I told that mostly as an anecdote. I don't think a solution is really expected. The devices I referred to (made 2005 - 2007) worked rather well for about 10 years. I guess that's a satisfactory achievement.
This is in part due to the difficulty of doing so. On linux at least there is generally not a central location for CRLs, or anything to keep them up to date. Each application is responsible for maintinging CRLs it cares about itself. And then there is the fact that a full set of CRLs is pretty big. OCSP fixes some of that, at the cost of more latency during the TLS handshake. OCSP stapling is probably the best existing solution, but I don't think it is widespread enough that you can rely on it yet.
(Disclaimer: I work for Mozilla and have helped with the rollout of this)
If you don't have an expiry then you'd need to keep certificate revocations around forever, so your CRL grows without bound. Currently the certificate revocation list can remove expired certificates as clients won't use them. There's also lots of clients that don't check CRLs. Those clients would be forever vulnerable to a stolen certificate if we removed expiry.
Imagine if you inherited the infrastructure for a company where the previous admin created certs, lost track of them, and used questionable methods for securing them. I believe you'd struggle to find and revoke every previously issued certificate. The expiry ensures that gets cleaned up, eventually.
I don't have a good solution to the Nokia Symbian problem. I suspect if the device only supports SHA-1 then there are other unpatched security issues. Does anyone know if that's the case? If so, this seems more like a support and patching issue.