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Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by usr1106 on Friday December 25, 2020 @08:47AM (#25536437)
I have always wondered a bit what is the purpose of expiration dates. For certificates or GPG keys alike. Once they expire it often enough creates some problems. Either because renewal has just been forgotten or because there are some technical issues, like in the Let's Encrypt / Android case.

If you have a security incident you can't wait for the expiration date anyway, you need to revoke. And hopefully users have a mechanism to note the revocation in time.

So expiration dates help to avoid using weak algorithms forever. But does that need to be done on a fixed date per certificate? Wouldn't that be a more gradual approach in the libraries? And of course they are not updated they get less secure as time goes by. And sooner or later compatibility issues will do the job. E. g. most Nokia Symbian phones don't do https any more, because all they can handle is SHA-1 certificate signatures. That was a gradual decline in functionality.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by 8organicbits on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:25AM (#25536642)
I agree with the sentiment that cert expiry is a frequent cause of outages. I think short lived certs and automated cert management are a better fix versus certs that never expire (for that issue).

If you don't have an expiry then you'd need to keep certificate revocations around forever, so your CRL grows without bound. Currently the certificate revocation list can remove expired certificates as clients won't use them. There's also lots of clients that don't check CRLs. Those clients would be forever vulnerable to a stolen certificate if we removed expiry.

Imagine if you inherited the infrastructure for a company where the previous admin created certs, lost track of them, and used questionable methods for securing them. I believe you'd struggle to find and revoke every previously issued certificate. The expiry ensures that gets cleaned up, eventually.

I don't have a good solution to the Nokia Symbian problem. I suspect if the device only supports SHA-1 then there are other unpatched security issues. Does anyone know if that's the case? If so, this seems more like a support and patching issue.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by usr1106 on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:48AM (#25536755)
> I don't have a good solution to the Nokia Symbian problem.

I told that mostly as an anecdote. I don't think a solution is really expected. The devices I referred to (made 2005 - 2007) worked rather well for about 10 years. I guess that's a satisfactory achievement.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by thayne on Friday December 25, 2020 @03:48PM (#25538918)
> There's also lots of clients that don't check CRL

This is in part due to the difficulty of doing so. On linux at least there is generally not a central location for CRLs, or anything to keep them up to date. Each application is responsible for maintinging CRLs it cares about itself. And then there is the fact that a full set of CRLs is pretty big. OCSP fixes some of that, at the cost of more latency during the TLS handshake. OCSP stapling is probably the best existing solution, but I don't think it is widespread enough that you can rely on it yet.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by sciurus on Friday December 25, 2020 @07:56PM (#25540430)
If you haven't seen it already, check out https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2020/01/09/crlite-part-1-a...

(Disclaimer: I work for Mozilla and have helped with the rollout of this)

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by thayne on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:59PM (#25541261)
That is certainly an interesting project, I wish it success, and it may very well improve things in the future. However, it looks like currently it is only experimentally used in firefox and isn't really easy to use in other applications. And even if there was a readily available library for consuming crlite files, there is still the problem of keeping the local crlite filter up to date and if you want to use different trust anchors than firefox, you would need to have the infrastructure to generate your own crlite filters periodically.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by bawolff on Friday December 25, 2020 @07:07PM (#25540190)
OCSP stapling always felt a little hacky to me. It feels like just having super short lived certificates but with extra steps. Why not just have super short lived certificates instesd?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by thayne on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:08PM (#25541043)
That's fair.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by sverhagen on Friday December 25, 2020 @07:24PM (#25540289)
That was a great clarification, but wouldn't those admins also possibly have put far out expiration dates, to make things "easier" on them.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by AlphaSite on Friday December 25, 2020 @08:08PM (#25540489)
I think most browsers typically enforce a maximum duration.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by _jal on Friday December 25, 2020 @08:57AM (#25536491)
Things are moving in the other direction. Browser vendors have forced certificates used for browsers to a max life of 398 days.

