Regardless, even if it was, it is still a huge potential problem. Imagine Huawei had some backdoor code that looked for a certain pattern of data across any of the network interfaces and corrupted the firmware so it wouldn't load without being physically replaced. China then buys a load of ads and as users browse the web, they load the image with the secret string in, triggering it (one example).
Within a couple of hours enough users have seen it that the vast majority of western infrastructure is down, and needs replaced (and I would assume in this case, China wouldn't be willing to sell more!).
I think this sort of attack would likely take down most 5G anyway - as it's incredibly likely that the backhaul has some sort of Huawei fibre product in it somewhere along the line.
By compromising a large network provider they have the ability to access data from enterprise and government customers. Which as we saw when the US did it is very beneficial for trade negotiations etc.
Even NSA said their snooping on network infrastrucure was becoming useless with the leaked info on their monitoring, which was years ago.
I really don't see the value these days of being able to intercept traffic like this. You will obviously find bits and bobs that isn't encrypted but it's not like 20 years ago where you could get everything in a few days.
China's strategic plan is spy and collect, not destroy. Traditional espionage stuff that every country does.
When Huawei was chosen for those fixed line projects it was providing relatively ‘dumb’ pieces of kit (switches etc.), with controller software that could be looked at and ringfenced.
The 5G stack has been implemented using much more virtualisation, and the vendors are providing much more general capability which makes it a lot harder to risk assess and probe for weaknesses etc.