You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.
Every airplane is slightly different in its risks. Sort of like every car is also slightly different.
The MAX has been so thoroughly gone over, it's likely the safest airliner in the sky.
That's quite a jump of logic.
One potential case I could see is the price of MAX flights drop low enough so that price conscious consumers decide the risk is now warranted. But that hasn't happened yet. Thus, no reason to take the unnecessary risk at this time. Future factors may change this equation.
That depends. If you take a bus to go to the airport and it takes you an hour to get there, then your flight also lasts an hour (for simplicity's sake), you are almost 3 times more likely(on average) to die during the flight than you are during the bus ride [0]. In terms of number of journeys by plane and bus, for the same number of journeys you are 27 times more likely to die in a plane accident.
People repeat the "plane is the safest way to travel" mantra, but it's only true in terms of nr. of km traveled.
|Journeys | Hours | KM
Bus| 4.3 | 11.1 | 0.4
Air| 117 | 30.8 | 0.05
That's really interesting. Per KM, air is way safer than bus, but per journey it's roughly the same degree in the other direction.I'm having a hard time saying which one is safer from that data. However, both are very, very safe.
I would like to see "Air" replaced by "737 Max" though.
Don't tell me that when people tout the safety of air transport they're using deaths per billions of km rather than per (billions of) journeys. Journeys is the important metric, surely!
All that being said, it sounds like one can "control the level of risk" by taking a bus instead of driving/Uber/Lyft/taxi to the airport, but choosing to do the latter is an example of "taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to [which] is not a wise choice". And yet it is a completely reasonable thing to do.
You could account for the additional time it takes to go on a bus to adjust for the longer duration of risk, but at that point it seems like you're just approximating for risk per km.
If you tell me I can fly to Mars in a few days on a brachistochrone torchship and it's safer per mile than any other mode of transport, you may be right, and a few days cooped up in a cramped cabin might be a small price to pay for such an exotic vacation destination, but that risk calculus is really very misleading. The distance involved is so vast that per mile it could be an absurdly low figure by any terrestrial standard while still carrying an absurdly high (by the same standards) risk of death during the trip.
In other words, if the odds are e.g. 1 in 10 that the trip will kill me, I don't give a shit how low the risk per mile is.
The time comparison is "I live in Washington, DC and want to go... to wherever it is that happens to be an hour away from me by whatever mode of transport I happen to be using (so, either New York or someplace outside of Baltimore) and I want to know which is safer"... but I can't for the life of me fathom why the second is a tradeoff anyone would actually be forced to consider. People generally travel with the objective of getting from some specific place to some other specific place.
In practice, no mode of transportation anywhere near as risky per time or per trip as my Mars example is ever going to become mainstream. The point of it is to demonstrate how absurd risk per distance is as a way of getting at a practical and meaningful assessment of travel risk, and we have to go outside of existing mainstream transportation options to see that absurdity because all the existing options must be extremely low risk by any measure or they wouldn't exist. The majority of consumers won't tolerate 1 in 10, 1 in 100, or even 1 in 1000 odds of death per trip.
Sometimes you need to be in a specific city - say, a work trip, or public event, or life event etc. Then, the question you want to ask is "which vehicle will take me there in the safest manner", and plane will likely win (assuming large distance).
Other times, you are deciding on a vacation destination. Here you often have a more-or-less fixed time budget, but a flexible destination, and the question can become "what is the safest trip I can take that will last between, say, 5-10h?" ( I could get to NY by plane, or to Vienna by train, or to the Golden Sands by car in roughly that time). In this case, trains and other mass transports besides planes may well win out in safety.
In the 17th century, I would walk to my local knife sharpener. In the 21st century, I can take a train to Soho to visit a superior specialist.
Both trips take a few hours via two different modes of transport. The fact that one covers more distance is immaterial. They are comparable by the fact they can both be completed in an afternoon.
(Ironically, our modern era provides a third option: cycle to the local specialist. Cycling with a bag full of knives — even blunt ones — is way too risky.)
The average distance to mars is about 225 million km, so that would be one accident about every 2,2 billion km or 0.45 deaths per km, which is a bit deadlier than buses and 9 times as deadly as planes. Gives some perspective on how save planes actually are.