There are multiple reasons, but you seem focused on the certificate management side. One advantage of doing things more frequently is they are forced to become more routine or automated. So shorter expirations should actually make expiration failures less likely over time. Of course the transition sucks.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by tialaramex on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:41AM (#25536717)
Apple eventually clarified, and other root trust stores followed, by making longer-lived new certificates a policy violation rather than just not working on a Mac / iPhone.

That's a meaningful distinction. Certificates which lack SCTs (the proof that they were shown to Certificate Transparency logs before you) don't work in some popular browsers, but those certificates are not policy violations, they just don't work in browsers so you probably should not use them on a web site. In a handful of cases such certificates exist for legacy reasons (e.g. industrial environment that doesn't know anything about the "Web"), in other cases they're minted but not intended to be seen yet, for example Google's front end facing systems can do this.

When Google accidentally made some of those certificates live with insufficient SCTs they just did not work in Chrome - which is embarrassing but it was not a policy violation, the subsequent root cause analysis was Google's choice not mandated by the other root trust stores and there was no threat that anybody's trust would get revoked.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by thayne on Friday December 25, 2020 @03:59PM (#25538995)
That lifetime is for domain certificates. CA certificates, which is what matters for the Let's Encrypt issue have much longer lifetimes, like 10 years.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by necheffa on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:03AM (#25536537)
In order to revoke a certificate, you first must at least suspect it has been compromised. An expiration date can help limit the impact of compromises you don't suspect.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by segfaultbuserr on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:23AM (#25536941)
It's also important to see that the SSL/TLS system does not allow you to revoke a certificate with 100% certainty, the revocation mechanism is flawed - it's often practically impossible to reliably revoke a certificate after someone has compromised your private key. The only feasible workaround is early expiration to reduce the window of vulnerability.

* CRL is a list of revoked certificates, it must be downloaded and manually applied to all clients, which only occurs once in a while as a new update, and many hate system updates. The huge lists of revoked certificate have size, performance and scalability problems, currently they are considered obsolete and mainly replaced by OCSP.

* In OCSP, clients ask a CA's OCSP server to determine the validity of a certificate. It operates out-of-band from the main TLS connection, and networks and CA servers are not reliable, especially in the early days. Timed out OCSP requests were common. If you are a web browser, you don't want a failed OCSP request to block/DoS HTTPS, thus OCSP becomes essentially "optional". Browsers reject bad certificates when the connection goes through, but if it times out, nothing happens. An attacker can simply block the OCSP server to bypass the revocation check. There's also the problem of privacy - you have to send the name of every website you visit to third party servers.

* In OCSP Stapling, the webserver acts like a proxy - it hosts a cached copy of the OCSP response for itself (it cannot be forged because it's signed by the CA) and sends it to clients in-band, via normal TLS channel. Because now the client no longer asks CA's OCSP servers for a response, but instead simply asks the webserver itself, it eliminates the problem of third-party OCSP servers, solves the reliability and privacy issues. However, there's nothing to prevent an attacker to run a server with a compromised certificate with OCSP Stapling turned off.

* In OCSP Must-Staple, you can get a certificate from a CA that says "you must use OCSP Stapling, otherwise this certificate is null and void." Hence, if a browser sees a certificate with "OCSP Must-Staple" enabled, it must see whether the webserver supports OCSP Stapling, and via OCSP Stapling, the certificate's validity will be determined. If OCSP Stapling is not supported by the webserver, the connection is rejected. Thus, an attacker who uses a compromised certificate has to either disable OCSP Stapling and be rejected, or to enable OCSP Stapling and gets caught. Finally the problem of reliable revocation is solved. But this is an optional feature and is only used by a tiny percentage of sysadmins. Also, it's only supported by webservers and browsers, other TLS-based applications like VPN, FTPS, SMTP, IMAP, XMPP, IRC servers/clients, etc, usually don't support OCSP Stapling at all.

