Then he goes on to describe an engagement where the MiG didn't :-)
Found it on YouTube. Yay!! Now I don't have to watch my poorly-recorded-from-broadcast-TV VHS version.
Too bad he went the corruption route later in life:
To get extra range, the P-51s had a large fuel tank installed just behind the pilot (where the passenger seat goes if you've ever gotten a ride). Unfortunately, full of fuel caused a large imbalance in the airplane, making it nearly unmaneuverable. Naturally, the pilots would burn that tank off first.
The Germans never realized this - if they did, an attack on the P-51 squadrons soon after they took off would have caught them helpless.
Source: my dad was a P-51 pilot
> Bomber escort defenses were initially layered, using the shorter-range P-38s and P-47s to escort the bombers during the initial stages of the raid before handing over to the P-51s when they were forced to turn for home.
So it sounds like even if the Germans knew it wouldn't have mattered much, and even then these planes were taking off from Britain for the most part.
Even then, a lot more than just this piece of intelligence would need to happen for the Luftwaffe to engage airplanes shortly after takeoff across the English channel.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_P-51_Mustang#P-...
The Luftwaffe could have taken out a squadron of P-51s with just a handful of fighters. This would have required the AAC to then launch a bunch of fighters to protect the long range fighters until the tank was burned off, significantly hampering their power.
The P-51 was basically unable to turn with the center of gravity so far back.
Tail heavy aircraft turn faster than nose-heavy aircraft. With the centre of aerodynamic pressure in front of the centre of mass the wings contribute extra turning force whenever the aircraft isn't facing exactly into the airstream.
If the centre of mass is too far behind the centre of pressure the aircraft becomes unstable - continuously trying to snap around and fly backwards.
I would have joined the Air Force too, but with my thick glasses the AF told me no way I would be a pilot. So I wound up as a compiler nerd instead :-)
Edit: oh I found something to answer my own question: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-m...
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/meaning-of-have-in-c...
That in itself is a crucial piece of historical context. The MiGs of the day were better than contemporary American fighters such as the F-86. They operated at altitudes the Americans couldn’t reach and shot downwards. One reason America was in Vietnam in the first place was a genuine fear that the Soviet system was actually better! It was the Sidewinder missile that really turned things around.
Vietnam was a crucible where a lot of entrenched thinking had to be burned away, unfortunately those lessons were taught in the context of that awful conflict.
Trivia: the Soviets eventually recovered an intact downed Sabre and shipped it to Russia for evaluation. They copied from it, including the Sabre's gun-sight that later fitted out the MIGs in Vietnam.
Did the F86 ever serve in the Vietnam war?
The F100 was the first jet that could fly supersonic in level flight. It was known as the widowmaker, as it was basically a subsonic aircraft that could go supersonic, with pre-supersonic cockpit and controls. The workload on the pilots was intense, and many pilots died in flight school.
Since it was basically obsolete, it was used as ground attack aircraft, with fighter support provided by F105s.
Source: family member flew F100s in Vietnam
No. The National Guard had them through the 1960s but jet fighter technology was moving so fast at the time that they were not in front line service by the time the US had any involvement in Vietnam.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explosive_Ordnance_Disposal_Ba...
The Vietnamese pilots were using Soviet tactics, mainly Ground Control vectors.
Most Vietnamese pilots were rookies, but they did have some aces who would dogfight, like Colonel Toon, who was shot down by Randy Cunningham:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duke_Cunningham
But largely the tactics were to surprise the Americans with first MiG-17's, then have a MiG-21 at high speed do an ambush pass from the clouds through lower-flying Americans.
The Vietnamese could have done a lot more damage had they known how worthless the US air-air missiles were at the time. There were all kinds of problems with taking too long to arm (around 4 seconds) and vibration from takeoffs and landings inerting the missiles. And that no gun thing.
Additionally, US pilots were expected to have up to a dozen radio channels active, causing pilot workload problems until they turned off like 11 of them.
The Sparrow had its own challenges from what I've read. Specifically issues with the acquisition radar being able to track a fast moving target and the missiles ability to receive the reflected signal and apply the right amount of correction. Got to remember that the time when these missiles were being developed it was to target slow moving bombers - not tight turning bandits.
https://www.amazon.com/Sidewinder-Creative-Missile-Developme...
The rest ... were a liability for years.
US pilots also had the bizarre order to visually identify targets before shooting (which then meant waiting 4 seconds for the missile to arm before actually firing it.)
Amongst other things, visibility in the tropics is often not 4 seconds worth, and the enemy can use clouds to get real close.
0. https://combatace.com/forums/topic/91818-the-f-4-phantom-and...