Every new world-shrinking transportation innovation has changed the distribution of things in the world and increased the distance society expects us to travel on various kinds of "required" trips. That's because time and money are more important than distance in deciding whether a trip is worth it.
The correct comparison isn't "airplane vs. bus" it's "A320 instead of 737 MAX vs. bus instead of car".
Again, it depends on what you're trying to measure. If you're trying to quantify the risk of dying by accident at a certain hour, what activity you are doing in that hour is highly relevant.
If you are trying to quantify the risk of dying by accident while going from A to B, then it's not (that) relevant.
and this is an irrelevant measure, because by that logic, most people sleep for about 8hrs a day, so the chance they die in their sleep is high!?
You measure risk _only_ against what it rewards you. Otherwise, why take the risk at all? Therefore, measuring the risk of air-travel has to be accompanied by a comparison to bus-travel (or rail and/or boat), and measurement should be by distance travelled.
Do you also think it's wrong if someone wants to eat a healthy dinner after having an unhealthy breakfast and lunch?
The parent also wasn't arguing they always make wise choices, just that the grandparent's choice was unwise, which you haven't proved to be false.
That is why nobody is fat in fotos from the 1960's, but most people are obese in fotos today.
Coincidentally, this affects air crew. The standard airman is supposed to weigh 170 pounds (next time you're at the airport, note how thin the pilots in uniform look.) If you weigh much more, you will be examined further before medical license issuance, including clinical sleep apnea testing.
In addition, some pilots have faced medical review (ie. grounding) after drinking large caffeinated drinks (2L Coke or Mountain Dew, or a Slurpee) that caused cardiac events (erratic heartbeat, etc.) The FAA requires an explanation when a pilot stands down from a flight, so this is a serious matter - it's hard to prove why you were sick yesterday but ready to fly today.
So you can basically lose your career over a Red Bull if it makes you cancel a flight.
Source: commercially-rated airplane pilot.
Wow, that's over 6000 kcals per week, or nearly half of the required energy intake for a person of average height and healthy weight.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/328893/per-capita-consum...
For example, you might have the choice between driving to work (1 in 1M chance of death) or take a bus (1 in 10M chance of death).
If you can save 1hr on your commute, then choosing the higher risk option makes sense.
Same thing if you need to take a flight and the option is fly on a 737 Max for an hour (no the flights available) or take a 5 hr train ride.
Even if you are an aeronautical engineer, you won't convince me that you can assess these risks, because teams of aeronautical engineers designed this plane and did it overall very safely like they did the planes that came before it, and I'd have no reason to believe your claims. None of them assessed this level of risk as risky, they were willing to fly in it, and the only thing that seems absurd is you thinking you know better.
There are flaws of varying severity in every large scale human endeavor, kinks get worked out, this one is stochastically late in the game.
In terms of controlling this risk, that is exactly what "we" are doing, that's what this article is about, removing an identified risk from this plane's design. There is no reason to think that the plane now has bad juu-juu, that's superstition.
Air travel is incredibly safe, this plane is too.
That feels really really naive and an unfair judgement to make. I don't need to be an aeronautical engineer to know about other market force at play, and a repeated lack of ownership of the issue by Boeing: incentive for Boeing to not go out of business, airlines to get a return on the airlines they bought, etc. They reek of dishonesty on this matter.
As a traveler I would absolutely bucket that airplane model into the "Something is fundamentally wrong" and distrust.
Note that the problems aren't specific to the 737 MAX either; I know commercial / cargo pilots who were worried by the 787 design process and would have been terrified to fly the plane in its first several years. They believe it was simply good luck that the 787 didn't experience any bigger issue than battery problems. Likewise, many pilots are worried that the 777X could have potential safety problems and want to avoid flying it.
346 people and their relatives, which crashed, burned and died in two of those brand new planes within 6 month and their relatives probably beg to differ.
The history of this plane and the facts that came out after those accidents do not sound like a "very safe" design process.
Read Dominic Gates' reporting (for which he got a Pulitzer) to inform yourself about some of the nastier aspects of the design of this plane.
understatement...
With the airline industry going through an unprecedented recession I don't think we will see a lot of new 737s being delivered thankfully.
