I used to work as a criminal defense attorney, and the job regularly required that I obtain subpoenas from the court in order to mandate a witness's appearance at court. My state courts have a template that subpoenas must follow, wherein you would include the case number, attorney name, witness name, and other basic details.
Once the template is completed, you take the original along with a certain number of copies to the court clerk for filing. All the clerks would do is make sure that the case number on the subpoena corresponds to a case that actually exists in the system, and that the names of the plaintiff(s)/defendant(s) are accurate.
The clerks never asked me any questions about my role in the case (e.g., whether I was a party to the case, an attorney, or a staff member of the law firm representing a party), nor did they ever ask me to provide any sort of identification. I just give the clerk the papers, they look at the papers, they stamp the original and copies, and then they return the copies to me (which are to be served on the witness and/or opposing counsel).
I don't think there's a ton of value someone could get out of obtaining a fake subpoena (other than perhaps issuing your own self a subpoena as an excuse to get out of work, or maybe just to screw with someone), but it was always pretty astonishing to me that anyone off the street can just dump some papers in front of a court clerk and receive a legal order mandating someone's appearance in court--no questions asked.
A subpoena can also order the production of documents (in many cases including business records about other people, such as log files). That could be pretty consequential if the private information turned over was very sensitive.
When I was working at EFF I filed some comments on an international law enforcement cooperation plan where one thing that bothered me a lot was that, if you formalize the idea that jurisdiction A has to directly enforce orders/process/formal law enforcement requests from jurisdiction B, people in jurisdiction A will have even less idea how to authenticate them, and there will be even less likelihood of a remedy in case of a deliberately fraudulent request. The domestic status quo (as you point out) is typically pretty low authentication, but at least there's a likelihood of some significant punishment for people who commit fraud on a court (judges really dislike that). Now imagine if you could do this without even being in the country where you're committing the fraud! :-(
I think, generally, a subpoena issued as a request for production of documents would likely be vetted by an attorney; however, I could see how a small business owner (for example) may be likely to accept an official-looking subpoena at face value and seek to comply out of fear without first consulting a lawyer.
That would make a great plot for George on Seinfeld.
What trial? Uh, well, it's over a case with, um, an Architect, Art Vandelay, who, um, was was contracted to, uh, redesign the Lincoln Tunnel with a system of magnets so the cars would all go through at the same speed, but, uh his idea, you see, was stolen by a Mr. Pennypacker, a wealthy industrialist.
It's really a case of the century. Um. So, I actually have to go now.
(Proceeds to go home and eat a block of cheese the size of a car battery.)
This was a regular narrative from the days of phone phreaking and toll fraud, etc.
Just speaking the correct lingo of a lineman or an operator or a toll office supervisor could allow one to navigate through all the depths of the telephone system. Not just to receive services without charge, but to actually build and teardown circuits, set up test numbers (ANACs), conference calls, etc.
It's incredible to think that a few lines of Twiml, or a Twilio function, can create something like an ANAC which was a rare, valuable, and jealously guarded secret 30 years ago ...
(Technical systems often need more stringent protections because "screw around and go to jail" isn't a threat that, say, Facebook can bring to bear).
Just ask the con artists at Prenda Law how lying to federal judges went:
In November, Hillsborough County prosecutors became suspicious when they heard from a state forensic examiner, who had been scheduled to perform a competency evaluation on Landon.
The examiner saw a notice in Landon’s court file that prosecutors had dropped charges; the examiner wanted to know if the examination should go forward.
How would it have been detected if there were no loose ends like this out there or anyone who cared enough about the case to prompt a double-check?
The loose ends aren't separable from her desired outcomes. They're integral. You can't "tie up the loose ends" while committing these acts of fraud.
"Hold on, why'd this case drop off the docket", says the DA. "I didn't file this", says the lawyer. "My ruling is due next week", says the judge.
Any one of those would be noticed and questions asked of the court clerk. And they all end in the same place.
> "Hold on, why'd this case drop off the docket", says the DA. "I didn't file this", says the lawyer. "My ruling is due next week", says the judge.
That's someone caring enough. The loose ends are entirely separable when discussing hypotheticals.