And yes, had nothing to do with guns. Guns are and have been obsolete on fighter aircraft for decades.
In terms of defence gaining an edge over defense; I don't really think so. Offence is always cheaper. Think nukes.
They would not form deep columns to punch through, only one nation used solid squares in that age and that was the Prussian army. The French would form battalion columns which are pairs of companys deployed individually in lines after each other. Most of the brittish vs column memes are from ambushes where naturally the ambushed part had not time to deploy to line.
http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/inf... " The Prussians formed their battalions (4 companies each) rather in closed columns than hollow squares. Their regulations issued in 1812 (Exercir Reglement fur die Infanterie) eliminated the hollow square in favour of a dense column formed from the Angriffscolonne."
The french moved to contact in maneuver columns, Just Like Everybody Else Did As Well. The fact that you don't hear the brittish doing it is because they very seldom advanced at all in any battle. This is what we still do, we march manourver battalions in columns on roads and deploy mechanized forced out to a line once we are close to the enemy.
" - however, if the enemy kept his cool and opened fire only at close range, the officers instead of tightening the column, they deployed it into line and opened fire. As soon as the enemy began wavering under the fire they charged with bayonets. In 1805 at Austerlitz, French columns advanced with great coolness and at slow pace. The Russian infantry fired at long range but the French continued their march until they were 100 paces away from the enemy. They halted and opened fire, then "formed in several lines" and rapidly moved forward. The enemy fled. Captain Bonnet described similar infantry attack at Borodino; after few minutes the Russian skirmishers arrived in good order a little to the left "... and a dense column to our right. I deploy my battalion and, without firing, march straight at the column. It recoils. When carrying out this movement we were so exposed to grapeshot from the guns in the village that I saw my battalion falling and being breached like a crenellated wall. But still we went on.""
And by the way the nation which most frequently deployed "spread out" troops are, wait for it, the French!
"Several companies or even battalions could be employed as skirmishers (tirailleurs en grande bande). The tiralleurs en grande bande acted in large numbers, stormed or defended a position, or turned the flank of the enemy. The large skirmish formations were usually supported by columns and artillery. At Friedland General Oudinot had deployed 2 full battalions as skirmishers into the Sortlack Wood. In 1814 at La Rothiere four French battalions were formed in skirmish order by La Giberie to anticipate any attack which might develop in the rear of the wood. The French on occasion deployed even entire divisions [!] in skirmish formations. (Nafziger - "Imperial Bayonets" 1996 p 111) In 1806 at Jena, the French 16th Light Infantry advanced left in front towards the woods: its third battalion advanced en tirailleurs (in skirmish order) towards the wood, the first and second battalion, marching still in column, went past the right of the woods and deployed into line in the plain at musket range from the Prussian battery."
"The British well-drilled regulars were humiliated by American farmers, militia and Indians fighting in lose order. The american experience made a profound impact and resulted in tactical and organizational changes in the British army. But still the quality of the British skirmishers (except the 60th and 95th Regiment) was below their French counterparts. French General Foy wrote: "Several regiments of the line, such as the [British] 43rd, the 51st, the 52nd etc., are called light infantry regiments. These corps, as well as the light companies of the battalions, have nothing light about them but the name; for they are armed and with some slight change in the decorations, clothed like the rest of the infantry. It was considered that the English soldier did not possess sufficient intelligence and address to combine with the regular duty of the line the service of inspiration of the sharpshooter."
A Royal Scots officer wrote after Waterloo, that the French skirmishers were better trained, and on the whole much more effective in this type of fighting than the British skirmishers. (Barbero - "The Battle" p 255)
Moyle Sherer of the 34th Foot wrote on the British skirmishers: "Not a soul….was in the village, but a wood a few hundred yards to its left, and the ravines above it, were filled with French light infantry. I, with my company, was soon engaged in smart skirmishing among the ravines, and lost about 11 men, killed and wounded, out of thirty-eight. The English do not skirmish so well as the Germans or the French; and it is really hard work to make them preserve their proper extended order, cover themselves, and not throw away their fire; and in the performance of this duty, an officer is, I think, far more exposed that in line fighting." (Rory Muir- "Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon")"
Also being in formation helps stop people from running. If all your guys are spread out in the woods, more than a few might take that chance to 'disappear' from the battle if not from the entire military. It is a lot harder to do that in a tight formation and you would easily get called out, or even potentially shot in the back, for deserting.