Also, it was 2 crashes in 500,000 flights. It seems a little misleading to just compare it to hull losses.
It had almost unlimited pitch authority, used only one (potentially faulty) AOA indicator to decide to activate, and could activate repeatedly unless purposefully deactivated. Even the way in which it was certified was extremely suspect. I'm curious as to how you think that is "properly functioning". Its initial implementation was straight up dangerous, as should be plainly obvious by the 346 deaths it caused. (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...)
In the cases of the Ethiopian crash, they _were_ aware of the "proper" procedure to deactivate the MCAS:
> But on the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the pilots appear to have recognized the errant MCAS problem and flipped the cutoff switches as described in the checklist. But then it appears that the pilots were unable to move the manual wheel, likely because the forces on the tail made it physically challenging to turn.
> The bottom of Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist seems to acknowledge the possibility of this physically challenging scenario. It suggests that the pilots can first use the electric trim to neutralize those potential forces before hitting the cutout switches.
> After failing to manually control the stabilizer, the Ethiopian Airlines pilots appear to have flipped the cutoff switches back on, which awakened the MCAS system. It soon sent the plane diving to Earth.
(https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein...)
They let their airspeed get too high, so they were unable to manually trim because of the physical forces involved. But making this mistake during this phase of flight this is somewhat understandable, as they encountered the problem just one minute after takeoff (which is a pretty critical / task heavy phase of flight) and were still very close to the ground. Chelsea Sullenberger (the guy who ditched into the Hudson) commented that "Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews would have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems." (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-20/fight-for...)
> Also, it was 2 crashes in 500,000 flights. It seems a little misleading to just compare it to hull losses.
If we're talking about the relative safety of different aircraft, no it's not. Compared to, say, the Airbus A320neo (which has had 0 hull losses over ~1300 aircraft over 10 years), it's terrible. It's a far less safe plane.
About the 737 MAX: I calculated a while ago that it is, or rather was, about two orders of magnitude less safe than other airliners. Terrible indeed.
1. use the electric trim switches to drive the trim to normal
2. cut off the trim system with the console cutoff switches.
That's it. As simple as that. And it is NOT what the EA pilots did (they cut off the trim first).
Here are the exact directions:
"Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim can be used before and after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to CUTOUT."
https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...
Why they didn't read, remember, or follow the EAD instructions is anybody's guess, as I've never heard of any investigation into that aspect.
After all the changes, it's at the end, and uses the weaseling "may be needed" and "can be used". We saw that not doing very specific sequence in a few seconds makes the plane non steerable.
Edit: Answering: "The LA pilots worked the problem for 5 minutes, the EA 2 minutes. Quite a bit more than seconds." They "worked the problem" during that time by actively attempting to prevent the plane to crash. It's surely not that they simply had that much time to think about what to do next. Also, during most of that time of "minutes", if I remember correctly, the plane was most of the time actively turning to the ground, overriding their attempts to force it flying in the safe direction and doing that repeatedly. I really don't see that for these two accidents it can be said that it was "a pilot error" and I don't see any institution claiming that publicly anymore, even if some would really, really like to be able to do that and would immediately do, if it were possible. "Two simple steps"? Well "may be needed" and "can be used" is surely not even "after X happens do P and then do Q, if not exactly done in that sequence and at that point, the plane will surely crash." Nobody had the training to fight against the program that every time they straightened the plane up turned it back to the ground, making the manual trim impossible to be applied.
Frankly, I'm baffled by the EA pilots. If I was a MAX pilot, and I received an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE about how to not crash like LA pilots, it's my job to read, understand, and remember those instructions. And not just my job, it'd save my own life, too. It's not like it's complicated, either. Two simple steps.
After all, what would you do?
But yeah, it was the pilots not reading a message.
Looking back, MCAS was not a good idea. But whatever led up to MCAS might have given the 737 MAX also some other bad changes. At the moment we don't know, maybe in future it'll be "obviously aside from MCAS the 737 MAX should also have a fix for X".