No such thing as a perfect crime detection system either.
-- Balzac
even at places that carded, they wanted to serve you, so the ID had to only provide enough plausible deniability to the bouncer or bartender to credibly claim they were duped into serving you. i'm sure some bartenders secretly got a kick out of the cat and mouse game.
One time they did check, and my friend lied and said he didn't have his ID with him. Then the delivery guy who was probably only a couple years older than us just asked to see his actual underage ID to prove he wasn't a cop and handed us the beer anyway.
The liquor enforcement folks (usually not cops, AFAIK) could easily hire someone under 21 to attempt to purchase alcohol. In fact, I'm pretty sure that in some places they do exactly this.
1. To ensure safety, there will be an adult (undercover cop) nearby. (This could be around the corner, or someplace sneaky, but usually they just pose as another customer.) They probably will maintain pretty close proximity to their underage undercover though.
2. They probably won't give you a fake ID, because it makes it harder to get any sort of definitive enforcement to stick. They aren't trying to catch people that are easily tricked by fake ID's so much as they are trying to catch people that are either knowingly selling booze to underage people or not making any attempt to verify.
So if someone presents a fake ID, even one that's sorta but not totally obvious, that's unlikely to be a sting operation.
3. I believe they typically will actually present ID when asked. Again this helps get charges to stick.
Police spokesperson Sgt. Riley Harwood said that during such sting operations, the underage decoys are not made to look older with different clothes or make-up, and they’re not taught any strategies of deception. “There are no tricks,” he said, explaining if a decoy is asked for a driver’s license or ID, they hand over a valid card that shows they’re under 21 years old. “There’s no math that needs to be done,” Harwood said of the obvious differences between underage and over-21 IDs. “People just need to do their jobs.”
If the cashier asked for his i.d., the guy would silently hand them card that said something like, "Congratulations, you did not fail the underage liquor sales test", and then leave.
After the 4th or 5th time of the same person trying the same purchase most of the employees learned who he was. I think law enforcement did eventually switch to a different decoy towards the end of my time at the job.
The "serving alcohol to minors" laws are strict liability in some states, for this reason.
I both want to play and suspect that it would go really really badly.
Especially if the "assassination" attempt involved in the game requires getting into environments you shouldn't be, getting close to someone in an unusual way, I could see this ending in tears even if the water pistol was never visible.
http://www.caralevine.com/this-is-not-a-gun-1 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53d691ede4b0326a80e05...
Whatever else you are applying to the situation is entirely in your mind and does not apply to facts of the case.
Dead men can’t speak. Stand your ground is an affirmative defense. Or in other words, when in Florida carry a big stick and don’t be afraid to use it.
Honest question, are you saying the prosecution should have ignored years of case law and argued on purely circumstantial evidence? (Because Martin’s girlfriend was a baaaaaaaad witness. Like beyond bad. Like I would have been ashamed to have her as my star witness. Why would the one person who could hear the struggle of the fight have an attitude, on the stand, towards the prosecutor fighting for her bf?!?!!)
One of them initiated the violence or the reason for justified violence, and that person (the aggressor) is in the wrong, generally speaking.
> Dead men can’t speak. Stand your ground is an affirmative defense.
Its an affirmative defense to charges of assault, yes. This is why it applies to Martin even if everything Zimmerman said is true.
> Honest question, are you saying the prosecution should have ignored years of case law and argued on purely circumstantial evidence?
No, they should have relied on the facts not in dispute, which is that Zimmerman followed a person home, that person was unknown to him and had every right to be there, and Zimmerman acted contrary to the wishes of the 911 operator when he exited the safety of his vehicle to pursue a teenager down the path. For this reason, Martin's alleged reaction to attack Zimmerman was an act of self-defense by a cornered juvenile.
> Because Martin’s girlfriend was a baaaaaaaad witness. Like beyond bad. Like I would have been ashamed to have her as my star witness. Why would the one person who could hear the struggle of the fight have an attitude, on the stand, towards the prosecutor fighting for her bf?!?!!
