Even assuming this unsupported claim is true, it's not necessarily relevant because correlation isn't the same as causation. For example, it could be that Dems are pretty good at reading their local electorate, and left-leaning areas are more tolerant of violent protest in the name of left causes. So Dems in lefty areas did not condemn violence, whereas Dems in swing areas did condemn violence. If this was true, ceteris paribus you would expect Dems who condemn violence to be more likely to lose, just because they're running more competitive races.
BTW, I think people are unfortunately quite tribal nowadays, and tend to assume that extremists have control of the other side even if that's not the case. And disavowing extremists is only partially effective at changing that perception. Think about it--how much have Trump's many disavowals of the far right shifted your perception that he's in bed with them? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bd0cMmBvqWc Probably not much.
>So either that’s not actually the critical factor, or it’s not possible to control for this factor in any sort of reliable way.
One failed attempt doesn't mean that something can't be done.
You got a source on that? It's clear that democrats lost ground, despite the Republican party's abject failure to control the coronavirus. This should have been the easiest win in world history, and somehow, the Democrats barely escaped with the presidency. There is pretty clearly something to explain here.
There’s a reason for that.
Exit polls only interview people who vote in person, which may be generally be useful, but in this election are an enormously systematically biased slice of the electorate.
You really can't base any generalizations beyond the in-person voting segment based on them.
This one shows significantly lower Black vote for Trump than the Essence article (12% of men, 6% of women) but an even higher Latino vote (39% of men, 32% of women). Both sets of data show Trump losing support from white men slightly. (Which is consistent with pre-election polling.)
Are there some other measurements based on something else, or is it something we now can never know as a result of mail in ballots having no polling and an expected different statistical distribution?
For 2016 and 2018, Pew had validated voter datasets, based on people in their American Trends Panel who were matched against voter databases and thus known to have voted. Assuming they do the same thing (or some other reputable firm does something similar, or ideally both) for 2020, that would probably be the best data source.
At this point it seems pretty clear that Trump made big gains among Latinos compared to 2016; with other demographics the jury is still out (I think.)
What's clearer is that Trump made big gains in areas of the country with a high Latino and Hispanic population - e.g. Santa Ana county, CA, which is 77% Hispanic, saw a 13-point swing to Trump, and there are many similar datapoints from across the country. It's pretty clear Trump carried Florida on the strength of the Latino vote in that state. There's also similar evidence that Trump made big gains this year among Asians.
https://twitter.com/RyanGirdusky/status/1326190869163225090
https://sweep.thedispatch.com/p/the-sweep-dont-trust-the-exi...
So to summarise: Trump definitely made gains among Hispanics and probably made gains among Asians according to voting data; he made gains with every demographic except white men according to exit polls; the former data is more reliable than the latter.
Happiness = Reality - Expectations. Expectations were very high and the Democrats have a lot of reasons to be unhappy.
While the votes are still being counted and this may change a little bit, he underperformed the last 538 forecast by 2.7 points at current vote count (not 5 to 10 points), just on the edge of the 80% confidence interval (noted because that's what 538 publishes as its uncertainty measure). Note that in social science, the standard cited uncertainty window is the 95% confidence interval, which would be significantly wider.
Now, you might point out that the results were outside of the 95% CI of the polls, which is true, but polls don't predict voting behavior, they measure sentiment. The cited confidence interval of polls addresses only sampling error, but even if as a sentiment measure a poll has no nonsampling error, it has additional known source of error as a measure of voting behavior beyond its sampling error. Notably, polls are typically of either registered voters (which are very different population than "people who will vote") or likely voters (which are still a different population than people who actually will vote, based on some model of the pollster of who will probably vote.) The reason poll based forecasts like 538 exist is because polls, while they are useful inputs for predictions, are not themselves predictions.
On the Senate and House the results are similarly non-extreme outliers compared to the forecasts. The 80% CI for the Senate forecast ranged from 55 D to 52 R. The potential outcomes now have reduced to the range of 50/50 to 52R. The 80% CI for the House forecast was 225D to 254D. Current results are 218D with 16 seats uncalled. Its expected that deviations from the center of the predicted range on these will be correlated, and it looks like they are all hitting at or near the edge of the 80% CI.
Yes, Democrats underperformed the midpoint of the predicted range. But not by enough (and it didn't happen at all in the 2018 midterm) to think that the models are radically wrong.
I wouldn't say "the models are radically wrong" but I think it's still fair to say that last week was disappointing in several ways for the Democratic Party, even with Trump losing.
not yet
The tweet shor got fired for was literally giving data for this. Did you see the article about his firing?