It was that the message (see the whole, the link was quoted) definitely wasn't clear. It has multiple weasel words and it is far from a clear and actionable sequence checklist for the exact condition in which two planes were put due to the MCAS. Only with the hindsight of knowing how two accidents developed and the independent pilots trying to reconstruct on the simulators these events it can be claimed that that formulation described something usable. Just with the pilots "reading it" at that time and even having it in front of them at the moment of the accident, without any special training for that situation (where the plane multiple times "undoes" the actions of the pilot, orienting the plane toward ground as the plane is still flying low) it's still improbable that the accident wouldn't happen.
Note: It's Boeing who insisted that the training for MCAS is not needed.
> It's Boeing who insisted that the training for MCAS is not needed.
It's not completely unreasonable to expect the pilots to be able to handle runaway trim, especially given an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE reiterating how to do it. Runaway trim is a critical problem, which is why the electric trim switches are there as well as the cutoff switches, all in easy reach. Dealing with this is supposed to be a "memory item", meaning something the pilots must know.
But clearly in hindsight, dealing with runaway trim must be specifically and better trained for.
> special training
The thing about runaway trim is it turns on when it's not supposed to. That's why the electric trim overrides are there and the cutoff switches. Those are there for all Boeing jets since electric trim was installed going back to at least 1960 and probably much earlier.
When I worked on the stabilizer trim system on the 757, I worked mostly on the gearbox, but was peripherally involved with the electrical system for it. The cutoff switches were there for "when demons possess the control system and try to drive you into the ground."
For the second crash it wasn't about "hit the switch" at any moment you will when you notice the problem. It was: "unless you are lucky to hit the switch in a very special moment, you won't be able to regain the control of the plane at all." Not in the message, not trained, and even some pilots learned that only later in the reconstruction of the crash on the simulator.
There is nothing confusing about that. There is no "very special moment". There is no "you won't be able to regain control at all".
The proof of what I say is in the first LA incident (the one that didn't crash). The pilots trimmed back to normal a couple times with the electric trim switches, then hit the cutoff switches, and landed safely without incident.
In the second LA incident, they trimmed back to normal 25 times, never thought to cut off the trim system, and crashed on the 26th time.
I don't see that wording anywhere in EAD. Only the quoted weasel worded sentence. It's your interpretation post-crashes and their analysis that they were supposed to do exactly that in exactly that order. Or do you have some other quote? The mental model the pilots were trained to was "if the electric doesn't work, switch it off, trim manually." The MCAS changed that to: 1) electric will work, but MCAS "invisible ghost" will pause to confuse you that the controls work and only then undo whatever you managed to do. 2) There's only one position in which turning off the switch was safe, under their circumstances -- switching to manual trim outside of the "normal" was a practical death sentence, also nowhere written.
So, as far as I see, not only your "clear" sequence was nowhere written that clear, the mental model that the pilots had to have changed completely, but without training, and the safe procedure to escape was figured out only after looking at the logs of two crashes.
That it is "clear" to somebody sitting in the armchair with the crash logs and having all the time in the world to think about it after all that happened doesn't mean that those who survived had such clearness, just that they had luck.
P.S. your version of what the words mean is solely your invention. I've shown this text to many people, and none have come close to your creative version. This includes pilots.
You're entirely correct.
> Blaming pilots is way too simplistic.
Also correct, but in my opinion the pilots were one of the multiple causes of the accidents, based on the published accounts of their actions. Ignoring Emergency Airworthiness Directives is inexcusable. Ignoring EADs is a problem that should be dealt with as part of the corrective actions required by the FAA.
Recall that immediately prior to the LA crash, the previous flight crew on the same airplane had the same problem, dealt with it, and landed safely. (That was also before the EAD was issued.)
Let me put it another way - would you want to get on an airplane with a crew that didn't pay attention to Emergency Airworthiness Directives? I wouldn't.
And yes, Boeing must fix the MCAS system. I'm not excusing Boeing's role in the accidents.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5P8CkVckmA
These are some links to youtube sims of the two events. It seems that the Lion Air pilot at least who of course did not know about the top secret MCAS system was trying to fight MCAS directly with electric trim and at first was successful but for some reason did not hit the cutout switches after getting back to level flight. So the Lion Air pilot used electric trim correctly but failed to use the cutoff switches and the Ethiopian pilot used the cutoff switches correctly but failed to use the electric trim long enough. Maybe the Ethiopian pilots were aware of the Lion Air flight fighting MCAS with electric trim and losing and just went directly to the runaway trim stab procedure too soon. For whatever reason both flights were also going too fast and made no attempt to slow airspeed.
