I really wish people would research a bit more before posting these questions here. The quantum computing argument has been asked a thousands times before, it was first seen shortly after the bitcoin paper was published, it has been answered and re-answered and re-answered so many times, everywhere. And yet here we are filling the internet with more and more copies...
Which means you need to fork early and abandon any wallets that don’t do a transaction with the new system. That’s not the kind of transition that works with just the miners involved.
#define LATEST_BLOCK_BEFORE_EMERGENCE_OF_QC 76283747
# fill in number when that happens
if (block_height>LATEST_BLOCK_BEFORE_EMERGENCE_OF_QC) {
# Treat transaction as invalid if it still uses SHA256
}
You know transactions are timestamped through the medium of being included in a block, right?This means you need to pick some date where everyone with a private key needs to create a new key under a new system. Then before quantum crypto is available they need to make this transaction from their old wallet using an old key to a new wallet with a new secure private key. And they need to do this before quantum crypto is available.
Work is on the way to standardize a quantum-safe digital signature, but it takes years to get the best solution, and right now there's no time pressure.
Quantum computers have something similar to moore's law which is that adding each bit is as difficult as all the previous bits. i.e. the required noise floor scales exponentially, unless a certain threshold is reached.
If BTC has a multi-trillion-dollar market cap, and quantum exploitation occurs, the only thing that backs the currency (trust) vanishes, and the values quickly drops to zero.
If we are reliant on BTC for global finances in the future, as many are proposing, this could result in a global depression.
This might be the single biggest problem quantum computing could bring us, short of the "talking to alternate universes" theoretical use cases some people are talking about (that probably won't happen).
Encrypted data can be re-encrypted to be quantum-secure. The vulnerability is temporary
A compromised blockchain dies forever. A brand new quantum-secure blockchain would need to be invented.
More likely: "We'll skim from dormant wallets that won't be immediately noticed, and when it becomes too obvious, we move all of Satoshi's bitcoins to force an emergency fork that launders our profits".
I could exploit the old blockchain, then migrate my stolen keys to the quantum blockchain.
Forking doesn't work here. Traditional computing and Quantum computing are different enough that "porting" isn't just something you can do.
It's a question of how much time a new algorithm buys.
1. The oldest (and largest) wallets directly stored their public key on the blockchain. This would mean that attackers could transfer money away from these wallets (many of them are dormant).
2. Relatively early, the blockchain shifted to only storing the hash of the public key, which seems less susceptible to a quantum computing attack. The risk in these wallets is that once you want to transfer bitcoins out, you need to temporarily publish your public key - this key is not stored on the blockchain, but might be stored by future attackers. In addition, at some point getting your private key will be so fast that the moment you publish a transaction request you'll many fake requests asking to transfer to another wallet.
The solution is likely a soft fork - new addresses that are quantum resistant (similar to how in the past Bitcoin moved away from public key address into hash). The trick is that this needs to be deployed before attacks exist, and people need to transfer their Bitcoin into the new wallets.
That doesn't mean the Public key has ever been exposed online and therefore not true. Look up cold storage best practices, I'm not going to line it out for you but what you said is entirely false and built on a flawed premise.
> 2. Relatively early, the blockchain shifted to only storing the hash of the public key, which seems less susceptible to a quantum computing attack. The risk in these wallets is that once you want to transfer bitcoins out, you need to temporarily publish your public key - this key is not stored on the blockchain, but might be stored by future attackers. In addition, at some point getting your private key will be so fast that the moment you publish a transaction request you'll many fake requests asking to transfer to another wallet.
You started it off with a valid observation, but then led into a non-sequitur, what does that have to do with Bitcoin's vulnerability if as we just said 1 is not true if done correctly.
> The trick is that this needs to be deployed before attacks exist, and people need to transfer their Bitcoin into the new wallets.
While I agree security on mainchain is an issue, we should dhave had taproot long ago, and mixing by default by now as tx fees get more and more expensive--all you're doing is mixing it with other adddresses to make the sum indistinguishable from it's source and that cost adds up as the netowrk gets more expensive to operate on.
But also your premise is at odds with the fact that most of the traffic will be done on LN moving forward, and the bitcoin (token) will locked out of the network's mainchain (Bitcoin) to operate on LN and thus does not require your 'solution.'
In short, these are non-concerns.
Note how I didn't downvote you, and instead I challenged your arguments in order for others to benefit from this conversation, instead of being a child and downvoting simply because I disagree with your points.
Edit: HAHA!
Besides, the algorithm in question here is Shor's algorithm, it WILL be used to break some basic encryption. If Satoshi is dead, his coins will be hacked (they are old P2PK outputs). But there is no algorithm for breaking P2SH outputs (eg Native Segwit wallets). There could be, but Bitcoin has the ability to adapt if necessary. Bitcoin is not a static thing.
See also : https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/innovatie/artikelen/qu...
More importantly, quantum computers actually allow for something better than encryption. If you are having a secret conversation over the quantum internet, not only can no one listen in, BUT you will KNOW if they are listening. I read about this in David Deutsch's "Fabric of Reality," which I HIGHLY recommend and is freely available on archive.org https://archive.org/details/TheFabricOfReality/page/n1/mode/...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography#Mistrustf...
Nobody knows except the people doing it.
> He comments on technical issues and engineering problems, things he knows a thing or two about.
He still doesn't seem to truly understand BFT [2].
[1] https://davidgerard.co.uk/blockchain/buterins-quantum-quest/
But if the DLP is easy, then anyone can fabricate proper ECDSA sigs, and you're not wasting electricity to send bogus messages, you're wasting electricity to send valid messages.
The point I was trying to make is that there is no migration path from ECDSA. You can't fork bitcoin if the DLP is easy. It's just game over. Proof of work becomes irrelevant.
I don't think there is any feasible way you could ever convert the Bitcoin blockchain into a quantum variant, even if you set a hard sunset date before any exploitation could occur. You would have to start from the ground up and completely reinvent the wheel.
EDIT: I only ask this because if the world becomes more and more dependent on the blockchain and quantum computing becomes an existential threat, the existence of blockchain-breaking computation could potentially result in a global catastrophe. I compare quantum computing in this scenario to a device that can just magically take money away from you without your knowledge. Given that this obviously hasn't happened yet, I'm curious what mitigation strategies exist now. Thanks everyone for your replies.
disclaimer: I believe it's just a matter of time before all current (2021) encryption is broken. whether that happens in 2060 or 3000 obviously is TBD, but it's a matter of when not if IMHO.