tools that don't exist.

USBGuard is a newer tool, however the functionality has existed through udev or other integrations for some time.