Thus, it's often practically impossible to reliably revoke a certificate in SSL/TLS after someone has compromised your private key. The only feasible workaround is early expiration to reduce the window of vulnerability, an unrevokable certificate that expires within 90 days is less dangerous than a zombie certificate that lasts two years.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by spockz on Friday December 25, 2020 @04:04PM (#25539027)
I see a lot of discussion about server certificates. But does there exist ocsp stapling for clients at all?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by segfaultbuserr on Friday December 25, 2020 @05:14PM (#25539445)
No, I don't think so. According to RFC 6066, Section 8 "Certificate Status Request" (a.k.a OCSP Stapling)...

> In order to indicate their desire to receive certificate status information, clients MAY include an extension of type "status_request" in the (extended) client hello. Servers that receive a client hello containing the "status_request" extension MAY return a suitable certificate status response to the client along with their certificate.

And in a TLS handshake, the procedure is ClientHello, ServerHello, Server Certificate, CertificateRequest, Client Certificate. But "Certificate Status Request" is only specified in ClientHello, not CertificateRequest, so it's not possible for a server to request OCSP status from the client.

Hence, OCSP Stapling strictly a service provided to the clients, not vice versa - unfortunately, reliable revocation of client certificate is a still a problem. But I guess it's much easier to blacklist the offended client certificates on your own server, perhaps still problematic in a big organization, but certainly easier than blacklisting every leaked certificate on the Internet.

Disclamer: I don't have any experience on managing systems that use client verification. I did my best to RTMF and fact-check myself, but corrections are welcomed.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by spockz on Monday December 28, 2020 @04:22AM (#25557865)
This is indeed as far as I got as well. Maybe we can make it if we made an ssl extension ourselves but I’m not versed enough in them. It also would require controlling all ssl libraries in use.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by tialaramex on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:31AM (#25536667)
For leaves and everything else below a root, the expiration (notAfter in X.509) tells us when the issuer ceases to be responsible for the contained assertion being true.

For example take a 90 day Let's Encrypt certificate. When it was issued ISRG had recently (likely seconds earlier) verified that the subscriber apparently had control over all the names listed.

Suppose a month later one of the names has been sold to you. You're entitled to have that certificate revoked. Since you control the name, you can just do the Let's Encrypt proof-of-control dance and get it revoked, issue a new one instead, whatever you want.

They issue millions of certificates every day, so they don't want to remain indefinitely responsible for the ones from last July, from 2018, and so on. Ninety days later, having expired, ISRG has no opinion about whether the holder of the certificate still controls those names, and if you call that revocation API it will refuse, there isn't anything to revoke because it has expired.

Now, if the certificate you're shown is 15 seconds expired, is it so much more likely that it's really because they don't control this name any more than it was a minute earlier? Not really, but we must draw a line in the sand somewhere, or else a 10 year old certificate for "www.microsoft.com" is still valid right?

For the root the argument is a bit trickier, after all they could just issue themselves a new certificate with the same keys but a different expiry date - and some root CAs have done this in the past.

In this case (for roots) as we see with Android not every system actually enforces expiry. Out of the box OpenSSL doesn't for example I think. But the argument as to why expiry matters for roots goes like this: If we are actively managing the trust store, clearly a trusted CA which wants us to continue trusting them should send us a new or updated root in plenty of time. If they forgot we can hardly have confidence in their other processes. If they decided not to we certainly should cease to trust their root when it expires as this signifies they presumably do not intend to obey policy any more, for this root at least.

For example, if you have a Firefox that you just decide not to ever update, I believe it won't enforce expiry of roots. Newer Firefox builds will, like clockwork, remove expired roots entirely. But the old build will continue to trust roots that have notionally expired if you are still running it.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by hannob on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:38AM (#25536702)
> If you have a security incident you can't wait for the expiration date anyway, you need to revoke. And hopefully users have a mechanism to note the revocation in time.