The comment seems on-topic to me regardless of whether the culture war represents reality or not
To me it looks like "killing the messenger". Listeners want the most accurate data irrespective of the fact that some unknowns can be controlled for or not.
Furthermore to respond to the culture war that you brought up, I think Shor's theory fits my personal experience that some people stopped stating their political opinion in the open. So it is on topic.
That may very well be due to "HR" being a problem or those that play HR on public platforms. The explanation might be correct or wrong, it might resonate with people or not.
Your comment is just a data point here.
> Trump voters are not liars. As a Democratic pollster and campaign strategist, I feel strange typing these words. But it is required to debunk the “shy Trump voter” myth.
This was written days before the election.
My post isn’t about “Shor’s personal HR problem.” It’s about a culture that caused very smart people to misperceive the facts on the ground, and misallocate funding as a result, in the middle of a high stakes situation.
People in Silicon Valley should understand better than anyone that culture matters and bears on organizational and institutional effectiveness. Often these are pretty theoretical and abstract debates. But here is a case study that elucidates culture that works versus culture that doesn’t work.
I’m not weighing in on the larger cultural issue. As I caveated, this is context sensitive. Political polling, news, academia, and the like are areas where free discourse with respect to sensitive issues is particularly important for the effectiveness of the institution. This is less true if you’re running a food delivery business.
[1]https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2020-election-forecast/
[2]https://www.thetrafalgargroup.org/
[3]https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general... https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/latest_polls/
Trafalgar had completely different results than the rest of the consensus, and once counts are more finalized in non swing states (places like CA and NY take forever, but we don't pay attention because they are always blue), we can accurately compare the polling and real results between different pollsters and polling methodologies. Some experts have cautioned against using exit polls for this purpose (what is usually done for a quick read of polling accuracy), because exit polls are only measuring election day in person votes, and thus trend really red this year. Trafalgar had unconventional methodologies like a "shy trump voter" bias where they arbitrarily shifted their numbers to the right, with weirdly consistent results of Trump +3 in a bunch of close/blue states. Perhaps there is more complicated justification of these numbers in the background, but I'm concerned that even if their deltas end up better than the "normal" pollsters, they are generating an inferior product with overbaked data.
They tried to come up with approaches to get around the very effect the article talks about: Trump voters don't answer survey questions. The main differences in methodology were making fewer assumptions about Republican turnout, larger sample sizes, and different survey techniques.
Trafalgar clearly missed some things: traditionally republican collar counties breaking hard for Biden. (My county didn't vote for Obama either time, but voted for Biden by 12, after voting for the republican governor a couple of years ago by 38.) But 538 had some insane misses this year in critical states like Wisconsin (off by 7.7), Ohio (off by 7.3), Florida (off by 5.9), etc. Finalizing counts in NY and CA isn't going to change those numbers--and Trafalgar wasn't analyzing them anyway.
> but it's important to note that the Trafalgar polls were mostly outliers, disagreeing with the consensus in many states
Well, yeah?
The final count will change these numbers a little bit, but I think Trafalgar will have gotten closer to the final result in these key states by 2.5 points on average.
Also, who cares about 50-state results? One of the key points Trafalgar's founder has made is that polling is a state-by-state exercise. All pollsters use data to estimate e.g. turnout among different demographics. National pollsters use things like exit polls, but Trafalgar digs into state-level voter registration data.
As it's grown bigger, it's started to reflect the demographics of software/data/professional people, with a bias towards the West Coast of the US.
That's presumably what you mean by the liberal tech groupthink (note that disliking Trump does not make one a liberal, which is a mistake a lot of conservatives have made over the past four years).
Interesting. I came here a bit late.
That said, and to be perfectly clear: Civis should not have fired Shor. It was very bad. (To be fair in the other direction: the guy is a known genius in leftie political circles and my understanding is that he's done very well for himself since termination as an independent consultant.) But really it's the only good example of the "Cancel Culture" paranoia, so right wingers feel the need to trot out the argument every time his name comes up.
Here's a few more: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1282404647160942598.html
Why, because you agree with his politics? That doesn't seem like a very objective way to determine who we should or shouldn't cancel.
I think norms are better and more powerful. Be the norm you would like to see in the world.
FWIW, Shor’s theory about poll respondents is shared by Robert Cahaly at Trafalgar, but Trafalgar polls missed badly too in 2020 but in the opposite direction. So either that’s not actually the critical factor, or it’s not possible to control for this factor in any sort of reliable way. I find that far more interesting than Shor’s personal HR problems.