The LA flight prior to the LA crash flight did restore trim with the electric switches and then cut it off, and landed safely.
That article I think summarizes the state of the pilot error arguments back when people were still discussing this online. Two methods of disabling an out of control MCAS were mentioned but only one would actually work with a faulty AoA sensor: lowering the flaps. I wonder why Boeing did not mention just lowering the flaps to disable MCAS in an emergency situation. Could that also have saved the flights?
This is actually the first I've heard anyone mention the simple method of using the electric trim to fight MCAS until reaching a neutral trim and only then hitting CUTOFF, but would this still work if you were already at max trim and heading nose down toward the water? This method seems to depend on the electric trim being fast enough to fight MCAS to a neutral or near neutral trim even from a maxed trim stab position. Is it fast enough to do that?
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-procedu...
>“It appears the flight crew reactivated electric trim,” former Boeing engineer Peter Lemme said. “But they only made a very small nose up adjustment - I would have expected them to immediately and without stopping move the stabilizer back into trim. The last MCAS command comes 5 seconds after their last manual trim command.”
This does appear very strange to me. Why let go of the electric trim before getting to neutral or even a bit nose up? Did they think the trim could only be used in small increments or something? Were they so focused on the mystery of what was causing the trim adjustments that they didn't think to just jam down the electric trim switch until trim neutralized?
https://projects.seattletimes.com/2019/boeing-737-max-12-pro...
Here is another good article that summarizes what happened. Seems to me that there are essentially 3 ways the flights could have been saved although I'm less sure about your method of just electric trimming to neutral and then hitting CUTOFF because the electric trim adjustment would have to be fast enough to overcome the MCAS counter-adjustments. Surely electric trim would not have been designed for such a race.
And also that seems like such an obvious thing to do even if you haven't read the airworthiness directive you cite. Something is messing with the trim. There is a button that adjusts trim ffs. Why not try to just hold it down? Even a child might think of that simple solution. But these pilots didn't? Some of them were even experienced.
The other two methods are lowering the flaps which seems to have worked well for them even if it was by accident or slowing down the plane and then hitting the CUTOFF switches and hoping you can spin the trim wheels fast enough. Probably the Ethiopian pilots were unaware of the airworthiness directive and reverted back to the standard runaway trim procedure without realizing their high speed would make the wheels more or less impossible to turn. I am not a pilot so I am not clear on how easy it is to slow down a plane that is already in the nose down position. Gravity is a harsh mistress.
Yes, and it did indeed work. The pilots, though, did not cut off the stab trim.
> This method seems to depend on the electric trim being fast enough to fight MCAS to a neutral or near neutral trim even from a maxed trim stab position. Is it fast enough to do that?
Yes, and it doesn't "fight" MCAS. It overrides it electrically in hardware (not software).
> I'm less sure about your method of just electric trimming to neutral and then hitting CUTOFF because the electric trim adjustment would have to be fast enough to overcome the MCAS counter-adjustments. Surely electric trim would not have been designed for such a race.
I'm sure about it. The electric trim moves just as fast as the MCAS would, because the trim is electrically ON or OFF. There's no speed control on it. It's not a race, either. The electric trim switches are between the MCAS and the motors, they override it.
Furthermore, in the LA flight before the LA crash flight, the same problem happened. The pilots restored trim and hit the cutoff switches, and landed safely. The mystery to me was why that airplane was allowed to take off again before being repaired.
> And also that seems like such an obvious thing to do even if you haven't read the airworthiness directive you cite. Something is messing with the trim. There is a button that adjusts trim ffs. Why not try to just hold it down? Even a child might think of that simple solution. But these pilots didn't? Some of them were even experienced.
Exactly, and that's what the pilots did in the first non-crashing incident.
> Probably the Ethiopian pilots were unaware of the airworthiness directive
Yup, and that was a contributing factor to the crash.
There are a lot of factors this analysis doesn’t take into account, particularly the difference in airframe fault rate over time: A new plane will have different reliability figures than a 4000-year old one.