This is the key issue. For a long time there was no working revocation mechanism. With a combination of OCSP, OCSP stapling and the muststaple extension you can get there, but this isn't in widespread use yet. Revocation is a difficult problem.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by iso947 on Saturday December 26, 2020 @09:23AM (#25543630)
Even then it still relies on knowledge that the certificate has been compromised.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by vbezhenar on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:18AM (#25536604)
You can remove expired certificates from the list of revoked certificates. Without expiration time that list could grow limitless making it impractical.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by Causality1 on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:31AM (#25536994)
I know the concept is offensive to us who love optimization and efficiency, but would it actually be impractical, though? A root certificate is a couple of kilobytes. How much space would you need to store every single certificate in history for the next hundred years?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by anfilt on Friday December 25, 2020 @11:34AM (#25537362)
For root certs probably not too much space, but for all certs.... That depends on the number of certs issued, and more people and things are using TLS and such so it probably be more than just linear growth. 100 Years seems a bit extreme just even look back 20 years for the terms of hardware and such. Also think about how much common MD5 was then and SHA1, both of which are broken for a lot use cases.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by reaperhulk on Friday December 25, 2020 @11:50AM (#25537475)
A good example of how rapidly a CRL can grow in size is Apple's WWDRCA CRL. Current size: 224MB despite only containing revocations back to Feb 2020. http://developer.apple.com/certificationauthority/wwdrca.crl
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by Laforet on Friday December 25, 2020 @07:12PM (#25540221)
I chuckled a bit when I clicked on your link and got a browser warning that crl cannot be downloaded securely over http.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by Dylan16807 on Saturday December 26, 2020 @04:18AM (#25542307)
What in the world? Why are there millions of revoked certificates? What is creating all of these?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by schoen on Friday December 25, 2020 @06:59PM (#25540149)
Let's Encrypt alone has issued about 1.5 billion certificates in five years of operation; just storing those in DER form with no indexing or other metadata would occupy more than a terabyte of storage. (This is also not counting CT precertificates, which are duplicative of the final certificates in their meaningful content but contain different signature data.)
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by grishka on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:20AM (#25536922)
I can understand the purpose behind the expiration dates on the SSL certificates you get issued for your domain — domains change hands, things happen. But why do root certificates have to expire at all? Relying on the system to be updatable and requiring constant maintenance doesn't feel very sustainable, and generally causes all kinds of problems. Modern Android versions treating user-installed root CAs as second-class don't exactly instill confidence either.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by t0astbread on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:05AM (#25536545)
I assume expiration protects against the case where a valid certificate is forgotten and a bad actor gets their hands on it and abuses it without the domain owner noticing. Similar to how some sites enforce session expiration.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by dotancohen on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:07AM (#25536554)
That is beginning to appear to be a very corner case. But we didn't know that when the standards were being written.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by t0astbread on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:22AM (#25536625)
Maybe because certificates are treated as an ephemeral resource that needs to be managed? If a business had "the certificate" for all its lifetime I imagine it would be easier to forget revocation when it's not needed anymore.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by stjohnswarts on Friday December 25, 2020 @04:33PM (#25539212)
However lots of corner cases end up being weak points to be hacked if not properly accounted for
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by fpoling on Friday December 25, 2020 @02:29PM (#25538463)
Yet consider if root certificates would expire in max 1 year. That by itself long time ago forced if not the phone vendors but at least app developers to deal with the need to update the root certificate DB. And the LetsEncrypt issue would not exist.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by krupan on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:03AM (#25536536)
I had a co-worker who was pushing for certs that were only valid for a day, or for hours or even minutes. It would solve the whole problem of revocation.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by algesten on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:18AM (#25536605)
When I've implemented JWT in the past (yes, I know, "don't use JWT"), I've opted for public/private signatures. The public cert I would publish on some URL for all consumers of the JWT to use. The rotation of certs there was a matter of hours. It would hold 3-4 of the last certs (depending on JWT lifetime).
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by fireant on Saturday December 26, 2020 @04:05AM (#25542257)
What's wrong with using JWTs? What you have done should be industry standard and is enabled by the JWK spec. In fact several features of OpenID Connect are built upon signed JWTs from a well-known JWK store.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by Dylan16807 on Saturday December 26, 2020 @04:21AM (#25542319)
https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/

Having such a tempting footgun is a real problem.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by fireant on Saturday December 26, 2020 @06:41AM (#25542827)
The problem I think is that JWT is just a small puzzle piece of a great artwork that is identity and auth. It is overly complex (not without reason) and people don't put in enough effort to learn the whole picture (and it just isn't thought in schools) and just want to use something quickly for their current problem. Which is why they pick JWT and don't understand the host of related technologies - OAuth2, OIDC, JWK, JWE - just to name a few.