Yes, she was a bad witness because she lacked the signs of class and education that would have made her likely to arise sympathy in the hearts of the audience. and Martin was a bad victim because he was a young, healthy, skinny black kid.
None of that changes the part where an adult male followed a kid home and provoked an assault.
TIL that that's a thing!
https://telstarlogistics.typepad.com/telstarlogistics/2006/0...
I think the frauds that appear to be legal but do not actually involve courts are where more harm is. These are the scams asking people to pay fines or else.
There's a lot of fraud, waste,a abuse, or other chicanery in the courts and luckily in my experience they're never simply kept hidden without anyone noticing. The problem is always redressability. So much of the system requires discretionary rulings but the laws that dictate how we handle misconduct is heavily skewed in favor of the state if they ar a party and fails to take into account the urgency in resolving these cases that very often it becomes obvious that there's fraud, yes, but there's no redressability, and therefore there's no real punishment.
A particularly egregious case of falsifying evidence and using prtextual reasons to elicit false testimony and racially-based jury selections is the US v. Flowers case in the Supreme Court last term. There's a podcast on it, but the decision itself is... excoriating to say the least as to how far and how egregious the conduct was to try to execute an innocent man. It's discovered all right, but there's no punishment. So courts can and do definitely figure out fraud pretty readily, but when it comes to doing anything about it, victims not on the side of the state frequently find it cold comfort.
At least in the State of WA, I think prosecutors have qualified immunity and can be sued or charged for Brady violations.
I think one of the biggest 'frauds' is the churn in the lower courts. It often seems like judges, clerks, public defenders, and prosecutors are pretending they are doing something helpful or important while the repeat defendants think of the whole situation as a joke.
I get a kick out of seeing judges sternly reprimanding attorneys or defendants for being 10 minutes late to the start of a cattle call hearing while they must know the entire enterprise is meaningless kabuki theater.
The two cases mentioned above: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1635&context=lawfaculty
It sounds to me like they are using security-by-obscurity, as well as easily forgeable proofs such as "signatures" or drivers licenses (they're only as secure as your ability to spot a forgery). Hence why anyone who is knowledgable and determined enough, can easily crack the system.
If you want to prevent such problems, you could either go really old-school. Require the person filing documents to show up in person, and be personally identified and recognized by someone in-house. Or go really new-school and only accept biometrics or digital paperwork that has been filed using a secure account accessible only by that person.
Using an in-between approach, like a signed paperwork that has been given to you by someone you don't recognize, is the worst possible solution.
Not actually counting all the bolts after replacing the window on the plane; not checking in with the supervisor before administering that drug; not double checking that the name on the ID matches the name on the passenger list...
And signing something off with someone else’s supervisor code goes well beyond cutting corners on a process, though - that’s falsifying records. At that point you’re subverting the process.
Sure, some approval processes are BS, but... generally, any time you’re in a role where you need a supervisor to sign off on stuff, you do not know enough about what matters to your business to tell the difference between BS and critical safety or security guarantees.
I suppose put it this way. Imagine a software developer slipped in smaller code changes and circumvented procedures like QA or code review because they though it was "just some minor thing" Would you find that OK?
We all know there are bad or stupid rules out there. But honesty's not a rule, it's more of a moral principle. Gray areas for sure, but when dishonesty becomes a habit, or makes one lose trust, or actually breaks a rule meant to prevent an issue, it's a problem.
.
> I am not always honest,
I work with regulated professionals. Honesty is a big deal. Dishonesty is seen as a fundamental personal flaw. Healthcare professionals who've been dishonest struggle to show remediation.
It's really weird to me that I need to explain that forging someone else's name on documents is a bad idea.
Which also goes for the situation we're discussing. I've never heard of an attack like this and I doubt it is frequently attempted or succeeds.
I apparently was involved with some project on github, got flooded with emails with read me changes.
It never ocured to me how available such things are.
There was a story in WSJ like last week about how the Japanese red stamp / seal still survives and is a barrier to them adopting new technology for practical every day speeding up of tasks. And keeps things like faxes around unnecessarily.
Yet sometimes, these old checks are there to prevent maybe the worst case of bugs getting into the system. Maybe?