"In September 1952, I was made an instructor pilot in the F-86 and, in early November, I was made a flight commander and an engineering test pilot. It was also in November that we had one of our most frustrating experiences while I was at Kimpo. One day we were called into a hush hush briefing and told that the State Department had cleared us for a one time crossing of the Yalu River—and, as I remember, the only restriction placed on us was that we could not attack any aircraft on the ground, and that may have been because most of those people were not proficient in air-to-ground operations, I don’t know. Anyway, we anticipated some real aerial combat for a change since we would be able to catch the Migs with no place to run to—it sounded like the mission of a lifetime!! Imagine our disappointment, then, at going up to the Yalu River and not finding a single Mig anywhere—we went right on across the river into China and circled the big airfield complex at Antung and, looking down, there wasn’t a single aircraft anywhere on any of those three airfields! Apparently, the State Department had given the Chinese the same information they had given us and all the aircraft had been moved north to Mukden, Manchuria.
Well, as luck would have it, from our position at 40,000’, I spotted a single aircraft, on final approach to one of the Antung airfields, about a mile and a half from the end of the runway, one of the 10% that never gets the word, I guess. I really felt frustrated about the entire situation and was desperate to get a shot at one of those guys in their own back yard—I called the bogie out to #3 and said I was going after him. Number 3 called back and bet me a milk shake (to be repaid in the States) that I’d never reach him before he touched down, and then, of course, he was home free. I rolled over into a split-s maneuver, left full power on and was shortly exceeding Mach 1 (the speed of sound)—I completed one 360 degree diving turn and came out the bottom of that dive at about 1300 feet. I was really moving, and I just had time to rapidly reverse the bank, acquire the Mig in the gunsight and squeeze off a quick burst—he was about six feet in the air over the end of the runway at that time and that burst of gunfire caught him squarely in the center of the fuselage, lighting it up like a Christmas tree. I just saw his aircraft slam into the ground and go careening off the runway and then I shot past him and had to direct my attention elsewhere. I whistled past the control tower and under a bunch of electric wires, and all the time I could hear automatic weapons firing so I must have been very close to them. An aircraft going directly away from enemy guns is an easy shot so I stayed on the deck (close to the ground) for a couple of miles and then made a steep climb out. Maybe getting that guy was a dumb thing to do but it sure was satisfying!"
https://www.amazon.com/Clashes-Combat-North-Vietnam-1965-197...
Are drone swarms a thing yet? a sky filled with drones would be terrifying. I would hope modern jets deploy drone like missiles manned by ground crew for dogfights,but if I learned anything about F22 and F35, they spend trillions to basically let middle parties steal the money and the tech is something designed decades ago.
If I was china I would pop out hundreds of thousands of cheap drones to augment radar capabilities all the stealth tech would be useless if the adversary has millions of eyes at different altitudes each capabale of visual/infrared/lidar detection of fast moving objects. US intel seems spread thin, I wonder if they do enough spying to know what their enemies are capable of. Chinese R&D has been catching up fast these last few years.
ed.: and yes, the F-22 and F-35 are 5th generation and decade-old tech. There is unfortunately a lot of lead time on fighter development. I think the F-15 was relatively speedy at 9 years from selection to roll-out (1967 - 76).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grumman_F-14_Tomcat#VFX
It's interesting how things changed from that generation to the next.
The introduction of sophisticated computers seems to be part of the issue.
The F14's electronics, BTW, were pretty primitive. This episode of the Fighter Pilot Podcast F14 is amazing. The ways people had to keep the systems going were dramatic. In the 1990s the back seater in the F14 would sometimes carry their own tools to fix things in the plane.
https://www.fighterpilotpodcast.com/episodes/042-f-14-tomcat...
Sophisticated technology was always part of the issue no matter how far back in time you go. What changed is the mentality. 50 years ago you had to deliver because the enemy was at your door. Today companies realized that they can make far more money by just dragging it out for decades through the magic of a cost-plus contract and subcontracting. The kind of arrangement that keeps entire subcontracting companies going forever even if they only tread water and never deliver anything.
If anything, sophisticated computers and software just made it easier to drag your feet because unlike building the actual plane, coding is not that capital intensive. You just need your coders constantly writing code and picking up a paycheck while shipping eternal pre-alpha builds.
Imagine being given an order to kill a terrorist, but you notice the place he is at is actually a wedding. A fighter pilot has final authority on the strike, he can make decisions about collateral damage. Beyond that, if a fighter pilot engaged an enemy aircraft he coule be starting a war,you can't make the same quality of observation about the enemy pilots,their intent and threat.