I don't see a reason why I would ever want to use auth=none for anything as at that point JWT is just base64 encoded json but I may be too deep in the identity world by now.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by t0astbread on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:16AM (#25536591)
You have to draw the line somewhere. Daily certs would probably increase the load for CAs by a lot. Also, energy consumption for certificate management would increase.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by easton on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:52AM (#25537104)
How compute intensive is a CA, anyway? I’d think that a few Raspberry Pi-ish devices would be enough to do it for an entire enterprise (or maybe even one, but fault tolerance).
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by t0astbread on Saturday December 26, 2020 @11:02AM (#25544183)
In general I would assume when you shorten certificate validity from 90-ish days to one the computational resources required for issuance will increase to about 90x of what it was before. So it would be a lot more expensive to run.

Also, unrelated to that argument but I think the most expensive part in a CA is not issuance but rather OCSP since an OCSP query could happen with every TLS connection (although stapling exists to solve that). OCSP would not be affected by a shortening of validity periods.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by dotancohen on Friday December 25, 2020 @09:08AM (#25536561)
Is he not aware of OCSP Stapling? It's very much a solved issue, as the same CA authorization can be presented to multiple clients.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by viraptor on Friday December 25, 2020 @03:39PM (#25538865)
Openstack Anchor aimed for that. No problem with revocation if your certificates last a day, are fully automated, and issuing is validated by network https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Security/Projects/Anchor
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by supertrope on Friday December 25, 2020 @05:03PM (#25539385)
So like Kerberos?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by marcosdumay on Saturday December 26, 2020 @09:17AM (#25543592)
Certificate revoking has a completely different level of reliability from the normal certificate management. There are theoretical flaws that can not be fixed.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by hedora on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:07AM (#25536850)
I just always assumed it was like the rest of SSL:

It’s well-documented NSA saboteurs infiltrated the standards board. They forced through a bunch of bad proposals with the intention of making it overly complicated. The idea was to encourage misconfiguration and implementation bugs.

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by gallegojaime on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:12AM (#25536875)
Where did you read this?
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by vlovich123 on Friday December 25, 2020 @10:28AM (#25536974)
He’s referring to the leaks about NSA putting back doors into algorithms that Snowden leaked. Those algorithms were suspect from the beginning and avoided. It’s possible ones have gone undetected but that’s pure speculation without any kind of proof at this time. It’s also wholly irrelevant to this discussion and just pure FUD. Certificate expiration is needed to make certificate revocation perform well. Otherwise you need to keep the list of all certificates ever revoked whereas with expiration you can ignore checking expired certificates and more importantly revocation lists you download can prune certs that are otherwise expired anyway.

If anything, now that everything is connected to the internet you want shorter revocations (like days, weeks or months). That way the potential for abuse is shorter and the path for renewal is better trodden by organizations (ie less likely to forget about an expiring cert).

[1] https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/20/5231006/nsa-paid-10-mill...

[2] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE

[3] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)

Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by hedora on Saturday December 26, 2020 @04:59PM (#25546761)
I wasn’t referring to the cryptosuite weakening. I was referring to unnecessary complexity in the SSL protocol itself, such as the whole certificate chain parsing mess, the countless opportunities to implement things vulnerable to downgrade attacks, and the overly-broad attack surface of the whole thing.
Re:Let’s Encrypt comes up with workaround for abandonware An... by hedora on Saturday December 26, 2020 @04:55PM (#25546742)
It made the rounds in the press years ago. Here’s a first person account for ipsec, which was one of the first hits I found when looking for information about the SSL weakening:

https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg12...

It’s describing the same tactics, but a different protocol. Honestly, just crack open the SSL spec. In hindsight, it’s pretty obvious it was intentionally over-complicated.

The Wireguard protocol attempts to fix these issues by hardcoding everything behind a protocol version number. It’s vastly easier to implement and configure properly.