I used to work for Australia's national broadband network.

The issue with 5G is that there is a lot more software involved e.g. software defined networking, network function virtualization, edge computing, containerisation etc.

This makes securing the platform much more complex as you have to constantly validate that each piece of software is not able to access your core network or siphon user traffic.

Optical networks like you listed are pretty dumb so aren't nearly as much of a threat.

In addition, I think that a lot of ISO Layer 1/2 and even L3 gear can be swapped out too without much effort because of open standards (IETF, ISO, etc) that allows for easier mixing and matching.

Whereas a lot of wireless components are more tightly coupled to each other.

Which is why many service providers are talking about Open RAN.

This is the type of content we're here for! Thanks.

Welp. This is what I come to HN for.

good answer. cheers.

"Optical networks like you listed are pretty dumb so aren't nearly as much of a threat"

They can be tapped into still, of course. Doesn't GCHQ copy all the data coming through their fibre lines and run it through computers for analysis?

> They can be tapped into still, of course

Slightly different threat model.

This doesn’t quite make sense... at the end of the day you still put data in one end and it comes out the other... can you not just encrypt?

I’m missing something right?

yes, denial of service attacks.

Say what? I can denial of service attack any brand of network with state level resources... what does Huawei change in that equation?

Do you mean like they could disable the equipment and deny service?

If the COM/SYS layer to the infrastructure is all Huwawei due to no other providers being immediately available for contract, then all of the infrastructure has security issues along the entire chain.

It's implementing the security and 'ownership' of the data along the infrastructure thats at risk. And Huwawei don't have a good track record.

... this isn’t denial of service. ? Also my original question: doesn’t encryption secure the entire chain?

You do have a point, but I think from a risk perspective there is a difference.

When Huawei was chosen for those fixed line projects it was providing relatively ‘dumb’ pieces of kit (switches etc.), with controller software that could be looked at and ringfenced.

The 5G stack has been implemented using much more virtualisation, and the vendors are providing much more general capability which makes it a lot harder to risk assess and probe for weaknesses etc.

The UK has tens of thousands of Huawei VDSL2 DSLAMs installed, I imagine most countries have similar (Portugal seems to use Huawei for nearly all of their FTTH equipment). They are not dumb pieces of kit at all in terms of computing power.

Regardless, even if it was, it is still a huge potential problem. Imagine Huawei had some backdoor code that looked for a certain pattern of data across any of the network interfaces and corrupted the firmware so it wouldn't load without being physically replaced. China then buys a load of ads and as users browse the web, they load the image with the secret string in, triggering it (one example).

Within a couple of hours enough users have seen it that the vast majority of western infrastructure is down, and needs replaced (and I would assume in this case, China wouldn't be willing to sell more!).

I think this sort of attack would likely take down most 5G anyway - as it's incredibly likely that the backhaul has some sort of Huawei fibre product in it somewhere along the line.

China et al don't care all that much about individual users.

By compromising a large network provider they have the ability to access data from enterprise and government customers. Which as we saw when the US did it is very beneficial for trade negotiations etc.

Do they though? Nearly everything these days has TLS/SSL. What would they gain from intercepting a load of encrypted data?

Even NSA said their snooping on network infrastrucure was becoming useless with the leaked info on their monitoring, which was years ago.

I really don't see the value these days of being able to intercept traffic like this. You will obviously find bits and bobs that isn't encrypted but it's not like 20 years ago where you could get everything in a few days.

That is one form of attack, but that's "the nuclear option" of infrastructure. It's a concern, but many of the concerns around 5G are persistent nation state spying activities. China is far more concerned with data aggregating and mining than it is with nuking the West. China, in general, tends to avoid cataclysmic actions that upend the current order. Especially given that most of the Western world is China's largest trading partners and a fundamental part of their economy.

China's strategic plan is spy and collect, not destroy. Traditional espionage stuff that every country does.

Then 5G is down. So what? Considering the amount of procen backdoors in Cisco devices that seems miniscule.

Here’s another side of it. When Huawei deployed their equipment previously with at least one big telecom it’s equipment worked so badly that they sent a boatload of engineers onsite to fix it all and as far as I know they did. Now imagine all the systems, schematics, blueprints and locations these engineers touched or at least gained knowledge about. Even without a backdoor in this knowledge would probably be a hacker group’s wet dream if they wanted to plant themselves inside a telco.

Eh, this is getting silly. There are Chinese nationals working in the West, obviously they see how systems are made. Then they can go back and build something similar based on their knowledge - you can't copyright someone's brain.

I keep thinking that if, hypothetically, i would be in charge of a developing economy, I would not recognise foreign copyright and patents untill the country can catch up, at least on medicine and software. Especially the idea that breaking copyright is a crime and not a civil offence is an absurdity

This is exactly what has always been done. US did to UK, Japan did to Germany, now China is did/is doing to US. Copyrights and patents only come to the table when they get useful.

You have to start somewhere, with your argument we already have some x.y.z provider so why change?

Easier to replace because 5G is being fresh installed, imagine replacing all that fibre. It's also easier to hide possibly nefarious equipment in 5G and proxy to somewhere else, whereas the usual fibre splitters and taps nation states use are high traffic, bulky and basically impossible to exfil back to China. Fibre is "dumb" equipment whereas much of the 5G stack includes vendor software, virtualization etc which increases risks enormously.

You're not wrong.

Protectionism surely plays a somewhat unspoken role.

> bet the fibre connection to the not-Huawei 5G towers is going to be Huawei anyway.

With all the competition on fibre equipments I really doubt.

Heck, many ISP modems (which are not only modems but also routers and wireless APs) are of Chinese manufacture.

Perhaps it’s due to their involvement with the concentration camps, or their close ties with the CCP, or subverting sanctions against Iran?

It’s also absurd that EU would even consider using Huawei in the first place given their desire to achieve technological sovereignty.

No, it's tied to industrial espionage.

The NSA needs to hack into everything. Huawei everywhere makes it difficult to do so.

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/jan/27/nsa-hacked-...