Humans make different decisions if they are detached from the scene. I agree the piloting and targeting should be mostly automated away but final decison should be done by someone at the scene risking their own lives
If you compare say the Battle of River Plate (1939) vs. say the North Atlantic convoy run or the siege of malta (1942), there's a dramatic difference in how war was conducted and the types of weapon systems that were most effective. River Plate was almost gentlemanly: while commerce-raiding, the Graf Spee would first hail the merchantmen she was taking prisoner, identify them as belligerents, give them the opportunity to surrender, and then take crews on board before sinking them. When she was engaged and damaged, the ship took refuge in Montevideo, released the prisoners, and then there was elaborate diplomatic maneuvering to avoid violating Uruguayan neutrality. The ship was scuttled without further loss of life - other than Captain Langsdorff, who committed suicide. Several of his British adversaries attended the funeral.
By 1942, nobody cared about any of that. The most effective weapons were submarines and aircraft, and they shot to kill on sight.
We're at peace right now, despite a state of perpetual war that mostly exists for propaganda and business purposes. If it ever came to an existential conflict, human judgment would likely become a liability. Humans generally don't want to kill; in a state of total warfare that hesitation could be lethal.
Not hesitating when you should could mean escalation of conflict. Even if you win the battle,it can cost you the war. Look at vietnam, the US lost domestic support because of lack of political support at home. You need the people who are pulling the triggers to know what victory means and it is not as simple as efficiently killing everyone.
The only time taking humans out of decision making makes sense is if you want indiscriminant killing,political support would not waiver at the sight if most civilians being slaughtered , you are fine with inspiring waves of terrorists that will attack your civilians and every other country will remain allied to you and continue to engage in commerce with you despite your genocidal ambitions.
Even in world war 2, civilians were mostly not targeted and prisoners were taken on both sides.
War is not about killing, war is means to acheive a political end by force. A machine that kills without knowledge of the (political) end game in mind will slaughter the enemy and cost you victory. Killing axis soldiers was not the goal of the allies,liberating occupied regions and removal of the fascist regimes was the goal, a goal that can easily be acheived by bombing every populated area of europe with minimal foot soldier involvement.
None of the pilots died.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_a...
Both planes returned to the US.
We've used beyond line of sight weapon systems on massive scale for at least 40 years, and weapons like the Tomahawk and JSOW have taken things completely out of the realm where such an argument can be taken seriously.
The decisions you talk about are probably valid doing close air support in something like a helicopter where the aircraft actually operates at an altitude where the pilot can actually distinguish targets on the ground.
There's a whole vast world of aviation delivered ordnance that has nothing to do with that world.
To your last point, I think we've reduced the civilian death toll greatly by use of precision weapons. Compare what we do now to what was done in WWII or even Vietnam to an extent.
Basically all the current generation RPS tech (like Reaper) stops working once you're dealing with someone with jamming capability. No one is happy with algorithms pulling the trigger yet for air to ground, but air to air I can see happening quickly.
The paradigm we're moving out of was one where you'd get high-quality sensor data from a specialized patrol or AWACS plane like an E-3, which would send information to ground, which would relay it to the fighters. Now, platforms like the F-35 often have better sensors than patrol planes do; and despite still having a person inside, are better at evading missiles than big patrol planes are. So it's more like the fighters take on the role of the patrol planes; the human inside decides what to do, probably assimilating information from other fighters; and sends the drones out to do acrobatics. And there's no need to run that information through a ground station first.
The difference with the drone wingman (wingbot?) is that the controller is in the air and close by, and she can point a powerful X-band radar at the drones to use as an un-jammable comms link (high power, better geometry). If the manned aircraft were also to merge then they could be jammed because the geometry would be wrong, but for short periods the wingbot tactics are mainly dominated by physics (energy, shot flyout and engagement envelopes).
That said, there are countless stories about US pilots locking up a bandit who has a RWR system that scares them into turning around (they'd see/hear that they were receiving high PRF - being locked on). That happened a lot more in the 70s and after as US air to air radar got better (look down shoot down radar didn't exist until the 70s too).
They weren't necessarily scared. Such maneuvers are stock counters to potential radar-guided missiles. (1) Missile ranges depend on closing speed. You can launch against something coming towards you sooner than something heading away. By turning around, or just sideways, the mig can instantly get outside of missile range. (2) Doppler radar measures relative velocity. Turning around/sideways reduces relative velocity. That can break a radar lock. If you can hear the American jet coming via the RWR, turning sideways may allow you to disappear from radar and draw your enemy closer. It would be wrong to assume that such maneuvers are done out of fear.
So Top Gun comes out, and my mom points out he had graduated Fighter Weapons School - my uncle is a real Top Gun!
So I asked him for tales of dogfights, war stories. He had exactly one: “they’d send us out to fight some MiGs, and as soon as we got in range and turned our radar on to start shooting, they’d turn and run.”
So not like the movies?
“Nope.”